Framing and Counterframing of the Middle East Peace Process in the Arab -Israeli Press: a Comparative Analysis of  Assafir  and  The Jerusalem Post . by El-koussa, Houda Hanna
Louisiana State University
LSU Digital Commons
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses Graduate School
2001
Framing and Counterframing of the Middle East
Peace Process in the Arab -Israeli Press: a
Comparative Analysis of "Assafir" and "The
Jerusalem Post".
Houda Hanna El-koussa
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
gradetd@lsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
El-koussa, Houda Hanna, "Framing and Counterframing of the Middle East Peace Process in the Arab -Israeli Press: a Comparative
Analysis of "Assafir" and "The Jerusalem Post"." (2001). LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses. 401.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/401
INFORMATION TO USERS
This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films 
the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and 
dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of 
computer printer.
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the 
copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations 
and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper 
alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized 
copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by 
sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing 
from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced 
xerographicaliy in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white 
photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing 
in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.
ProQuest Information and Learning 
300 North Zeeb Road. Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 USA 
800-521-0600
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
FRAMING AND COUNTERFRAMING OF THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE 
PROCESS IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI PRESS 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ASSAFIR AND THE JERUSALEM POST
A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the 
Louisiana State University and 
Agricultural and Mechanical College 
In partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy
in
The Department of Speech Communication
by
Houda Hanna El-Koussa 
B.A., University o f Balamand, 1992 
M.S., Boston University, 1995 
December 2001
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
UMI Number: 3042617
UMI’
UMI Microform 3042617 
Copyright 2002 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. 
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest Information and Learning Company 
300 North Zeeb Road 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
"It isn't enough to talk about peace. 
And it isn't enough to believe in it. 
One must work for it.”
Eleanor Roosevelt
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ABSTRACT
The Arabs and Israelis have been negotiating peace for the past ten years; 
however, the conflict sill ignites with no apparent hope for any near resolution. 
Understanding the rhetorical construction of the peace reality may help in managing this 
conflict. This study examines the symbolic construction of the peace process in the Arab 
and Israeli press. It comparatively studies how the Arab and Israeli press, through 
language choice, define peace, elucidate its implications, and judge actors and actions 
involved in the peace process.
This study identifies the metaphors used and the dominant rival frames 
constructed in two conflicting newspapers, Assafir (Lebanese newspaper) and The 
Jerusalem Post (Israeli newspaper) in their coverage of the peace process in 1993 and 
1996. Then the study contrasts the different perspectives of the two papers in order to 
specify the point of conflict and check if any basis o f “shared values” exists across the 
perspectives that might be useful as a basis for negotiations. The analysis is based on the 
media framing and agenda setting theories as well as Johnson and Lakoffs metaphorical 
analysis paradigm.
This study reveals the power of metaphors, images, and symbols in the discourse 
of peace. This discourse is surrounded with language of violence, victimhood and 
accusations; a discourse that casts pessimism on any chance for cooperation and peaceful 
resolutions. Similar terms repeat themselves but are treated differently. The image of 
victimhood is present in both papers but attached to two different parties. In their 
characterization of actors, both papers follow the same strategy with similar agenda
V
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setting geared toward two different groups. Both papers discipline their readers with 
opposite doxas.
The study concludes that both papers are involved in a rhetoric of stasis. Both 
seem to cooperate in producing a deadlock. This dissertation reveals that rival 
perspectives can be collaborative as well as competitive. Both can cooperate to spread an 
atmosphere of ambiguity, passivity and pessimism. Finally, the use o f framing 
contributed less to the understanding of the dilemma than the patterns of imagery. Future 
studies should look at how imagery opens options and creates new ways of considering 
solutions.
vi
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
The Arab-Israeli conflict has entered its fifth decade and despite the peace negotiation 
that has been going on for more than ten years, the conflict remains unresolved. Although it is 
the leaders o f both parties who are directly involved in the peace negotiation, it is also 
important to study the role o f the Arab-Israeli media in the peace process for these provide the 
lenses through which political acts are seen and judged.
Most of the research involving the Arab-Israeli conflict has dealt with the historical 
and political aspect of the conflict. Few scholars examined the rhetorical dimension o f the 
struggle. For example, how the Arab-Israeli press framed the peace process remains an 
untouched issue that needs to be pursued if we want to come to a better understanding of 
the conflict. The discourse o f the Arab and Israeli press regarding the peace negotiations is 
of vital importance. Examining this discourse may help us understand the role o f the press 
in shaping the perception of the Arab and Israeli public opinion regarding peace talks.
The importance of this issue is rooted in a particular communication problem. The 
problem is as follows: Although the Arab and Israeli media speak of “peace,” each has its own 
definition of the situation. Each defines a different reality while using a similar vocabulary. 
The same events and language are used to construct widely different accounts of the process 
and to praise and blame different heroes. The papers to be examined do more than tell their 
readers what to think about, they supply interpretation and judgment Thus, this study will 
examine the media's symbolic construction o f the peace process. In addition it will entertain a 
secondary question: To what extent is the response of the press on both sides affected by 
changes in the political identity o f the Israeli government?
I
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The objective of this study is to qualitatively examine the rhetorical frames and 
dynamics used by the Arab and Israeli press when covering the peace process. There are four 
specific questions this study answers:
1. How did the Israeli Press frame the Middle East peace process?
2. How did the Arab Press frame the Middle East peace process?
3. At what time, if at all, did these frames converge to present a unified contextual 
whole?
4. At what times did these frames diverge to perhaps augment the conflict?
5. What are the rhetorical components of divergence and convergence?
In other words, the broad objective of this study is to comparatively examine how both 
the Arab and Israeli press, through language choice, define the peace process, explicate its 
implications, form moral judgments, and recommend remedies. The study may help us 
understand the heuristic and pragmatic value o f Arab and Israeli press framing of the peace. 
The convergence/divergence of the framing between the rival parties may shed new light on 
the role that the media can play in conflict resolution.
This study advances the understanding of the Arab-Israeli conflict by uncovering 
the language patterns and perspectives used by both press parties and how such metaphors, 
images, and perspectives either undermine or bolster the peace process. A knowledge of the 
rhetorical construction o f this public reality may help in the management of conflict in 
other sites of struggle and negotiation.
Significance of the Method o f Study
This study differs from earlier media studies in that it takes a close look at the text in order 
to build up a metaphoric mosaic from which a perspective can be identified. First, this 
study will identify the metaphors used in rival newspapers covering similar events or
2
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issues. Next, it will determine dominant patterns of metaphors within each story and across 
stories. Third, it will examine how metaphoric clusters build up a moral perspective within 
each context (editorial versus news item). Fourth, it will contrast each paper’s dominant 
perspective with its counterpart. Fifth, it will draw conclusions based upon the data in the 
light of events, commentary, and suggested correctives.
Studies that focus on the relationship between framing and metaphorical analysis 
are few. Those related to the rhetoric of Arab-Israeli conflict are almost rare. By focusing 
on a highly charged and apparently polarized situation, this study aims at uncovering the 
importance of metaphors as a master cue, which the audience can use to understand events, 
and then participate in the making o f the extended text. In particular, by examining the 
metaphors and language use in the rival press coverage of the Middle East peace process, 
one can develop a better comprehension of how newspapers assist in constructing the social 
reality of the peace process for a significant audience.
Moreover, through metaphorical analysis o f the discourse about peace, one may 
uncover the various meanings given to peace in oppositional discourses. My initial 
supposition is that the Arab and Israeli press invest the same words with different, perhaps 
even opposite meanings. These verbal patterns reflect and help sustain the political 
perspectives of their readers while leaving basic assumptions unchallenged. Third parties 
often assume consensual (trans-national) meanings o f words and foil to understand the 
depth of national division. Thus this study tries, through a metaphorical analysis of 
rhetorical framing, to provide insight into the social and political struggles that take place 
around the issues o f Middle East peace process. It may provide insights that alert us to 
unexpected shadings o f meanings and codes that mask apparent differences. On the other 
hand, it may alert us to oppositional terms that remain as historical residues or to
3
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conventional images based on temporary political advantage rather than responsible long­
term policies.
Further, the author believes that these “patterns” may support perspectives that 
reflect habit as much as authorial choice. The idea of analyzing the way in which such 
perspectives are built up may make writers more alert to their use of unconscious social 
myths, conventional ideas and time-honored shibboleths. In this way, the study would 
function as a corrective to our media practice. Newspaper writers, however reluctant they 
are to admit it, are rhetoricians. To make events coherent, significant, and useful they must 
write from a consistent perspective, they must adopt an attitudinai voice, and a persona that 
includes aspects of mentor and guide as well as reporter. Perspectives have consequences 
and thus political reporters must be aware that they may be mobilizing opinion rather than 
merely informing their public.
Research Methodology
The press facilitates public perception by providing a context that makes events 
coherent and meaningful. The heart o f this study is an examination of the rival frames 
constructed by The Jerusalem Post (Israeli press) and Assafir (Lebanese Press) in reporting 
the Middle East peace process. Specifically, I identify the dominant perspectives used by 
each newspaper in its discussion of the peace process. One purpose is to contrast the 
different perspectives o f the two papers in order to determine the points of conflict. 
Another purpose is to discover if any basis for “shared values” exists across the 
perspectives that might be useful as a basis for negotiation. In doing so, I want to do more 
than identify “missed opportunities.” Shared beliefs could provide the tropes for a future 
leadership of peace and cooperation. Accordingly, I have selected the news stories, 
opinions and editorials from 1993, when the Labor party was presiding over the
4
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government, and 1996, when Likud was leading the government. In order to perform the 
comparative analysis, the following steps are followed:
1. I will examine the general mood o f the news articles and editorials. Do they 
reflect a positive/optimistic or negative/pessimistic mood with regard to the 
peace process? I will mainly focus on the headline and the lead.
2. I will look at key words, metaphors, images, concepts, and symbols associated 
with “peace” that are used in the news stories. In this case, I specifically 
examine the clusters and agons related to “peace” (my hypothesis here is that 
the cluster in one newspaper is an agon in the rival press.) Through such 
examination I uncover the value(s) given to peace in each paper and how peace 
is transformed into other concepts.
3. After examining the pattern o f imagery, I will identify the rival narratives, that 
is, I will look at the plot lines (extended actions) and the characterization of the 
actors. For example characters may be portrayed as victims or oppressors and 
events may be presented as survival stories.
4. Based on my survey of image, plot, character and discourse, I will attempt to 
identify the unique frames used by each newspaper in its coverage of the peace 
process.
5. Next I will examine how framing affects the peace process by showing how the 
selection of a particular frame affects the characterization of peace (i.e., how 
framing affects which events and persons are emphasized and how they are 
presented and evaluated).
Framing will be seen as far more than disposition and arrangement. It is a 
perspective act with immense consequences for human understanding. Ideas and beliefs
5
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simply do not fall from the sky or rise up from the ground. They are a product of human 
interaction. The settling of Israel may have encouraged one type o f national identity rather 
than another. The point is that beliefs about that identity had to be spoken, interpreted, and 
reified in order to exist. This dissertation may provide a snapshot of how beliefs about 
peace in two countries were explained and promoted over time by their most significant 
media. It may also reveal how conflicting beliefs were blended into adaptive functional 
mega-narratives about the peace process in general. Finally, the dissertation might suggest 
the presence of “shared values” across the narratives that could provide the basis for a 
rhetoric of peace in the future.
The above steps are the means to discover the nature of the rival strategic symbolic 
representations of reality that each newspaper tends to reflect.
Method of Selecting Press Articles
Assafir and The Jerusalem Post were selected because they have a high percentage 
of readership among their constituents. Both papers are considered to be somewhere in the 
center between liberalism and conservatism. Thus, unlike press on either of the extremes, 
Assafir and The Jerusalem Post serve better the purpose of this study: to find any base for 
“shared values” among both press. In addition, The Jerusalem Post could easily be accessed 
through the Internet while Assafir had all its archives on CDs. Thus it was easier to have 
access to the articles of both press. It is worth noting that Assafir is published in Arabic and 
the author translated the article into English. The Jerusalem Post is published in English.
The articles were selected as follows: All articles including the keywords “peace” 
and peace process” were downloaded. Then the author read every single article and 
selected the articles that centered on the peace process. The final number of articles 
analyzed in both papers were 200 articles
6
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The rest of this work consists of six chapters. Chapter Two provides the historical 
background to the Middle East peace process. Chapter Three provides an overview of agenda 
-setting and framing theory. Chapter Four provides an overview o f metaphors and discourse 
analysis. Chapter Five is the analysis of Assafir’s coverage of the peace process. Chapter Six 
is the analysis o f The Jerusalem Post’s coverage of the peace process. The dissertation 
concludes with Chapter Seven, which is composed of the findings of the analysis process, 
their significance, and their implications for future studies.
7
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER TWO
A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
In order to understand the language games used by the Arab and Israeli press 
regarding the peace process, it is important to narrate briefly the historical background of 
such language games. Since the Likud and Labor party regimes are the two crucial periods 
on which the current study focuses, the background will be centered on the history and 
ideology of Likud and Labor in terms o f their relationship with the Arabs. It is important to 
note that the Israeli-Arab conflict has always been strongly affected by the nature of the 
Israeli party that is in office. During the past thirty years, the time during which Labor and 
Likud witnessed their birth as the two major political parties in Israel, Arab regimes and 
foreign policies have remained relatively stable.
Introduction
On November 2,1917, Balfour Declaration was issued. The Declaration stated that 
the Jewish people have the right to establish a homeland in Palestine because of the 
“historical connection of the Jewish people to Palestine”1. When Belfour Declaration 
called for the establishment of the State of Israel in Palestine, Jews started forming their 
political parties each with a vision of an “ideal” State of Israel These parties range from 
the extreme right to the extreme left. Although they share an ultimate common goal 
establishing a strong Jewish state, they differed in their beliefs and ideologies.
Israel is geographically oriental but socially and culturally western. The main 
concern and interest of Israel is the Jews in the world who are free to immigrate to Israel 
anytime they want.2 As Israel celebrated its 53rd anniversary this year, the State has 
witnessed many changes in its political system. Politics in Israel is dominated by a multi­
party system. Ever since its establishment, the State has witnessed the rise and fall o f many
8
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
parties that range from extreme right to extreme left. These parties changed policies along 
the way depending on the demands o f the time. Despite the relatively large number of 
parties that are still functioning in Israel, Likud and Labor remain the major parties that 
compete to win over the government and the Knesset. The policies of these parties change 
over time and so does their rhetoric.
Debate in Israel is strongly influenced by ideological divisions. There have been 
two major schools of thought in Israel. The first school, identifiable with the right wing, 
can be called “territorial” school The main concern of this school is that Israel should try 
to “maximize its control over as much territories as possible of the historical Land of 
Israel.”3 This emphasis on territoriality emerges from the belief that the control o f more 
historical territories implies a more Jewish and Zionist country. Thus one will be more of a 
Zionist if he claims that Judea and Samaria are parts of the Jewish State. Since the Land of 
Israel is that o f Eretz Israel the government of Menachem Begin had no ideological 
problems of giving up Sinai to Egypt, while settlements in the West Bank was an 
important Jewish claim o f the territory of the Land of Israel From this perspective, the 
Likud refused any compromise over these 'sacred' territories. According to Likud, “Israel 
would continue to maintain territorial control of the area; Israel would be responsible for 
security; public land will be under Israel jurisdiction; natural resources will be controlled 
by Israel; and Israel will have the exclusive right to decide about where and when to put 
new Jewish settlements.”4 This vision sees Israel as a country with a frontier, a “Wild 
West” to be settled.
The second school of thought, identifiable with the left wing, can be called 
'sccio logical' school This school agrees that Judea and Samaria have a historical link to 
Israel However, the most important consideration for this school is internal structure of
9
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Israel Unlike right wing, this school believes that more territories mean less Jewishness 
because Israel would encompass more Palestinians and Arabs. Therefore, if Israel 
maintains control over the West Bank and Gaza, that means giving the non-Jewish 
population civil and political rights. That would change Israel from a Zionist State to a bi­
national one. Hence the Labor would go for territorial compromise over the West Bank and 
Gaza after assurances of security for Israel.
Another ideological difference between right wing and left wing is related to the use 
of force as a means to realize the Zionist dream. The left considered the use of force as a last 
resort To the right, the use of force was always a “legitimate expression of sovereignty and 
independence.”5 Zionism underlies the wish to found an independent Jewish state in 
Palestine. Modem Zionism was developed by Theodore Hertzl who “called for the creation of 
a Jewish state that would absorb European Jewry and thus end the anti-Semitism that still 
prevailed even in Western Europe and proved that assimilation was impossible.”6. The right 
wing and the left wing share Zionism as a goal but differ in the means to an end.
The Period of 1918-1939
There were four major issues during the founding period on which the policies o f 
the parties were based. The first issue was related to economic equality, social justice, and 
the distribution of production between private and public organization. The second issue 
was related to security in terms o f defending Israel's existence and maintaining territories. 
The third issue was foreign policy; and the fourth issue was related to the “status of the 
Jewish religion in state and society.”7 The relative importance of these issues to the parties 
varied according to electoral competition, the parties' internal structures and their outside 
responsibilities.
10
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These issues have remained the basis of every party's policy since the establishment 
of the State till the present time. With the establishment of the State, right wing and left 
wing parties emerged. Each had a specific ideology and a set of policies to guide the 
political, social and economic development of Israel. The parties faced many difficulties 
that resulted “from the structure of Israel's society, and its definition as a nation.”8 These 
difficulties were the result o f unresolved problems regarding many matters: the State's 
territorial boundaries; the ideological differences; Israel's occupation of territories; the 
need for political stability; social gaps among classes; the rift between Arab population and 
Jewish majority. All these elements contributed to the complexity o f Israel's socio-political 
status.9
The labor parties were the first parties to be organized in the Jewish State. These 
parties competed against one another. In the 1920s, the General Zionists, a right wing 
party, the Revisionist Party, a radical right wing party, and the Religious-Labor party were 
founded.10 Along with the Labor movement, these parties formed three major blocs in the 
Knesset: the left bloc, the right bloc, and the religious bloc. In the twenties, the Jews began 
to purchase more lands in Palestine followed by mass immigration of Jews to the 
“Promised Land.” This inflamed Arab sentiment against the Jews in Palestine.11 Mapai 
which later merged into the Labor party as it is known today, was the dominant party from 
mid-1930s till its defeat in 1977.12 The major goal o f the Mapai party was to pursue 
international recognition of the 1949 borders of State o f Israel Although Mapai was 
reluctant to accept the Peel partition plan* in 1937, it found that there were two advantages
* The plan called for the partition of Palestine into two separate independent States, one Arab and the other 
Jewish. Accordingly, the Jewish state was awarded 20% of Palestine, while the Arab were given the 
remaining part of the area. Great Britain was to remain a mandatory power to watch over the zone that 
included the holy places. This plan was seen as the resolution to the conflict and fighting between the Arabs 
and Israel.
11
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to the partition: “sovereignty for the Jews and a way to keep the Arab population of a 
Jewish state within manageable proportions.”13
During the founding period, Mapai's governmental responsibilities affected its 
policies. As the party in power, it had to shoulder a set of fixed tasks. Mapai's priorities 
revolved around security in terms of Israel's relation with its Arab neighbors; economic 
development related to what instruments should be used to improve the economy; the 
legitimate place of Israel in the international arena. Once these issues were settled, Mapai's 
top priority went to the gathering of the exiles because, after all, this was the main reason 
that the state was founded. In addition to this, Mapai believed that in addition to their 
policy o f defense, they should also have a policy of peace that would guarantee the support 
o f the international community. In economic matters, Mapai supported private and public 
enterprises. As the ruling party, it typically emphasized class cooperation and social and 
political compromise as the means to achieve prosperity. As far as religion was concerned, 
Mapai supported the population's religious needs “as long as there was no coercion of 
either religious or non-religious sections of society.”14
Mapai received the greatest number o f votes to the Knesset. According to Isaac, 
along with other left bloc parties, Mapai believed in Labor's secular vision of a Jewish state 
that would be an ideal state.15 They also advocated Israel's mission to become “socially 
'redeemed' society, in which the perfect social arrangements would be worked out and 
from which the message would go forth that the ideal society could be achieved on 
earth.”16
The Period of 1939-1949
This period o f time witnessed the birth of more parties both in the left bloc and in 
the right bloc. Although the left wing parties adopted an approach o f political appeasement
12
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and justice and asserted that military force is an immoral and cannot be used to impose 
peace, they still disagreed on when to use military action. Mapam was a supporter of this 
rationale. It believed that the political system in Israel ought to promote social justice. 
However, Mapam considered that “just wars” such as wars for self-defense are 
justifiable.17 Mapam major policy had always called for “moderation in affairs of national 
security, emphasis on the need for Israeli diplomatic initiatives, and actual willingness to 
recognize the rights of the Palestinians for political self-determination as a basis of the 
creation of political justice and the achievement o f peace.”18
Mapai, on the other hand, adopted a “strategy of defense with tactics of offense.”19 
It always justified military actions for the purpose of assuring the existence of Israel and 
saving Israel's security. Mapai supported the initiation of periodic war aimed at forestalling 
anticipated and committed terrorist strikes that threatened the existence of Israel20
In 1947, the United Nations passed a resolution that called for the partition of 
Palestine, into two states, one Jewish and one Arab .2l During this time, Arabs threatened 
to prevent the establishment of the Jewish State through violence, bloodshed and 
disorder.22
In 1948, the “Arab Liberation army” began entering Palestine to dominate the roads 
and prevent the communication between the two states. Most Palestinians did not join the 
Army and favored the partition since they feared that the Arabs had their own design for 
Palestine’s future.23 In the same year, right after national independence, the Herat 
movement, led by Menachem Begin, was formed as a mixture of former terrorists, 
dissatisfied new immigrants, professionals, businessmen and supporters of the old
13
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Revisionist1*. Herut was an extreme right wing party that attacked the State control over the 
economy. They insisted on carrying preventive war against the Arabs as the only guarantee 
of Israel's survival. By 1949, although Herut lacked an organizational network, it was the 
third largest party in Israel. Ever since its establishment, Herut tried to present itself as “a 
party trying to transform itself from a dissident movement into a legitimate anti-labor, anti- 
government opposition party.”24 Regarding foreign policy, Herut emphasized a nationalist, 
expansionist, and militant stand.
The Herut party adopted an approach of powerpolitik and coercion. According to 
this approach, initiation o f preventive war is justified whenever circumstances reveal an 
opportunity to destroy the capabilities of the enemy. Proponents of this strategy saw that 
initiating war was a useful way of solving “problems of strategic-political and strategic- 
military nature, including the problem of dealing with acts o f terror.”23 The public 
perceived Herut as the voice of military activism. Its major goal was to criticize the 
government's weaknesses and its futile effort to negotiate peace with Israel's neighbors.
Herut's leader, Menachem Begin, was the major player in shaping the direction of 
the right wing bloc. He was almost always in an offensive position, attacking and 
criticizing the government policy. From the very beginning, Begin rejected the idea of 
partitioning. He believed that Israel could not prosper unless it was completely freed from 
invading armies. He accused the Ben-Gurion government for failing to reclaim all the Land 
of Israel that included the slopes of Lebanon and the approaches to the Nile. Begin always 
viewed Mapai as the appeaser of Arabs. When Ben-Gurion accepted America's request for 
withdrawal from Gaza in 1949, Begin considered that an act o f betrayal.26
b Vladimir Jabotinsky the founded old Revisionist in 1925. The Revisionist's concern was to create a Jewish
state, a concern that surpassed all other considerations. The Revisionists called for the unity of Palestine.
14
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The Period of 1949-1967
The 1949 armistice ended the War of Independence, but did not bring any peace 
between Arabs and Israelis. It was a lost opportunity. Consequently, the 1950s was 
characterized by two fears: a continuing danger of renewed war and “terrorists raids from 
across Israel's borders.”27 These two threats were always at the top of the agenda of the 
parties from both the left bloc and the right bloc. Their presence affected the stance of the 
parties on various domestic and foreign issues and became particularly salient during 
election campaigns.
In 1956, Mapai, led by Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion saw that the blockade 
imposed by Egypt on Israel navigation, the attacks by Egyptian terrorist gangs, and the 
rearmament of the Egyptians endangered Israeli's existence. Thus, as a part of their 
realpolitik strategy, Ben-Gurion initiated a war against Egypt in which Israel annexed Sinai 
Peninsula.28 Mapam opposed the Sinai Campaign (October 30-November 5,1956). In 
1957, Israel withdrew from Sinai.
While Mapai was occupied with internal problems and governmental 
responsibilities, Herut was reshaping its policies preparing for the upcoming elections. The 
1959 elections embodied Herut's position on foreign policy. Herut's political agenda then 
emphasized three major points. First, the right of the Jews to the entire historical state of 
Israel; second, the realization of this right makes the peace treaty possible; and third, Israel 
reserves the foil right to self-defense. In addition, Herut's position on internal issues 
focused on the same goals of the party policy on which it was founded.29
While Israel was dealing with various internal social and political changes, the 
Palestinians were developing an agenda that would threaten the security of Israel in the 
years to come. In 1964, the Palestinian Liberation Organization was founded and, along
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with other Palestinian organizations, started to press for war against Israel The PLO had 
its bases first in Jordan. Then after Black September, it began to establish bases in 
Lebanon.
In 1965, Herut retained its position as the second largest party in Israel. The party 
was no longer satisfied with its constitutional opposition role. It wanted a role in governing 
the country. Thus it demanded a share in the Labor coalition party. In the same year, a new 
party, the Liberal Party, joined Herut to form Gahal Bloc. With the formation of Gahal the 
right bloc began to make strategic modifications in their ideologies. Their 1965 and 1969 
platform had reference neither to the “historic boundaries to Israel” nor to any distinction 
between “peace treaty” and “peace conditions”. In fact, the platforms called for constant 
effort to achieve peace with Arabs.30 In other words, the right bloc, which had once 
demanded a unified sole Jewish state of Israel without any compromise with the Arabs, 
now softened its attitude and saw peace with the Arabs as an important task. A formerly 
“taboo” subject had become a political objective.
The Period of 1967-1977
This decade witnessed many changes in the politics of Israel; it saw the birth of two 
major parties, Labor and Likud. These parties have been locked in a power struggle since 
their conception. The period between 1963 and 1973 witnessed the third decade of Mapai's 
dominance. Eshkol was the Prime Minister between 1963 and 1968. In 1967 with the 
efforts o f Menachem Begin a National Unity Government was formed with Eshkol as its 
Prime Minister. However, in 1970, Herut withdrew from the government after the latter 
decided to consider a settlement with the Arabs. The unity government played a major role 
in legitimizing Begin as a respectable leader.
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In 1967, Mapai realized that the naval blockade imposed on it posed a threat to 
Israel's existence. Based on its realpolitik strategy, Mapai initiated the Six-Day War on 
Syria, Egypt and Jordan after diplomatic efforts M ed. The war began when Israel attacked 
Egypt, occupied the west Bank, Gaza Strip, Sinai, and the Golan Heights. The UN passed 
Resolution 242 calling for the withdrawal o f Israel from territories occupied in 1967.31 
Mapam declared that Israel should abstain from initiating the attack in the Six-Day War.32 
Ever since the Six-Day War, Mapam emphasized on the Palestinian right to self- 
determination and strongly supported coexistence between Palestinians and Israelis.33
After their victory, Mapai leaders had confidence in the power of Israel's army to 
defeat the Arab army. However, between 1970-1973, the party came to believe that their 
dependence on the U.S. for political, economic, and military seriously limited the 
preemptive strike as a policy option.34 Consequently, in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Israel's 
leaders decided not to initiate preemptive strikes on Syria and Egypt although they saw 
real signs o f danger. Ever since, Labor Party modified Israel's national security doctrine 
based on Israel's best interest and on the timing.
Following the 1967 war, Herut (later known as Gahal, 1965-1973), headed by 
Menachem Begin, concluded that Israel's victory and occupation of territories was enough 
to safeguard its existence. Thus the party changed its political conception regarding the 
nation of the “Land o f Israel” They abandoned their political goal regarding the inclusion 
of the East Bank o f Jordan under Israeli sovereignty. Rather, Herut/Gahal's practical goal 
was to win national support and participate in the National Unity (1969-1970). To achieve 
this goal they had to modify their definition of “Land of Israel” to mean only the area 
between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River.33
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After 1967, Israel abstained “from defining its final borders.”36 However, the 
controversy over the border did not abate and revolved around two issues, ideology and 
security. The Israeli had emotional and historical reasons for the annexation of East 
Jerusalem in 1967. This was considered as a “symbol of the revival o f the Jewish people 
within their homeland.”37 Moreover, they also regarded the 'liberation' o f the West Bank as 
a messianic event. Later, the 1973 war crystallized the ideological dispute over border 
issues. The territorial issue was no longer merely a matter of security but one of “historic 
right.” This led many religious activists to call for settlements in the occupied territories.38
The Labor party was formed in 1968. It included Mapai, Achdut Haavoda and Rafi. 
Mapam joined the Party to form the Labor Alignment. The leaders of this party were 
considered the pioneers in building the State o f Israel. They represented the Zionist values 
of egalitarianism, voluntarism and chalutziut (Zionist pioneering). The Labor’s ideology 
encompasses universalistic democratic ideology, egalitarianism, land settlement, and 
pioneering.39 The Labor party gained newcomers' support because it encouraged the influx 
of immigration and it offered many services to the new settlers. Labor stayed in power for 
29 years because it was able to meet the challenges o f the time: defense against the Arab 
hostility, absorption of immigrants and the need for economic growth. Labor was 
successful in integrating survivors o f the Holocaust from Europe with those immigrants 
coming from North Africa and the Middle East.40
In 1968, Go Ida Meir became the Prime Minister after Eshkol's death. Her 
administration was not a Golden Age for the Labor party. It was during her time that the 
Yom Kippur war took place. In 1973, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel Although Israel won 
the war militarily, the nation became dependent on the United States and suffered 
substantial economic and human losses. The Arabs lost militarily but won diplomatically.41
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Go Ida Meir resigned soon after, leaving behind a country weakened by war, politically 
isolated, with a high inflation rate and a party trying to overcome the shock of a pyrrhic 
victory.42 In 1974, Yitzhak Rabin became the Prime Minister and Shimon Peres the 
defense minister.0 Rabin insisted that the West Bank remain an integral part of Eretz Israel. 
On the other hand, Yigal Allon, a member o f Achdut Haavoda was more lenient toward 
substantial Israeli withdrawals in return for peace.43 The heyday of the Labor movement 
came to an end in 1977.
In 1977, it was obvious that the Labor Party's dominance was threatened by 
growing opposition. There were many reasons that led to the growth of the opposition in 
Israel and to the victory of Likud in the elections. Among these was economic growth, 
demographic changes, and increasingly unequal distribution of income between ethnic 
groups.444 Golda Meir and Israel Galilee left the party and were no longer active leaders. 
Their departure affected the election turn out in 1977. Despite the fight over leadership, 
ideological differences among the various factions of the Labor party dissipated especially 
after Rabin became the first non-Mapai prime minister in 1973.45
In the 1977 elections, Likud's agenda focused on economic issues including 
inflation, corruption, taxes, and deteriorating living standards. Peace with Arabs came sixth 
on their agenda. They called for settlements in all the Land of Israel with the proviso that 
Arabs in Eretz Israel be welcomed to gain citizenship and receive equal rights if they
c In 1969, Mapam joined Labor party to form the Labor Alignment. When Mapam joined the labor party to 
form Labor Alignment, it worked with certain dovish leaders to ease their positions on peace and territories.
In the meantime, Peres was the leader of Rafi and was considered too hawkish.
d The influx of Jewish immigration from different ports of the world to Israel led to a change m 
demographics. The Ashkenazis were no longer the elite majority. The Sephardis became a potential ethnic 
group that played a major role in changing the politics of the nation. They were no longer the working class 
who had to submit to the orders of the Ashkenazi. They had more opportunities to improve their educational 
and economic status and viewed Likud as a better Party to lead the country than Labor
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showed their loyalty to Israel46 In this year, Likud negated its pledge to annex the West 
Bank.47
The Period of 1977-1992
When Begin claimed to control not only the West Bank but also the East Bank, and 
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Western governments disputed Begin's claims. They 
were afraid that Begin's hard-line ideology would leave no chance for peace negotiations in 
the Middle East.48 The British and Americans reacted negatively to Begin's victory because 
o f his violent history. He was the commander of the Irgun Zva'i Leumi that was 
responsible for blowing up the King David Hotel the Deir Yassin massacre and the 
hanging of the British Army sergeants.49
In 1977, the image of Begin as a terrorist and demagogue blinded the people from 
understanding the Likud's real position on various issues.50 However, at the end of that 
year, Begin surprised the West with his autonomy plan that called for the abolition of 
military presence in the Territories and for “Palestinian elections to an Administrative 
Council.”51 The responsibility o f the Council encompassed education, religious affairs, 
health, housing, finance, the administration of justice, and supervision of local police force, 
security and public order, while water and land rights remained the responsibility of 
Israel52 The Palestinians could choose between Israeli and Jordanian citizenship.
Begin also surprised the West in 1979 by signing the Camp David Accord. This 
treaty declared the return o f Sinai Peninsula to Egypt since the latter agreed to stop its 
terrorist attacks on Israel and have normal relations with Israel. Part of the Camp David 
Accord was Likud's recognition of some collective rights for the Palestinians.53 This act 
suggested that Begin now possessed a less extreme personality. Begin had shifted from 
Jabotinsky's ideology regarding the territorial issue. Although Israel regarded the territories
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as a strategic tool, Israelis welcomed Camp David Accord because they never considered 
Sinai as part of Eretz Israel By contrast, Israeli leaders in both Likud and Labor initially 
considered the 1981 annexation of Golan Height a security strategy and only over the years 
developed an ideological commitment.54
However, not all the Israelis were happy with the Accord. Immediately after the 
peace treaty in 1979, a new party emerged. Former members of Likud who were on the 
extreme right created Tehiya in 1979. In response to the Camp David Accord, the party 
believed that the agreement was harmful to Israel's interest because it relinquished 
important and strategic territories that had an effect on Israel's security. Consequently, 
Tehiya called for full annexation of the West Bank and Gaza. In 1981 it won three Knesset 
members. In 1984, it gained five.55
The 1980s was an important decade in the history of Israel. The 1981 election was 
violent and polarized the electorate. It caused tensions and anxiety. Begin was anxious to 
win another term so that he could continue his plans o f building more settlements in the 
West Bank. Moreover, he hoped that a victory might overcome the pariah image that had 
characterized him and his party.
Begin succeeded in rewriting Israel's history to include the names of the Likud 
heroes. Henceforth, Likud as well as Labor shared the glory of nation building. The Likud 
succeeded in using mythology and history “to interpret contemporary political events, to 
gain ideological legitimacy, and to attempt to establish dominance.”56 From 1977 to 1984, 
the Likud tried to establish its legitimacy by co-opting religious nationalism and by 
exploiting ethnic tensions. In 1981, the Likud reduced taxes on consumer goods, which 
were considered luxury items by Labor. In addition, the Likud passed a number of popular 
laws. These laws included a bill that granted huge benefits to the soldiers once they were
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discharged from the Army, and a “bill that obligates the government to protect the real 
value o f the public's savings.”57
When Likud came to power in 1977, one of its aims was to solve the problems of 
terrorist attacks emerging from Lebanon. Likud didn't distinguish between basic security 
problems and day-to day security problems. They found it difficult to moderate or fine- 
tune their military responses to perceived threats. Therefore, their 1981 decision of foil 
military strike against Lebanon was justified by their claim that the terrorist raids from 
Lebanon threatened Israel's existence. The increase in military actions against terrorism, 
argued Likud, was the only way to “eliminate the strategic problem of terror for a 
considerable period of time.”58
The military action against Lebanon was delayed as long as Moshe Dayan, the 
foreign minister, and Ezer Weizman, minister of defense, remained in power. These two 
leaders perceived the high economic, political and military price that the military strike 
might cost Thus as an alternative to a foil military action, they called for a limited actioa 
However, after the resignation of Dayan and Weizman from office in 1979 and 1980 
respectively, foil military strike was imminent. The appointments of Ariel Sharon as 
Minister o f Defense, and of Shamir as foreign minister removed all the barriers. In 1982, 
the military strike against Lebanon was implemented.59
According to their strategy adopted in 1973 and on, in 1982 Labor opposed the 
military strike against Lebanon unless it was implemented against terrorists and restricted 
to a range of maximum 45-50 km from Israel's borders.60
The Lebanon invasion caused friction among political parties in Israel. Some called 
for immediate withdrawal while others insisted that Israel remain in South Lebanon to 
protect its borders. In this tense atmosphere, the Likud went to the election with a poor
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economic record in 1984. Some of the oriental Jews withdrew their support because o f the 
money that they lost on October 6,1983 with the collapse of the bank stocks, a devaluation 
of the currency and a high rate o f inflation.61 The economic and political condition led to 
the formation of a unity government between Likud and Labor. This government was 
headed by Labor leader Shimon Peres until 1986, when it shifted to the Likud leader 
Yitzhak Shamir. In the first two years, the government focused on domestic issues, mainly 
the economy. Peres knew that his party had to accomplish its objectives in a limited time.
It is worth noting that any decision was made on a consensus basis. The two parties were 
consistent on domestic issues. The major gulf between them appeared in foreign policy and 
security issues. These two issues revealed the underlying contradiction in the coalition.
The economic issues overshadowed foreign policy issues until 1983. That helped Peres 
maintain a credible and reasonable leadership, while Shamir's term witnessed an 
“increasing militancy of the settlers in Judea and Samaria” which threatened civil war.62 
When he became Prime Minister between 1984 and 1986, Shimon Peres had three major 
objectives: “to withdraw Israeli forces from Lebanon as quickly as possible; focus on the 
unilateral creation of a security zone along the border in southern Lebanon; and the 
policing of the zone by an Israel-created and-supported militia, the 'South Lebanese 
Army'.”63
Shamir's term witnessed the birth of a different kind of resistance in the occupied 
territories. In 1987, the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip began the Intifada that spread to the 
West Bank. Israel's first response to the Intifada was ineffective as the rebellion gained 
international attention. The Intifada became a major issue in Israel's domestic politics and 
it affected the policies of political parties and leadership. The Intifada surprised Israel and 
divided it into two camps: (1) Labor who believed in resolving the Palestinian problems
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through territorial compromise and saw the Intifada as a proof for the Likud's folly in 
keeping territories; (2) the Likud camp who believed that Israel could still have peace and 
keep the territories. Likud believed that Intifada was a proof of the dangers that ‘Israel 
would face if it relinquished control over territories.”64 The Intifada played a major role in 
the beginning of peace talks in 1988.
The Intifada and the ineffective response of the government affected the agenda of 
Likud and Labor in the 1988 elections. The main issue of the 1988 campaign was the 
Arab-Israeli conflict and the special circumstances that the Intifada had brought about. 
There were two major blocs in this election, the hawkish bloc led by Likud and the dovish 
bloc led by Labor. After Camp David, Likud opposed any further territorial concessions. In 
1988, headed by Prime Minister Shamir, Likud insisted only on direct talks with any Arab 
partner interested in forming a peace agreement with Israel. The party went on record as 
refusing to negotiate with the PLO.
On the other hand, Labor, led by Peres, offered its readiness to direct talks with 
Arabs “under the umbrella o f international conference.”65 Unlike Likud, labor was willing 
to make some territorial concessions. Such territorial concessions, thought the Labor party, 
would encourage Arabs to engage in peace talks and would reduce the danger of a growing 
Arab minority to the Jewish identity o f Israel. Although labor showed no willingness to 
talk with the PLO or accept any Arab army presence in the West Bank, Likud accused 
them o f supporting these two issues.66 In feet, Peres was the one who had gone on record 
in 1988 indicating that there “will be no return to the pre-1967 borders, that there will be 
no independent Palestinian state, that the Jordan River will be Israel's eastern security 
border, that the Jewish settlements on the West Bank will stay, and that Jerusalem will 
remain united under Israeli sovereignty.”67
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The Arab supported parties witnessed a relative defeat in the 1988 election 
although there was a 75% increase in the turnout among Arab voters. Moreover, the 1988 
election also revealed a change in ethnic votes between Sephardis and Ashkenazis. The 
support that the Likud received from Sephardis decreased while the support given to it by 
Ashkenazi increased. The reason was that many Sephardis defected from Likud to vote in 
favor of Shas, which was established in 1984 by dissatisfied Sephardi Jews. Shas was an 
ultra-orthodox ethnic Jewish party. On the other hand, Ashkenazi who “floated between 
the two parties” tended to favor Likud.68 The outcome of the
1988 election resulted in another unity government between Labor and Likud leading the 
country into the 1990s.
During the 1990’s, a new Israel was emerging. Its population was more consumer- 
oriented. As the economy became more important, the age of ideology seemed to be 
passing away; people appeared more concerned with having someone who could solve 
their practical problems.69 These changes affected the policies of Labor and Likud. Many 
factors brought about the changes in Israel. The Gulf war, the events in Europe, and the fall 
o f the Soviet Union raised the hope among Israelis that a new era of domestic and foreign 
affairs was starting.
The immigration o f200,000 Jews to Israel ‘Threatened to alter the dimensions of 
Israel's internal politics.”70 The Soviet Jewry immigration raised many problems. First, the 
influx raised problems o f housing, employment, and training. The political parties in Israel 
were not prepared to deal with the issue. The sheer size of the arrivals had unforeseen 
political ramifications. The large number of potential voters played a major role in 
deciding who would be in power in the 1992 elections. The mass immigration also affected 
the Palestinians' economic status. To protect its new Russian job seekers, Israel shut the
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borders to the occupied territories thus preventing many Palestinians from gaining access 
to their economic resources. In addition to that, the war created many job opportunities for 
the new immigrants. However, although more jobs were available to Israelis with the 
shutdown of the green line, unemployment in Israel rose to 10% by the summer, because 
of the uncontrolled immigration from the Soviet Union and the refusal of Israelis to hold 
the types of jobs that the Palestinians used to handle. Accelerated development and 
urbanization increased water usage. By 1990 water shortage reached crisis level in Israel 
By 1991, Israel's agricultural production was cut by 30%. Israel had become even more 
dependent on the West Bank water and the minister o f agriculture, Rafael Eitan, 
announced that Israel could not give up the West Bank without destroying its agricultural 
sector. Consequently, scarcity o f water supply elevated the problem of authority over 
“Judea and Samaria.”71 Moreover, the Palestinian support for Saddam Hussein led to the 
disruption of the peace movement that started in 1989. The Palestinian stand eroded the 
small gains in Israeli public attitude that they had made during the I980's.e
In 1990, Labor withdrew from the National Unity Government. In the first weeks 
after the fell o f the government, Shimon Peres tried forming a coalition with the religious 
parties. Peres realized that religious parties were growing in the country; they had won 18 
seats in 1988 election. In addition, there was a fruitful cooperation between Labor and the 
religious party with regard to settling Israeli's conflict with the Palestinians. Thus, Peres 
couldn't form a coalition because Labor also differed with religious parties on the issue 
concerning religion-state and Jewish culture.72 In fact it was Peres's rejection of the 
religious parties' perception of the Jewish state that led him to lose the rabbis' votes. For
c It is worth noting that the peace movement has always been fragile due to tactions within the Labor party and the Likud 
as well.
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example, when Labor focused on the secularism and territoriality o f Israel, Rabbi Schach 
announced to his followers that the important issue was the “holiness of the Torah and the 
religious traditionalism, which he considered as being the essence o f the Jewish people's 
existence.”73
Upon Labor's withdrawal from the government, Shamir formed a right-wing 
government. It was then that Shamir started showing a different approach to the Palestinian 
issue and the peace process. He went to the Madrid Conference because he believed that 
conditions were going to be better after the Gulf war. He believed protracted negotiations 
would allow fewer concessions and ultimately preserve the lands o f Eretz Israel74 Shamir's 
intentions were not known to the far right bloc who saw the Madrid Conference as “a first 
step down the slippery slope to a Palestinian state.”75 Shamir proposed the election of a 
Palestinian council that would be in charge of the internal governmental affairs of the 
Palestinians in the occupied territories. He even stated that Israel would not examine 
whether the members o f the council had any PLO connections. Shamir also suggested a 
joint Israeli-Jordanian confederation that would administer the territories. However, when 
he saw “Israel rushing to embrace PLO and to grant the Palestinians an independent 
state,”76 he reaffirmed that Israel was not ready to give away any o f the territories 
especially the ones on the west of Jordan river. His position was strengthened when the 
PLO resumed its terrorist attacks against Israel by the end of May 1990.
When Shamir proposed the confederation, the Israeli government coalition started 
to break up a few weeks after the Madrid Conference. Likud began receiving attacks from 
the members o f the coalition, Tehiya, Moiedet, and Tsomet. Backed by leaders of Moledet 
and Tsomet, Yuval Ne'eman, leader of Tehiya denounced the 1989 peace plan that called 
for autonomy o f the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. He claimed that the plan was
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adopted by Labor when they were in the coalition; thus since Labor left the government, 
the plan should no longer exist. He maintained that the Gulf war proved the Palestinians 
would cause danger to Israel's presence. This position was also supported by Ariel Sharon 
who in 1989 nearly split the party into pro and opposition peace factions. Sharon's solution 
to the problems in the Middle East was to demilitarize the Arab world as a necessary 
condition to any peace negotiation. He also claimed that “Jordan is Palestine” and that 
Arafat could replace King Hussein. Sharon accused the Israeli government of becoming 
“victimized by PLO brainwashing.”77
Moledet and Tehiya withdrew because they saw the negotiations “opening the way 
to territorial concessions and abandonment of the settlers,”78 and because Shamir agreed to 
discuss an interim agreement on Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. As 
a result the Likud and Labor agreed to schedule national elections on June 23, 1992.79
Friction between the political parties was now rife within the Likud itself. Arial 
Sharon represented the extreme hawks in Likud; David Levy, Shamir's foreign minister, 
represented the doves within the party. When Shamir formed the 1990 government, Levy 
developed friendly relations with Egypt. It was David Levy who put an alternative 
'reasonable' peace plan, but it was rejected by Shamir and the Likud. Levy did not abandon 
Likud's tough stand on territorial issues; however, he believed in a more diplomatic foreign 
policy. Like any Likud leader, he refused the principle of “land for peace”, rejected 
recognition of negotiations with PLO. However, unlike Sharon, he announced that the only 
alternative was to negotiate with the Palestinians in the occupied territories that supported 
Saddam Hussein. Sharon, on the other hand, refused the principle of negotiating with the 
Palestinians and called for the expulsion from the territories.80
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Similar divisions appeared within the Labor Alignment. There were those who 
officially prohibited any talks with PLO, while others called for territorial concessions 
except for East Jerusalem. This latter faction was led by Yossi Beilin who declared 
security was more important than territories. A third faction agreed with Shamir's position. 
None however supported Sharon's suggestions. Shimon Peres presented yet another 
dramatic peace proposal He called for negotiations under the auspices o f an international 
conference that might lead to a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation or federation.81
In 1991, the Palestinian Intifada entered its fourth year stronger than ever before. In 
the period of four years, the Israeli Defense Forces killed approximately 880 Palestinians, 
while Palestinians killed about 70 Israelis. The Intifada raised serious problems within 
Israel because its soldiers had to fight civilians who were often children under the age of 
17. This unequal conflict became a public relations conflict between the government and 
the military. The excessive use of military force became a major issue. In feet, the Intifada 
led to the politicization of the army. On one hand, the right wing parties supported the 
military action against the Intifada; on the other hand, the left wing parties believed that the 
army had claimed brutal actions. Moreover, since the emergence of the Intifada in 1987 
more than 30% of the Jewish public supported the idea of a Palestinian state; more than 
50% supported the idea of territorial compromises. On the other hand, only about 20% of 
the population endorsed the idea of forcible expulsion of Palestinians from the occupied 
territories.82
In the meantime, the Left wing parties saw the continuing struggle with the Intifada 
as a powerful example o f the urgency for negotiation with the Palestinians. However, this 
time they were against the coexistence principle. Now they called for two separate states. 
On the side, the right-wing parties ruled out any possibility o f negotiating an independent
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Palestinian State. Rather they called for solving their problems with Syria as a priority and 
for forcible suppression of the Intifada.83
The Period o f 1992-Present
The main concern of Israeli foreign policy is reaching peace with Arab neighbors. 
After the 1967 war, Israel decided that it would not withdraw from any territories until the 
Arabs agreed to reach a peace settlement with Israel based upon a recognition o f Israel's 
existence and its permanent borders. The quest for peace increased after the 1973 War 
especially after the power of the oil cartel that led most European countries to decline from 
helping Israel economically.84 In the late eighties, Rabin noted a change in the Arab 
position and decided to seize the opportunity to arrange peace with the Arabs.
In the meantime, Likud remained extreme hard-liners. Likud's ideology has always 
focused on the preservation of “Greater Israel”, thus the denial of any Palestinian self- 
determination in the areas of Judea and Samaria.85 The Likud's policy toward Palestinians 
can be summed up in three nos: “no to negotiations with the PLO, no to a Palestinian state, 
and no to swapping land for peace.”86 While the Labor party agreed with the principle of 
partition as a trade for peace, the Likud rejected this principle.
However, it was a Likud leader, Shamir, who participated in the Madrid meeting, 
an event followed by bilateral peace talks between Israel and the Arabs. The focus of these 
talks was on the “continuation of the process rather than on achievements.”87 The most 
difficult negotiations were between Israel and Palestinians, on one hand, and Israel and 
Syria, on the other hand. The multilateral talks focused on the issues of refugees, economic 
development, water resources, environment, and arms control88
While Likud was busy with its internal problems, Labor party had already elected 
Rabin to head the list for the election. Rabin was known for his tough stand on security.
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Rabin's stand on policy emphasized the necessity to soon reach an autonomy plan for the 
Palestinians. He didn't reject any settlements that were built for security purposes in Golan 
Height, Jordan River, or greater Jerusalem. In addition to focusing on peace, Labor also 
focused on economy. Labor targeted the new immigrants who were struggling to find jobs 
and the young working class that was affected by the Likud government's policies.89 
Furthermore, Labor's return to power was aided by the new voters from the Soviet Union 
who were deeply disillusioned by Likud's performance. Moreover, Labor's platform 
promised their commitment to preserve equal rights for all Israeli citizens.90
When Labor formed the government, Rabin outlined the agenda of his 
administration in a speech to the Knesset in June 1992. He emphasized the peace process, 
national priorities, and Israel's position in the world. Instead of spending money on 
building more settlements, he pledged to spend it on immigration absorption, 
unemployment, education, and social and economic reforms. Rabin also maintained that he 
would give priorities to peace talking with the Palestinians. This announcement revealed 
the major differences between Meir's Labor and Rabin's Labor. Under Golda Meir, Labor 
had been a party of “nationalism and territorial maximalism.”91 Under Rabin, the party 
emphasized political moderation, liberal Zionism, and reconciliation. Rabin also worked 
on halting settlement buildings in the occupied territories, which satisfied the United 
States.92
As the Labor party focused on the necessity o f making peace with the Arabs, it was 
carrying secret negotiations with the PLO in Norway under the auspices of the Norwegian 
government. These secret negotiations culminated in the Oslo Accord. The Accord was 
signed in Washington on September 13,1993. According to “Oslo”, the peace process 
takes place in two stages over a period o f five years: The interim stage, during which the
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PLO would terminate its charter that calls for Israel's destruction and would “foster 
peaceful relations toward Israelis among their people.”93 In return, Israel would withdraw 
from parts o f the occupied territories, mainly Gaza and West Bank where Palestinians 
would have autonomy. In the second stage, negotiations would culminate in a final 
Palestinian independence and long-standing peace between the two States.
From 1993 to 1995, the right wing hard-liners became more aggressive toward the 
peace process. Israeli public opinion was divided between supporters and opponents to the 
peace process.
Even as Labor was losing its popular support, a new aggressive personality 
emerged in the Likud. During the Reagan Administration, Bibi Netanyahu emerged as a 
promising figure in Israeli politics. He believed there was a need to encounter the 
sophisticated Palestinian propaganda, and castigated the Likud government's ineffective 
use of the media. He thought that the Likud's failure to produce persuasive messages that 
explained Israel's position in the world had led to consecutive defeats. Netanyahu knew the 
extent to which the media shape foreign policy especially in the United States. Netanyahu 
considered the Madrid conference merely a mechanism to return Israel to its 1967 borders. 
He wanted to wage a propaganda war against the Bush Administration's tactics. In addition 
to Likud, several Labor Alignment MKs had their reservation about the Madrid 
Conference. The parties announced that Israel should retain Golan Heights to protect its 
security.94
Netanyahu's approach to peace was hard-line and its roots were nakedly 
ideological. He argued that the only realists and guardians o f truth were the Likud. 
Netanyahu knew that he had to accept the PLO as the Palestinian representative, yet he 
considered the Oslo Agreement invalid and asked for a 'national referendum'. He also
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hinted that if the Likud came to power, it might not honor the peace process. Despite the 
Likud position, Rabin was able to win the Oslo Agreement debate in the Knesset93 and to 
dominate the political scene until his assassination in 1995. To supporters o f peace, he was 
considered a hero. However, to the non-supporters he was a villain who was willing to sell 
out Israel to Syria and the Palestinians.
The 1996 elections deeply divided Israel over the peace issue. The election was 
perhaps the most crucial one in the history o f Israel. For the first time, there were two 
simultaneous but independent ballots: one for the Knesset and one for the Prime Minister. 
This change in the electoral system weakened both Labor and Likud because it left more 
space for other parties to resist pressure from the two major parties.
In 1996, the Israeli society was equally divided over the negotiations with Syria 
and the Palestinians. There were those who agreed with the “land for peace” principle, 
while others opposed any territorial compromise because it undermined Israel's security. 
Thus, the crux of the debate in the 1996 election focused on the 1993 Oslo Agreement. 
Those who supported Oslo supported Rabin; those who regarded the peace process as 
flawed supported Netanyahu. After Rabin's death, Netanyahu was cautious in his criticism 
of Labor’s peace policy and instead shifted his rhetoric to the economy and governmental 
administration. By early 1996, however, after Hamas's suicide bombings in Jerusalem, Tel 
Aviv and Ashkelon, Netanyahu returned to his attacks on Labor and public safety. Thus, 
the public started questioning Labor's ability to maintain security in the country. 
Recognizing the side effects of Hamas's bombings, Peres changed the slogan of his 
campaign from “Vote for Peres, vote for peace” to “Israel is strong with Peres.” Labor 
understood that only one third of the voters held Labor's moderate or extreme left views 
and knew its appeal resonated with a majority o f citizens. After the bombings, Peres
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adopted Rabin's concept of “separation.” He decided to fence off Israel from contact with 
Palestinians in the occupied territories. In addition to that, to prove his ability to maintain 
security, he ordered operation “Grapes of Wrath” against Hezbollah in April 1996. 
However, the operation was costly materially and politically. Likud accused Peres of not 
finishing the job of extricating Hezbullah.96
In general, Labor’s platform emphasized both national security and recommitment 
to peace. Labor promised to end the Arab-Israeli conflict by the year 2000. Peres reiterated 
his vision of “a new Middle East based on a common market with regional irrigation, 
tourism, transport, and communication systems in the fields of culture and science.”97 The 
Platform emphasized a united Jerusalem under Israel's rule. Labor’s agenda also included 
the principle of establishing no new Jewish settlements in the occupied territories while 
still maintaining jurisdiction over the Israeli settlers remaining there.98
On the other hand, Likud's platform restated the traditional Revisionist's claim of 
“the right o f the Jewish people to the land of Israel, an eternal right, not subject to 
dispute.”99 Their agenda also focused on strengthening the settlements in the territories, 
and upon a pledge that security would be the first condition in the peace negotiation. Likud 
declared their willingness to continue negotiations with the PA on condition that PA annul 
the charter that called for the destruction o f Israel and that they hinder all terrorists acts 
against Israel.100
The outcome o f the election uncovered a new political reality in Israel, the 
increased power of coalitions. Netanyahu may have won the premiership, but Likud and 
Labor were weakened in the Knesset The religious parties showed more strength. Three 
major religious parties, Shas, National Religious Party and United Torah Jerusalem 
increased their seats in the Knesset. These parties were ultra-orthodox with a strong
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emphasis upon Jewish spiritual values, identity and education. Their success meant that 
they could make strict demands on Netanyahu regarding their goal of preserving the 
Jewish character o f the State.101
Two factors helped Netanyahu come to power “First, there was a reticence to 
'accept' Arafat after years of Palestinian terrorism, PLO double-speak and Likud 
demonization. The support for Oslo agreement was cooling down. Second, this coolness 
towards the Oslo agreement was exploited by Islamic militants, who contrived to wreck 
any Israeli-Palestinian rapprochement through well publicized atrocities and suicide
9*102missions.
Ever since his election, the major problem that challenged Netanyahu was the 
peace process. He refused to talk with the PLO for 19 months after his election. He 
increased settlements in the occupied territories. He never ceased to attack the Oslo 
agreement. However, after 19 months o f stagnation, Netanyahu agreed to meet with Arafat 
in Wye Plantation, Maryland. After nine days o f meetings and talks, an agreement was 
signed. Under the terms of the Wye agreement, the Israelis would free a substantial number 
of Arab political prisoners and withdraw from 13.1 percent of the West Bank. In return, the 
Palestinians would abolish anti-Israeli language from their charter and provide more 
security guarantees.103 Thus, the Likud leader shifted from the extreme ideology o f the 
right wing. Netanyahu moderated his image, actions and rhetoric as earlier leaders had 
done before him.
This agreement endangered Netanyahu's position in Israel Right-wing hard-liners 
protested against the agreement, accusing Netanyahu of betraying their trust and voters.104 
The main opposition Labor Party said it would back Netanyahu and shield him from a no
35
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
confidence vote in the Knesset. However, they would call for early elections because such 
an agreement could have been reached two years earlier.105
On May 17,1999, Ehud Barak, the Labor leader, won the election as the new 
Israeli Prime Minister. His campaign focused on maintaining peace with the Arabs. His 
victory brought some optimistic feelings among some Arab states after a long pessimistic 
atmosphere during Netanyahu’s reign. However, two years later, this optimism waned and 
a new Intifada rose in the occupied territories. The increase in violence between 
Palestinians and Israelis led to Barak’s resignation and Sharon’s victory as the new PM, in 
an early elections. As of this writing, violence and fighting between the Palestinians and 
Israelis is a daily routine.
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CHAPTER THREE 
MEDIA FRAMING AND AGENDA SETTING
Most of our information about politics does not come to us from direct experience 
or even from local sources. It is gathered, selected and interpreted by a vast communication 
industry. Thus, any study of political discourse must deal with mass media. The print 
media is traditionally the most information heavy medium. Its coverage is detailed and it 
has functioned as a conduit, adversary and interpreter o f political discourse. Accordingly, 
this chapter examines the agenda-setting functions of the press in society. In addition, it 
will outline the procedure of framing analysis that will be used in chapters five and six. 
Finally, the chapter concludes with a brief estimate of the significance o f this research for 
the present study.
Research related to media function, roles and effects has occupied a relatively
important place in the field of communication. Scholars from different fields have, one
way or another, been concerned about the effects of media upon the society they purport to
serve. Conventional wisdom calls mass media a Fourth Estate. Its obvious influence in so
many arenas has prompted the Hutchins Commission to outline the social responsibility
and functions of the press. According to the Commission, the press should:
First, provide “a truthful, comprehensive, and intelligent account of the day’s events 
in a context which gives them meaning”; second, serve as a “forum for the exchange 
of comment and criticism”; third, project “a representative picture of the constituent 
groups in society”; fourth, be responsible for ‘^ he presentation and clarification of the 
goals and values o f the society” in which it operates; finally, provide “full access to 
the day’s intelligence.”1
These responsibilities imply four basic functions of the press: providing information 
and news2; selection, interpretation and evaluation of the information;3 learning of basic 
values that help the individual fit in his cultural environment4, and promotion of national
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interests especially during national crisis.5 This last function Graber calls manipulation. 
She argues that the media have an active role in which they shape the news by making one 
issue more salient then the other. This issue weighting constitutes the agenda setting 
function of the media.6
Agenda setting informs Bernard Cohen’s claim that the press is “stunningly 
successful in telling its readers what to think about.”7 The relevance of this selective 
weighting to the present study is obvious. Rival presses feature different agendas in 
reporting issues of war, peace negotiation, and national interest. Cohen’s statement o f the 
power of the press has been affirmed by other scholars. Gilberg et aL maintained that the 
press also has the power to set the government’s agenda.8 Thus the media shapes what the 
public observes as political reality and also “how political elites understand what voters 
and opinion leaders are thinking about”9 Thus agenda setting implies that “the media set 
the public priorities just by paying attention to some issues while ignoring others. They 
determine what issues are important and in this way play an important role in structuring 
our social reality.”10
Agenda setting function o f the media relates to the level o f abstraction at which an 
issue is covered. It seems that a decision to cover an issue in vivid concrete details will 
affect the public’s perception of the issue’s importance. Yagade and Dozier developed a 
study to examine the validity of the above statement.11 They concluded that the power of 
the news media agenda setting in influencing the perceived salience of an issue increases 
when the issue is concrete and decreases when the issue is abstract.
Noelle-Neumann examined the role of media in forming public opinion. She 
suggested the media choose what is newsworthy and creates accordingly the background 
and meaning o f public discourse.12
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Iyengar and Simon define agenda setting as “the ability o f the news media to define 
significant issues of the day.”13 Cook, et. aL states that agenda setting refers to the media’s 
ability to shape the public’s priorities “by leading them to view certain issues as more 
important.”14 McCombs and Shaw assert that agenda setting tells the audience not only 
what to think about but also how to think about it.15 Communication researchers have 
revealed great concern about the impact of news coverage on public concern. Research in 
the area of agenda setting emerged from the scholars' concern regarding the direction of 
agenda setting impact. Did the news coverage direct the public concern or did journalists 
cover news that appeals to the audience?16
However, the media not only tell us which issues to think about; it also tells us how 
to think about issues. The press not only selects issues, it defines them. This 
contextualization process is called media framing. Media framing is the second concern of 
the present study. An issue can be framed in several ways by descriptive images, by 
association with another issue, by narrative form, or even by the choice of emotion-laden 
language.
Iyengar and Simon examined the function of agenda setting and framing in the 
news coverage of Gulf crisis.17 They concluded that the news coverage of the crisis 
affected the political concerns of the American public and their evaluation of President 
Bush. Prior to the crisis, the public's main concern was economic. Accordingly, economic 
performance served as the main criterion for their evaluation of Bush. After the crisis, the 
public concern shifted to foreign policy and so did the evaluation of Bush. Moreover, the 
researcher found that episodic framing “increased viewers support for a military resolution 
o f the conflict.”18 Framing may have unintended effects as welL The heroic Work! War II 
type of reportage raised Bush’s stature and solidified his mandate. It may also have raised
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expectations. When Bush did not show the same energy and focus in fighting recession, 
many supporters became disillusioned with his leadership.
Framing Analysis
Before narrating the literature on media framing and agenda setting, it is important 
to define certain terms. Framing has been defined in different ways by communication 
scholars; however, all the definitions share a common core. Entman defines framing as 
“selecting] aspects o f a perceived reality and mak[ing] them more salient in a 
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item 
described.”19 In other words, frames identify problems, detect causes, formulate moral 
judgments and recommend solutions. Cognitively, individuals use frames to interpret, 
organize, and make sense of the work! around them.20 Framing “involves the relationship 
between qualitative aspects o f news coverage contextual cues and how the public interprets 
the news.”21 Thus the media try to persuade the public to accept their interpretation as the 
truth.22
Usually in the framing process, information is associated with cultural symbols. 
Framing is effective in the sense that it decides how audiences understand, remember, and 
evaluate a particular problem. Most important, framing directs the attention toward 
particular aspects and away from others; as a result, audiences have different reactions. 
Framing is most effective when the audience is not well informed about the main problem. 
Moreover, audiences have different reactions to issues because news frames draw attention 
to some aspects o f reality while suppressing other aspects.23
Framing is a process employed by the media that promotes “elite social discourse 
as the public discourse or the common sense of society.”24 This statement reflects a belief
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among scholars that elite discourse is often unquestioned and is processed as feet rather 
than as opinion or judgment. Media framing is a process whereby certain interpretations 
and judgments are promoted through the use of keywords, phrases, images, metaphors, 
symbols, rhetorical devices, and themes emphasized in news narratives.25 Cape 11a & 
Jamieson state that “news frames are those rhetorical and stylistic choices, reliably 
identified in the news, that alter the interpretations of the topics treated and are a consistent 
part of the news environment.”26 Although Gamson asserts that there are conditions that 
alleviate the impact of media framing on the audience,27 Zaller maintains that because 
people are not well informed on social and political issues, framing tends to heavily 
influence the audiences’ responses to the covered issues.28 Thus, the interpretation derived 
from the news frame is a function of both the message and the knowledge of the 
audience.29 In processing local news, people may have alternative sources of data. In 
national news, they seldom process personal data and quite often lack an alternative frame 
of reference.
The importance of frames is that they organize the “facts” of newspaper stories in a 
way that leads to the formation of one perception rather than another. For example, poverty 
may be framed in a way that social and political forces are to be blamed. Alternatively, 
poverty can be framed so that the poor alone appear to be responsible for their situation.30 
Or, as Gamson and Lasch suggested, a social policy such as welfare may be depicted as 
responsible for the cycle of poverty in the society. In this case, the solution is redefined as 
the problem.31 However, it is worth noting that journalists themselves may not be 
consciously aware of the framing process. It has been suggested that their reliance on elite 
sources means that the media serve as mere conduits for the beliefs o f the powerful.32 
Nevertheless, news organizations, journalists and editors may themselves reconstruct the
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quotes of the elite to summarize the core of the story, thus playing a major role in the 
framing process.33 Framing molds individual perception and opinion by “stressing specific 
elements or features o f the broader controversy, reducing a usually complex issue down to 
one or two central aspects.”34 Nelson et. al. tested their assumption by examining the 
media coverage of the Ku Klux Klan rally. They ran two experiments where the rally was 
framed in different ways to examine the impact of media frames on tolerance and the role 
of “value weighting in mediating frames effects.” 33 The researchers concluded that the 
words, images, and phrases the journalists use to cover a particular issue frame the event in 
a coherent picture and consequently, this picture exerts a recognizable influence on the 
audience.
Research on framing has focused on how the public attributes responsibility for 
issues and events. Kuyper’s work studied the impact of media upon attribution of 
responsibility for events among congress, the president, and foreign leaders.36
Iyengar and Simon state that framing of issues can be either episodic or thematic. 
Episodic frames focus on concrete and specific events.37 Thematic frames depict issues in 
an abstract and general context. TV political news relies heavily on episodic framing. 
Iyengar studied the impact of episodic and thematic news frames. Episodic frames focus 
“on specific episodes, individual perpetrators, victims, or other actors at the expense of 
more general, thematic information”38 and “depict concrete events that illustrate issues 
while thematic framing presents collective or general evidence.”39 Iyengar states that 
episodic framing attributes responsibility for the problem and its solution to individuals 
rather than to societies; thus making particular traits and acts of individuals more 
accessible, while thematic reporting frames the event in terms of social and political 
outcomes.
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Consequently, in addition to influencing the public opinion regarding the political 
event, the media also help the public conceptualize the event Thus, Noelle-Neumann 
concludes, media defines reality for many people. A coherent story is more powerful than a 
briccolage.
Allen, et.al in an effort to explain the media framing process in a historical context, 
examined the media priming and framing effects on public opinion during the early stages 
of the Gulf War. The researchers state that framing “describes the use of symbolic 
language or imagery that characterizes and shapes the meaning of a political event or 
proposal”40 They found the media coverage of the event offered a negative attitude toward 
dissent and a positive attitude toward war effort Consequently, the media “affected 
Americans’ interpretations and support of the Gulf War.”41 The media offered the public 
redundant, repetitious and ubiquitous messages o f support for the Gulf War. Individual 
“tales” were made prototypical. The media framed the news of patriotism and dissent to 
construct a reality that influenced the public’s perception of military intervention. It 
contrasted the President’s commitment with the tardy lukewarm support of many members 
o f Congress that made formerly reluctant senators scramble aboard and voice their patriotic 
support. The framing of U.S. technological superiority and the use of technological 
language and jargon contributed to the support of the public. A nearly totalized and 
integrated view of the war emerged; what scholars have called exegetical bonding resulted 
among viewers who “discussed” the war in the tutelary perspective o f media.
In a dramatic example of the power of the media framing, Entman examined the 
news narratives used by the U.S. media coverage of the KAL_ Soviet fighter shot down 
Korean Air Lines Flight 007 and Iran Air_ American Navy Ship shot down Iran Air 
Flight 655. Entman documented how the media portrayed similar events in two contrasting
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frames. In their coverage o f the Iran Air incident, the media defined the incident as a 
technical problem; KAL, on the other hand, “was portrayed as a moral outrage.”42 In the 
KAL incident accounts include moral evaluation. In the second incident, Iran Air, moral 
evaluation is absent.
The moral evaluation is reinforced by the “sizing” of the event; Entman maintains 
that the core of framing is sizing; that is, shrinking or amplifying elements of reality to 
make them more or less important. The moral judgment frame is also emphasized in KAL 
coverage but not in Iran Air “by the degree of generalization from the attacks to the nature 
o f the two political systems.”43 The idea of “sizing” is called “expanding the 
circumference” by Burkean critics. In this way local problems can be given national 
significance. Reagan’s struggle in Grenada was spoken of as part of a much larger struggle. 
The war on the tiny island was placed in the expanded context o f the Cold War. In a sense, 
the liberation of medical students in Grenada was a synecdoche for the liberation of subject 
peoples in the Soviet Union.
Davis explored the effect o f message framing on responses to environmental 
communications. He explored the influence of the three major components of framing, 
problem definition, target definition, and types of behavioral actions, on the public 
attitudinal and behavioral changes. Davis reviewed how each component functions.
1) Framing the problem: situation framing can emphasize positive/negative consequences. 
Consequently, framing can affect how a problem is perceived and “how alternative 
decisions are evaluated.”44 For example, Meyerowiotz and Chaiken concluded that 
negatively framed messages wield more judgmental affect than positively or objectively 
stated messages.45 This may be because negatively framed messages are seen as threats to 
the social order. We criticize situations that seem wrong and are in need of corrective
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actions. 2~> Framing the Target: Individuals are more persuaded when the message 
emphasizes how they will personally be negatively influenced by the outcome of their 
inaction in comparison to positive effects of their actions. Appeal to immediate self- 
interest has been the conventional advice of manuals o f rhetoric since Aristotle. 3) Framing 
Actions: Individuals tend to be more supportive of actions that maintain the “taking less” 
frame than of messages that maintain the “doing more” frames. In a 1993 study, Davis 
found that individuals are more likely to participate in an environmentally responsible 
action when “communications present simple, clear, and understandable actions in a 
context which stresses how the target will be personally, negatively affected if they 
continue to be inactive.”46
Many studies have been conducted to examine the role of news media in building 
communities. Eaton found that the salience of the issues of crime, fear, unemployment, 
inflation and poverty on the public agenda was positively associated with the issues’ 
salience in the news media.47 Likewise, McCombs examined how the agenda setting of the 
news media helps achieve community consensus about important issues in society. 
McCombs asserts that there is “evidence that the news media can reduce individual 
differences among people within the community.”48 Shaw and Martin confirm McCombs’s 
assertion in their study where they found that the media agenda brought groups within the 
community smaller together.49 Their North Carolina Survey revealed that subgroups that 
are exposed to the news develop a consensus about the public agenda among themselves. 
McCombs states that there are two ways in which community agendas are set. One is 
bottom-up and focuses on the public agenda; the other is top-down and focuses on the 
media agenda. Both ways work and make three contributions to achieving community
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consensus. First, they make an issue salient; second, they bring the community together, 
and third, the news creates a picture of the public issues.
Cook, et. aL examined the impact o f television news on members o f the public, on 
interest groups, policy makers and policy.50 They studied the extent to which media news 
is capable o f changing the audience’s attitudes about the importance of a particular issue. 
The researchers state that the media agenda setting capacity indicates that there is a causal 
relation between sequential events. First, media report the event; second, the reporting of 
the event influences the perception of the saliency of the event. The researcher concluded 
once media reports are researched, written and produced, their impact on the public, policy 
makers and interest groups who view the news report becomes definitive. Subsequent 
events form a “text” that becomes a kind of collective memory place. The issue becomes 
the symbolic property of the readership as a whole. Once policy makers understand the 
public opinion through the media, they act to make policies.
Gilberg et.al. reported that U.S. presidents try to influence the agenda setting of 
news through their press conferences and televised addresses to the nation, and most 
importantly through the annual State o f the Union address.51 Later, Gilberg et.al studied 
the limits o f presidential influence, and his subsequent study argued that the mass media 
agenda tend to affect the president's priorities and not the other way around.52
Tucker analyzed the framing process of media discourse regarding the August 1995 
CK Jeans advertising campaign.53 His studies examined the impact of kiddie-pom frame in 
producing and reproducing beliefs about youth sexuality and cultural as well as economic 
power. Tucker identified the components o f the frame and analyzed the sociopolitical 
context in which the frame occurred. He concluded that had it not been for the substantial 
media coverage of the campaign, the Klein ad would not have been recognized by most of
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the public. Consequently, the media coverage led the media elite to place the blame on CK 
as the real problem. Thus, Tucker speculated that the “frame of Kiddie pom masks the 
interests of the cultural industry that created him.”54 Perhaps the media disciplined a voice 
that violated the master narratives of the culture and threatened its stock of symbolic 
capital.
Framing as a Rhetorical Process
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Entman states that frames “promote a 
particular problem definition, causal interpretations, moral evaluation, and/ or treatment 
recommendation for the item described.”53 Framing becomes especially important and 
effective when dealing with an issue over which public opinion is divided. In controversial 
situations, press coverage of a particular incident tends to encourage certain voices and 
marginalize others.56 For example, Daley and O’Neill examined the press coverage of the 
Exxon Valdez oil spill.57 They compared the news narratives of the mainstream press and 
the minority press. They found more than one narrative employed in the news. A disaster 
narrative naturalized the spill and represented the event as the product of forces outside 
human control. Such narrative, through the use o f available cultural metaphors, 
transformed a historical and social event into a technological and natural inevitability. A 
crime narrative individualized the event and put the blame on the legal officials. In other 
words, it allocated failure to people rather than natural forces. An environmental narrative 
depicted the voices of environmentalists contesting the statements and practices of the 
industrial spokespersons and the Bush Administration. These three narratives were used by 
the mainstream media. The minority media used the subsistence narrative where the voices 
o f the marginalized come to the front pages. Although some views become dominant, a
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seamless web of discourse is seldom created and often the mainstream media in America 
cannot discover a single cosmogony, but feature alternative discourses about events.
Pan and Kosick employed a thematic mode of frame analysis.58 They stated that 
every news story contains a theme that operates as the Kernel o f the story. Such themes 
help the public encapsulate the story in a specific manner, a kind of indirect suggestion.
The news story is further framed through lexical and syntactical codes that help readers 
construct a particular news discourse. Pan and Kosicki examined a news story about pro­
life rally in Wichita, Kansas in which they found four frames.59 First, the syntactical frame 
yielded constant patterns of words and phrases arranged into sentences mainly in headlines 
and head sentences. Second, script frame used the guide of the five W’s and the H of 
journalism. Third, thematic frame unearthed patterns of causality usually found in the 
headline, lead and conclusion o f the news story. Fourth, the rhetorical level was a search 
for repetitive metaphors, catchphrases, images, and exemplars. To summarize, in framing 
analysis one looks at the vocabulary used by journalists in order to “reveal the way the 
reporter categorizes that which he is reporting upon.”60 In this sense, there is a kind of 
Platonic soul above each news story, an embedded truth that harmonizes its disparate parts. 
Implications of Framing for the Present Study
This chapter has briefly covered the literature on agenda setting and framing analysis 
of the news media. The literature folly supports Cohen’s and McComb’s statement that the 
media has the power to tell the public what to think about and how to think about it. The 
studies cited provide a rationale for the use of rhetorical framing. They further indicate that 
the rhetorical devices used by the press from conflicting countries may affect the manner  in 
which the public perceives a particular event The following chapters will deal with an
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application of these theories and research to rival national presses during the Arab/Israeli 
peace process.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
METAPHORS AND DISCOURSE FRAMES:
REVIEW AND APPLICATIONS
In the classical era, audience was not such a problematic entity as it has become 
today. In the Classical perspective, public discourse is very much like a formal speech in 
that it is a planned performance in front of a specific group of persons, all of whom are 
physically present at a particular place and at a particular time. But today's audiences are 
dispersed. In the public sphere, messages are dispensed to a variety o f groups via several 
different media. There are those who receive the message in a printed copy, those who see 
it on television or view it through the Internet. Further, messages are received folly, partly, 
or in edited forms. Finally, it would be impossible to identify every member of an audience 
even for a single discrete message.
Given this situation, it is obvious that much communication between rhetor and 
audience will not be face to face. Instead most people see and hear messages in mediated 
form at different times and in different places. Rhetoric invites or discourages people who 
are engaged in a variety of activities to become members o f an audience. People frequently 
scan news headlines and decide whether a message is salient to them. Such judgments may 
be made in the blink of an eye. Since messages compete for attention, audiences must be 
motivated to attend to their content. Once an audience has been invited to become a 
constituency, discourse will not end when a message is given. It will be carried on by 
editors, subscribers, columnists, and other readers. They will amplify, critique, update, and 
build upon the original discourse. They will extract, misquote, and reinterpret it.
The newspapers under study are characterized by consensus making. They provide 
perspectives or ways o f understanding the world for their readers. They are engaged in
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supplying collective meaning. Thus, in essence, this study is about identification o f rival 
symbolic perspectives and an assessment of their divisive and assimilative potential for 
their readership communities. The power of the symbolic perspectives articulated in the 
mainstream press is considerable; regularly recycled ways of seeing and thinking tend to 
become part of a nation's cultural discourse; that is, they become part o f the unconscious 
and seldom questioned belief system of the people. The constant reiteration of a unified set 
of themes, issues, and recommended actions come to seem “natural” instead o f merely 
strategic. In turn, this discourse frame provides a horizon of interpretation for readers that 
extends beyond any immediate issue or event, predisposes them to mobilize around certain 
issues, to neglect or downplay others and to doubt or dismiss data that do not correspond to 
the ethos of the dominant perspective For example, a certain Southern daily celebrates its 
“community stars” on full page spreads. These are exclusively male businessmen. 
Educators, artists, politicians are absent. Thus, the paper contributes to the feeling that the 
only important members of the community are powerful businessmen. These leaders 
become the symbolic capital of the community and their decisions are sought as the 
legitimate voices of authority at times o f communal crisis.
Frames of discourse provide both stumbling blocks and opportunities for people in 
conflict. Of course, in order to discover these potentials for conflict or reconciliation, it is 
necessary to examine these frames closely, to make explicit their implicit persuasive 
content. One important way of rendering perspective explicit is through metaphoric 
analysis.
The remainder o f this chapter will attempt to 1) review the relevant literature on 
metaphor analysis, 2) discuss the relationship between metaphor and frame analysis and 3) 
briefly preview the way in which metaphoric analysis will be employed in this study.
59
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Review of Relevant Literature
It is a truism that framing depends on the use o f particular language patterns. These 
patterns are revealed through metaphor. Dominant metaphors highlight certain aspects of 
an issue and hide others. For example, framing a business transaction in war imagery 
(struggle, conflict, combatants, etc.) may prevent us from seeing opportunities for 
cooperation, negotiation, and peaceful resolution. Metaphor also keynotes particular 
attitudes and feelings. Edwards states that metaphors are not only mere similarities. Rather 
they have “the power to transform the real and make it seem to be something other than 
what it had always seemed before ... The potency o f metaphors derives from the 
possibility that a resemblance recognized on the surface o f language will cause a 
fundamental transformation in the way we perceive, organize, and express our experience 
o f the world.”1 A constant characterization of the world as “a jungle” may affect our 
feelings about daily life. The same work! might be called “a garden” suggesting a very 
different relationship between humans and their environment.
Of course metaphor goes beyond transforming traditional concepts. It may also act 
as a policeman, narrowly restricting the range of meanings we apply to a message. Thus, 
Whorf states that the individual’s ability to interact with his environment is restricted by 
his language.2 Likewise, Wittgenstein (cited in Edwards, 1992) asserts “that the world is 
my world shows itself in the fact that the limits of my language (of the only language I can 
understand) means the limits of my world.”3
Lakoff and Johnson state that metaphors are prevalent in everyday life, in language, 
action and thought. Metaphorical concepts structure what people perceive, how they relate 
to each other and how they act. In other words, metaphorical concepts play a functional 
role in defining everyday realities. Through the use of metaphorical concepts, we are able
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to comprehend one aspect o f a concept in terms o f another. However, as mentioned before, 
even as metaphor highlights one aspect of a concept, it may hide another aspect of the 
concept for the same person. That is, “a metaphorical concept can keep us from focusing 
on other aspects of the concept that are inconsistent with that metaphor.'*4 If we view a 
company as a machine, we will emphasize its efficiency and productivity, but we may not 
value its nurturing dimensions. In addition, a pattern of metaphor sets the context by which 
particular sentences and words are interpreted.
Lakoff and Johnson continue to claim that “people in power get to impose their 
metaphors” upon others.5 Metaphors have the power to construct and define reality and 
those with higher spoken status have greater access to media. Consequently, Lakoff and 
Johnson believe that reality is seen and understood through the eyes of the dominant class. 
National leaders “define” the nation’s enemies. Until recently the U.S. Department of 
Interior defined who was or was not an “Indian.” The Farm Bureau defines who is or is not 
a farmer in terms that seem arbitrary to so-called hobby fanners. From a purely strategic 
point of view, it is not the truth or falsity of a metaphor that counts. Rather, what counts is 
the “perception and inferences that follow from it and the actions that are sanctioned by 
it.”6
For Lakoff, metaphors are inherent in the person's experience and fundamental.7 
Metaphors are placed between subjective experience and objective reality. Our 
understanding of things in terms of others help us find coherence and resemblance and 
order by using different types of metaphors. Lakoff and Johnston claim that people tend to 
understand one thing in terms of another, be it prototypes or categories.8
Lakoff and Turner made several claims that form the basis of their approach to 
metaphor:
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1. Metaphor is a conceptual organization from the source domain to the target 
domain. The target domain may or may not be obvious yet it is what the 
metaphor is “all about.”
2. Metaphors are predominant in language and they reflect cognitive and 
cultural formulation of the world.
3. Poetic metaphor enriches everyday metaphor.9
Metaphors vary according to two parameters. First, a metaphor is
‘conventionalized’ “to the extent that it is automatic, effortless, and generally established 
as a mode of thought among members of a linguistic community.”10 Second, a metaphor is 
‘conceptually indispensable or basic’ in the sense that it is virtually utterly changing the 
way we think. In the early part of the 20th century the idea of an organization as a 
“machine” seemed as natural as the force of gravity or breathing air. The Taylorites acted 
upon the idea to form scientific management, a perspective that broke factories into 
interchangeable parts, treated workers as productivity units, and managers as efficiency 
experts.
Julian Jaynes (cited in Mulaik,1995) argued that metaphor is crucial to cognition. 
He states that when a person encounters an unfamiliar situation/experience that is difficult 
to comprehend, he turns to metaphor for help to assist him in understanding the new 
experience with known schemas.11 In other words, according to Jaynes, metaphor helps the 
person comprehend the unfamiliar. Lakoff argued that cognition is both preconceptual and 
conceptual12 The preconceptual implicates perception and embodied action. It consists of 
two levels: basic level structure and kinesthetic image schemas. The conceptual is abstract 
and representational. Lakoff argues that our understanding of the world is embedded in 
image schemas. These, applied to smaller or larger levels of magnitude, become the bases
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of metaphor. Johnson and Lakoff explored many metaphoric preconceptual image schemas 
such as forces, personifications, conduits, birth, and causation.13 These form the perceptual 
heart of our core metaphors, and their effect is omnipresent in language.
Burke and Perebnan also assert that metaphor requires special attention. Burke 
states that metaphor is one of the four master figures of speech, an idea he borrowed from 
Vico without apparent acknowledgment.14 Like irony, metonymy, and synecdoche, Burke 
regards metaphor as a means of bridging metaphysical and material domains. For 
Perelman, metaphors are very essential in human cultures and world-views. They facilitate 
the development of thoughts and constitute an important tool of proof because they 
connect separate spheres: the lucid and disputable; the ordinary and the spiritual.15 
Metaphors have the power to create order, meaning, and new realities in our lives.
Both Burke and Perelman agree with Lakoff that metaphors are more than 
linguistic decorations and that metaphors negotiate different orders of experience. These 
scholars also agree that metaphors are selective and thus limit as well as expand meaning. 
Similarly, Lakoff and Johnston assert that metaphors emphasize certain aspects o f an event 
and suppress other aspects that do not frill within its logic o f the chosen association.16 
Further, Burke affirms that bringing out “the thisness of a that and the thatness of a this” 
using the “perspective process”17 is a heuristic approach to the countless aspects o f reality. 
It is a composing process, producing an edited version o f the external world. An old truism 
states that the act of invention involves abstraction and therefore selection. Similarly, 
Perelman states that metaphors highlight certain themes and leave out others.18 For 
example, in the case of naming foreign policy conflicts, “metaphors form a special class of 
explanations by referring to the events not simply as some type of violent confrontation but 
by borrowing the logic and terms o f the definition from a radically different area of human
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action, such as games, sports, dreams.”19 The British characterized their 19th century 
rivalry with the Russians in Asia as “The Great Game,” WWI was named “Serum” 
(Rugby), and the cold war was called “duel.” Kuusisto wrote: “wars are fought not only 
with arms, but also with words. Official definitions of conflict situations, publicly declared 
motives, names given to the warring parties, and explanations concerning decisions made 
in the course o f the hostilities, the rhetoric and discourses o f war, play as important a role 
in the progression of events as do the physical acts of belligerency that accompany 
them.”20 Facts are not mere facts and cannot speak for themselves. They need to be named 
and given meanings through words in order to be understood. Therefore, events, actors, 
and objects exist after they “have been constructed and ordered in human language and 
speech, placed into a textual context of purposes and roles.”21 Thus, events, objects and 
subjects don’t just exist because they are there but because o f the actors who define and 
interpret them and because o f the linguistic practices which mold them.22 Foreign policy 
rhetoric has a potent ability to shape people’s perception of events and objects. Such 
rhetoric can make people believe that a particular actor, such as Saddam Hussein, is a 
crazy enemy or other actors such as Serbs are savage tribes bent on destroying the world. 
And, o f course, characterizations of “savagery” or “craziness” leave residues of ill feeling 
that remain long after the events and the actors who inspired them have passed from the 
scene.
However, Kuusisto maintains that such power is not random but follows a 
particular pattern.23 For example, Alker (cited in Kuusisto, 1998) studied the repetitive 
elements o f historical and societal texts.24 He argued that all stories follow a particular 
pattern. Stories feature repetitive poetic and mythic factors, such as dragons and heroes, 
kidnapping and rescuing. These familiar patterns help people give meaning and identity to
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their community providing celebratory niches for the heroes and canonizing victorious 
moments o f their past.
In times o f crisis, a dominant metaphor may determine the range of possibilities for 
problem solving.25 Thus, for example, the three Western leaders, United States, Great 
Britain, and France, in the Gulf War used the charismatic metaphor of rescue mission to 
justify their acts and operation to an international audience. Their discourse shaped the 
destinies of thousands of people. So, by January 1991, the discourse of the three Western 
leaders depicted Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait as “a threat to the freedom and security of 
each individual nation and as a menace to international law.”26 This appeared to legitimize 
action in the Gulf. However, in Bosnia, the three Western leaders found the situation too 
complicated for tidy metaphorical framing and they ruled out any military action in the 
Balkan. To justify their inaction, they depicted Bosnia as a “tragedy, a muddled, cruel, and 
meaningless slaughter that outside forces could do very little about.”27 The image of chaos 
is not one that mobilizes nations.
The relationship between metaphor and frames can be expressed as:
1. What goes with what? (Clusters or Patterns)
2. What goes against what? (Agons)
3. What follows what? (Order and Hierarchy)
4. What is transformed into what? (Transcendence)
If a frame may be thought o f as the dominant perspective of a text, then metaphor is 
the building block of the frame. The coherence, conflict, and resolution of the metaphor 
patterns that make up the text determine the moral ethos of the frame. Kenneth Burke spent 
years studying these patterns o f discourse. He believed that strategic discourse was not 
random in its imagery, but strongly patterned (clustered) and that it bristled with binary
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patterns (agons). It was explicitly value laden (hierarchical) and constantly rising to invoke 
sacred sanctions (Transcendence).
Blankenship and Kang examined how ten major newspapers in the United States 
‘constructed’ the 1984 presidential debate by analyzing the verbal and visual metaphors 
used by the press. They found that the most pervasive metaphoric patterns were those of 
war and aggression, followed closely by sports, and metaphors taken from the world of 
show business. For example, according to the press, the debaters ‘smashed, attacked, and 
assaulted each other.’ Moreover, “the debates were seen as a best of five series.” 28 The 
researchers concluded that although they didn’t claim that the press is the sole constructor 
o f reality, yet they assert that the media “are among those who have both the initial power 
to characterize and the power to diffuse those characterization.”29 The researchers drew 
two conclusions: First, that political reality is constructed. Second, that reality is reflexive 
because the way people talk about reality shapes their attitudes toward that reality. This 
means that text and practice interpenetrate. The codes and tropes developed by the press 
form a kind of doxa as political campaign coverage matures.
Coles examined how the dominant and oppositional discourses of the Gulf War are 
supported and compelled by identifying and incorporating the “active framing strategies of 
dominant actors.”30 Coles asserts that in political discourse language plays a major role in 
constituting the status upon which people “base their claim to exercise power.”31. 
Accordingly, the predominant discourse defines and delimits the things that should and 
should not be said.
This means that leaders can test the analogical possibilities of their metaphor. Coles 
noted that George Bush linked the Iraqi invasion to Adolf Hitler and WWII. The purpose 
o f the extreme analogy was to make people perceive the Gulf War as a just cause and a
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“good war.” The acceptance of the analogy allowed Bush to overwhelm the discourse of 
oppositional peace movements. His story became the mono-narrative, and finally 
approximated a closed view of the war.
Hay explored the power of the crisis metaphor in the fall o f British Labor at the 
close o f the 1970's.32 The electoral pendulum was hastened by the media's announcement 
of a 'V inter of discontent” and a call for political renewal of transportation. Those who 
have the power to define crisis also have the power to define the strategies of solving it. 
The British media discourses constituted the moment of transformation as a crisis. The 
'discursive selectivity’ that was imposed by the media narratives constructed reality and 
created a sense of crisis. The media characterized the British as sleep walking into decline: 
“IT IS TIME TO WAKE UP BEFORE THE NIGHTMARE OF BRITAIN BECOMES A 
REALITY.”33 When Margaret Thatcher rose to power, she exploited the obverse face of 
the sleep metaphor through her constant theme of Britain’s awakening.
Stein examined the framing process used by the U.S. social movements by looking 
at the Holocaust rhetoric and the symbolic appropriation forms of two opposing 
movements: The Lesbian/Gay movement and the Christian Right.34 Snow and Benford 
(cited in Stein 1998) stated that after WWII, the Holocaust metaphor has become an 
association by which U.S. social movements are able to “claim moral authority.”35 Gay 
activists, for example, have used the Holocaust as a simile to emphasize their victimhood 
“comparing the plight of homosexuals today to the plight of victimized minorities during 
the German Reich.”36 Through the use of the Holocaust frame, gays and lesbians present 
themselves as victims and their opponents as oppressors. Moreover, when the AIDS 
epidemic spread among the gays and lesbians, the Holocaust metaphor helped frame their 
charges against conservative activists and apathetic health professionals. Likewise, the
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Christian Right used the Holocaust frame to dispute the gay activists' rhetoric of 
victimhood, asserting a reversal o f roles.
Edwards analyzed the structured metaphors in imperial discourse to discover their 
touchstone images and role in rhetorical framing. Accordingly, he chose the imperial 
discourse of Churchill, then a young officer and journalist, during the 1897 uprisings in 
Chakdara and Malakand. He also studied the discourse of Mad Fakir who wanted to claim 
the Mughal throne of India. Edwards recognized that both Churchill and Fakir used 
miracles as metaphorical tools to promote their causes. Churchill, for example, used 
miracles to explain the causes o f the uprisings and as an “evidence of the fanatical nature 
of the local people."37 Miracles have the same effects as metaphors and both have the 
capacity to make people perceive the world in a particular way and also to involve people 
in the resolution of their own problems. Edwards realized that “lifting the veil” was a 
metaphor central to both discourses yet it meant different things according to who was 
using it. For the British, it “expressed the dominance of reason over superstition and 
civilization over barbarism.”38 For the followers of Fakir, it symbolized the “hidden nature 
o f divine power in the world and the inevitable failure of all political dominion, save that 
of God."39 This opposite use of the same metaphors demonstrates, Edwards concluded, 
their power to create meaning or to legitimize an action.
In the same study, Edwards examined how one can predict presidential decision­
making from the presidential language and media coverage. Using a concept developed by 
Kenneth Burke, he states that the definitions the president uses in his discourse are a 
‘terministic screen’ through which the public views the event Reagan used significant 
symbols in his discourse, symbols that maintain “singular meaning over a long period of 
time and are usually attached to basic cultural attitudes toward objects whether these
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objects ate people, institutions or settings.”40 When these symbols reified in political action 
and in individual practice, the text gains a pragmatic sanction, even a higher truth status. 
Thus Reagan’s ’64 Go Id water address now enjoys prophetic power and is a source of 
symbolic capital for conservatives.
Moreover, metaphor has epistemic properties. Rhetoric as the “art of manipulating 
meaning”41 is the tool that helps people perceive or apprehend something. Moreover, since 
the world is plural because of the way people apprehend it, then there are truths about the 
world that are contradictory and provisional42 Brummett argues that there is no absolute 
meaning for any event; rather meaning is attributed to experience and is negotiated through 
rhetoric.43 For example, the old classical metaphor o f the balance beem suggests our 
apparently contradictory needs for both stability and change can be resolved in daily life. 
Brummett also argues with James Andrews that a choice o f metaphor is a choice of 
worlds.44 For example, categorizing a particular discourse as mythic reflects a friendlier 
move than describing it as a force. The term, “euphemism” (a soft name for a harsh reality) 
suggests the ubiquity o f this practice.
Studies Related to the Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Media.
Studies conducted about the Arab Israeli conflict from a rhetorical perspective are 
rare. There are also few studies conducted about the role o f the media in the conflict. Among 
these studies, Vallone etaL examined how pro-Arab and pro-Israeli viewers perceive the 
coverage of the Beirut Massacre.45 The researchers concluded that each party tends to 
perceive the coverage as biased in favor of the opposing party. Wolfsfeld examined how the 
ability o f the government to promote the policies through the news media changes through 
time and circumstances. He argued that the leaders are in constant struggle to control the 
political environment and, consequently, monitor the flow o f news from the media.46
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Wolfcfeld studied the Rabin government's attempt to promote the peace process to the Israeli 
public. He found that the first few months of the peace process, which were successful, led to 
media dependency on the government However, in the second phase of Oslo, the 
negotiations became difficult and consequently the media took an independent and adversarial 
role since the government wasn’t able to control terrorism and political dissent Similarly, the 
media became dependent on Rabin Government during the peace process with Jordan, 
because it occurred at a moment when Rabin’s government dominated the political 
environment.
Conclusion
This chapter concludes the overview of theory and the nature of an appropriate 
method. The next chapter will begin the application of my method and the analysis of 
discourse.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE FRAMING OF PEACE PROCESS IN ASSAFIR
Assafir. a leading Lebanese newspaper, has been in circulation for 35 years. While 
it is considered the second most read newspaper in Lebanon, its readership spans the 
region. It is on the web and it is distributed in most Arab countries. This chapter will 
examine the framing of the peace process in Assafir. The analysis will focus first on news 
stories. The latter part of the chapter will deal with the editorials and opinions.
News Stories
The Mood of the News Stories 
The peace process made headlines on the front pages in nearly every issue of 
Assafir in 1993 and in 1996. 1993 was selected because it was the year the peace accord 
was signed between the Palestinians and Labor party. 1996 was chosen because it was a 
fateful year for peace. Likud came to power in that year dashing hopes for achieving any 
realistic peace agreements between the Arabs and the Israelis. 1996 was the axial year 
when the mood of hope was replaced by a mood of angry fatalism.
In 1993, a general mood of pessimism dominated the news stories. At the 
beginning of the year, a mood of guarded hope was interrupted by dark headlines that dealt 
with the issue of the 400 Hamas members who were deported from Palestine. Positive 
headlines such as “Rabin reiterates previously spoken words: Partial withdrawal from 
Golan in return for comprehensive peace,”1 and “Baker. Negotiations are useful for all. 
Israel prepares to withdraw from Golan”2 were dominant in January, but even these 
headlines were clouded by dark headlines about the Palestinian deportees. Peace gradually 
became linked to the fate of the deportees. Thus headlines such as “Mubarak warns of the 
dangers of deporting Palestinians on Peace”3 dominated the pages of Assafir until May of
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1993. Moreover, the headlines focused on the key player in the peace process, the United 
States represented by Secretary of State, Warren Christopher. A February 6 headline stated 
“Huge doubts surround the possibility o f Christopher’s success in his mission (to rescue 
peace talks).”4 The lead of the news story assured that “Christopher will not succeed in 
deciding a new round of negotiations in April.”5 Moreover, a February 4 headline read, 
“Washington rushes resuming negotiations despite Arabs’ objections.”6 On April 29, 
pessimism was reflected in America’s tone as “Washington warns o f the consequences of 
delay[ing] peace talks.”7
In fact, most of the headlines in the first half o f 1993 concentrated not on achieving 
a peace treaty alone but also on the difficulty o f the process of setting a date to start a new 
round of talks. For example, on April 20, the headline stated “the ninth round of talks 
postponed . ..and peace agreement is being tested.”8 A June 4 headline read, “Possibility to 
resume the tenth round on June 14.”9 In addition, in most of the news stories peace seemed 
to be ‘mission impossible’. A February 10 headline stated that “the peace process faces a 
dilemma,”10 followed by a February 25 headline stating that “Christopher returns to the 
Israeli starting point: The negotiations are foil o f obstacles and geography complicates 
things.”11 This pessimistic mood continued through April and was sustained by headlines 
such as “Arab parties prepare themselves for a foiling negotiation.”12 and “Washington 
prepares cloudy proposals for the negotiations.”13
After June, the headlines concentrated on the deal reached between Arafat and 
Rabin. Although the settlement reached might seem something positive at the surface, 
however, the underlying tone reflected a negative mood. For example, on the first of 
September, the headline stated, “Gaza-Jericho agreement paves the way for a Palestinian 
Israeli accord; Palestinian strikes ... Syrian-Jordanian concern...”14 followed by a
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September 6 headline assuring that “PLO: Arafat and Rabin will declare mutual 
recognition; Palestinian-Israeli caution toward September 13.”15 The negative mood in 
these headlines was reinforced by the subheadings that accompanied them. The pessimism 
is obvious in a headline such as “Signing the accord is delayed: Jericho municipality ... 
and the police a symbol.”16 Even after the accord was signed, the headlines sustained their 
negative mood by focusing on the differences between the parties. For example, on 
September 15, the headline stated, “First day after signature: Palestinian-Israeli differences 
regarding execution.”17 Such headlines were further amplified by others such as 
“Washington talks o f‘deep disagreement’ between Syria and Israel and its intention to 
close the gap.”18 The nadir was reached in a November 15 headline that announced: “Israel 
builds ‘security zone’ around Jerusalem and asks PLO to control opposition.”19 The year 
ended with gloomy assessments o f progress toward peace.
Following the same pattern, 1996 news stories reflected a negative mood, a mood 
especially heightened after Netanyahu came to power in May. While the attitude shuttled 
between optimism and pessimism in the first five months of the year, it became more 
pessimistic when Netanyahu came to power and unleashed an anti-Oslo rhetoric. The 
mood expressed in the headlines was reflected in the leads of the news stories as well. For 
example, on January 22, 1996, the headline read, ‘Tel Aviv rejects commitment to overt 
withdrawal” and continued to ask “Has Peres’s preference of peace over election 
changed?”20 On January 24, a reporter titled his news as if a burst of hope had been 
undermined by deep division between parties. He wrote, “A decisive round of negotiations 
after a wave o f pessimism; Syria focuses on withdrawal and Israel’s security concern 
‘jumps’ to issues o f water and economy.”21 The focus on the differences cast temporary 
progress as a false dawn of peace. For example on January 30, a reporter wrote, “PLO
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confirms and Israel denies the beginning of unofficial talks regarding Jerusalem.”22 In 
general, the mood of the news stories depended on who was the focus of the headline. In 
other words, the mood was pessimistic/negative when Israel or the Arabs were the main 
actors in the headline, while the mood became relatively optimistic when the main 
characters of the headline were Americans. A kind of American innocence was juxtaposed 
against Middle East cynicism. A headline on January 25 read, “Maryland’s Peace talk 
resumes to a reality of Israeli stubbornness.”23 On February 5, a news story headline read, 
“Election atmosphere welcomes Christopher in Israel and Damascus does not see any 
reason for the American optimism.”24 On February 26, the headline runs, “Maryland’s 
negotiation resumes on Wednesday; Damascus expects stagnation.”23 The negative mood 
o f the news stories was reflected in key words such as “impede” as in “Damascus: New 
Settlements set impedes peace,”26 “terrorism”, “irrelevant circumstances,” “revenge,” 
“stagnated talks,”—
The Americans were quoted most of the time in the headlines as having some 
optimism toward the peace negotiations until May; afterward a sense of pessimism became 
the dominant American style note as well. They were quoted in headlines, “Christopher: 
The situation between Washington and Damascus is very complicated.”27 Or “Washington 
expresses its concerns regarding the tension between Syria and Israel”28 In May, the mood 
became more pessimistic as Likud came to power with a different agenda with respect to 
the peace with Arabs. Headlines such as “Netanyahu will not commit to Elkhalil deal”29 
“Netanyahu specifies his condition for 'Lebanon First’”30 or “Netanyahu threatens to stop 
the American aid to the Palestinians: No negotiations unless activities are ceased in 
Jerusalem,”31 or “Netanyahu rules out any deal regarding Jerusalem.”32 These headlines 
along with others o f similar mood dominated the news stories for the rest of the year. All
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these headlines sabotaged the earlier notes of optimism regarding the peace process. More 
negative vocabularies started to pop out in the headlines: “absent,” “threatens,” “accuses,” 
“entangles,” “complicates,” ... These negative verbs expressed a pessimistic mood with 
respect to the peace process.
Patterns of Imagery
In most of the news stories analyzed in Assafir. the terms “peace” and “the peace 
process” cluster with terms that formed a dominant pattern in a large number of articles. 
These clusters are often geographical and rhetorical, but sometimes they are dialectical and 
relational Often, “peace” was referred to as a geometric figure. Peace is “a circle that has 
to be closed” and the “key” to that is to achieve a breakthrough in the negotiations.33 In 
addition, Warren Christopher asserted that “there is still a chance to complete the full circle 
of peace.’'34 In some articles peace talks are treated as a ‘boxing race’ that needs to go 
through several “rounds.”35 In other articles, peace was treated as a ‘tempting prize’ that 
Israel would gain in return “for her withdrawal from the Golan Heights.”36 Moreover, there 
was a trend in the news stories that shows the peace process was clustered with “borders” 
whenever the Arab perception of peace was covered, and with “water and economy”37 
when the Israeli perception was mentioned. In addition, peace is associated with 
“normalization” when Israeli sources were quoted. And it was not any peace that the 
negotiating parties were trying to achieve. It is a “comprehensive and fair peace” that is 
based on “international legislative decisions and on the principle of land for peace.”38 
Arab/Israeli relations were parsed by adding emotive terms. Metaphors from nature are 
also used to refer to different types o f peace. There is “cold” peace like the one with Egypt, 
and there is “warm” peace like the one with Jordan and then there is an “ambitious peace” 
that Barak thinks Syria is seeking.39
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Assafir tends to use not only its own concepts and metaphors when it covers peace 
but excerpts the perspectival metaphors o f its neighbors. For example, the peace process is 
like a ‘door’ whose “key is Israel’s agreement to withdrawal”40; this is paraphrased from 
what Damascus has to say. Moreover, the news article continues covering how Syria thinks 
of peace as a 'battle’ where the enemy puts it in the category of “maneuvering”41 or what 
Christopher describes the talks as “preliminary maneuvering.”42 Moreover, peace is treated 
as a business deal. So “Christopher does not believe that the negotiators are going to 
achieve any deals in this round.”43
These “imported” peace clusters or agons within Assafir suggest a perspectival 
stability among the players in the peace process. For example, when Syria is quoted, peace 
is always associated with fairness. Syria is ready to make peace “when peace is fair,”44 
Assafir quoted Assad; and the Baath party assures Syria’s desire to achieve a “fair and 
comprehensive peace in the region,”45 [unlike Israel] whom Khaddam accused of desiring 
“a peace of force.”46 Moreover, the Lebanese foreign minister was quoted saying that 
[Lebanon] does not want violence but rather a “real and fair peace.”47 Egypt’s Foreign 
Minister is also quoted saying that Egypt aims at a “balanced peace between the Arabs and 
Israel”48 There are not only different types of peace, but peace is also treated as a “deal” 
that cannot be ratified unless certain conditions are met. Peace is also a selling 
merchandize that needs to be marketed. For example, Assafir spoke of Gaza-Jericho accord 
as a deal that “is being marketed for billions of dollars.”49 Similar metaphors are used to 
refer to the peace process. Peace accords are not ultimate goals any longer but rather a 
means to an ultimate end. For example, Assafir stated “Israel harvest the economic fruits of 
the agreement before signing it”50 thus peace becomes a 'crop’. And thus for the Arabs, the 
“land” becomes a concept that clusters with peace without which peace is impossible.
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“Syria leaves the door open for talks, but insists on Israeli guarantee of a withdrawal from 
the Golan Heights.”51 In another headline, Assafir wrote, “France and Syria agree on the 
principle: ‘Land for peace’.”52 In addition, in another news story, Assafir quoted a Syrian 
official assuring that Syria “wants to achieve a peace that ends the foil occupation, and that 
returns the land to its owners and that guarantees the Arabs’ rights and the principle of land 
for peace.”53 As we can see, peace is no longer an abstract term. It is transformed into a 
tangible material object that can be measured and even weighed. How much settlement 
there is decides how much peace there can be. How much land is given decides how much 
peace can be given in return. At times, peace seems to be the prize that is paid for 
particular merchandise. When peace is defined in so many different ways, the goals and 
means seem not only complex, but perhaps contradictory as well With so many different 
motives, only a spacious “cluster” can accommodate these differences.
Further, one group’s clusters are another group’s agons. For Arabs, land and 
resources are clustered with peace while settlement and unemployment are agons of 
conflict. For example, Assafir quoted a Palestinian source saying that the peace process 
would be in real danger if the problem o f “unemployment” was not solved. Thus the 
association of unemployment with peace is an agonistic or negative coupling in contrast to 
the positive cluster terms o f stability and prosperity.54 “Settlements” is one of these terms 
that are treated as a danger to the peace process. On July 10, Assafir wrote: “Talks are 
postponed as Netanyahu insists on settlements.”55 The Egyptian Foreign Minister was 
quoted saying, “the politics o f‘settlements’ is very dangerous to peace.”56 “Settlement” 
and “peace” had become opposed terms for many Arabs as well for frontier minded 
Israelis.
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On the other hand, if the source is from the Israeli or Israel's supporters’ side, 
different concepts and terms act as agons or clusters to peace and the peace process. 
“Terrorism” is a recurring agon in the Israeli and American rhetoric. Assafir quoted 
Clinton saying that Netanyahu believes that “terrorism is an obstacle in improving 
relations with Syria.”57 In another news story, Netanyahu insisted that “the only way for 
Syria to prove to the Israelis that Syria wants peace is by stopping terrorism in South 
Lebanon.”58
Furthermore, Assafir detailed the Israelis’ constant association of peace and 
security. Assafir quoted Ducharet, ‘France totally understands Israel’s need for security” 59 
in return for peace.
Peace is also treated as a person whose welfare is organically related to events. 
Peace is also treated as a pregnant woman and Peres wants to fight those “who desire to 
abort peace.”60 The peace process is like any person who “faces real dilemmas”61 and who 
Washington treats as “an illegal baby.”62 Moreover, peace is also a student that is being 
‘tested’ to see if it can pass the exam.63 Finally, if the situation in the region remains 
having “a dark gray color” then the peace is like an individual going into “isolation and 
retreat”64
Many other images are used to portray the peace process. As usual, these images 
are usually used by the sources o f Assafir. but Assafir tended to emphasize on them. For 
example, Assafir quoted Peres saying that “we are on the seventh day of our Torah trip” as 
he referred to the peace process. Thus peace is a trip that some journalist wondered if it 
was a “trip in a diplomatic desert” and Peres responded, “I believe it is half arid, but I don’t 
think it is a desert”65 Peace is also treated as water that can be “frozen”. The peace talks
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that took place “assures Israel's politics to 'freeze' the peace process,”66 wrote Assafir 
quoting a Palestinian source.
Peace is also spoken of in terms of war concepts. Peace is a fragile being that Israel 
is ready “to blast” at any time.67 On August 8, Assafir headline read: “The Oslo peace 
agreement explodes between Israel and the Palestinian Authority”68 and with reference to 
Jerusalem as a condition for peace, Assafir quoted Arafat insinuating that “Jerusalem is our 
most important battle,”69 and that he would not give up on diplomacy although “the bells 
of warning are tolling.”70 Moreover, in another headline, Assafir wrote, “The occupation 
turns Jerusalem into a military base.”71 While there are many images and concepts that are 
associated with peace, the nature and variety of metaphor suggest the emotional response 
to peace is connected strongly to national identity and aspiration. Land, security, war, 
fairness, recognition, homeland, and work are powerful associations and their connections 
with the peace process suggest the passion and complexity of the project.
Extended Action and Characterization o f  Actors 
Part of the framing process that Assafir adopted in its coverage of the news story is 
a special characterization of actors involved in the peace process as well as the events 
related to the peace process itself. It is worth noting that in the news stories, most of the 
characterizations are not directly Assafir’s but those of its sources that are adopted by 
Assafir. In addition to the metaphors and key concepts that are used to cover peace and the 
peace process, Assafir tended to portray characters and events in a particular way by either 
talking about them directly or quoting sources.
For example, on January 22, Assafir indirectly questioned Peres's credibility in the 
headline: “Has Peres’s preference of 'peace over elections’changed?”72 On April 30, 
Assafir portrayed Peres as a fragile leader whose “image is shaken more than ever before
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on both the political and media arenas.”73 However, in the same news story, it portrayed 
Peres as an assertive leader who assures “that peace will defeat terrorism.”74 On January 
23, Assafir also described Barak as a snobbish and condescending man who speaks with “a 
patronizing tone to the Arabs.”73 Assafir’s negative characterization of the Israeli actors 
especially targeted Netanyahu. The latter was portrayed as a strict leader who insisted that 
they “will not submit to the Arabs’ demands.”76 Moreover, Netanyahu is a ‘troublemaker’ 
even with his own people who has “overstepped the red line and insulted David Levy,”77 
as Assafir quoted from an Israeli TV channel. He is a ‘hostile and antagonistic’ who keeps 
threatening to stop the American aids to the Palestinians if they do not stop their activities 
in Jerusalem.”78 Or he “threatens with an extremely painful retaliation against Hizbollah 
and even Syria.”79 Arafat was quoted calling Netanyahu “an idiot because he started the 
battle over Jerusalem,”80 and “accused him of declaring war on the Palestinians.”81 Thus 
Netanyahu was routinely characterized as brutal, cunning, manipulative and hostile. This is 
not a ‘trustworthy’ partner for negotiation of any sort. Rabin was also treated as an 
‘indifferent’ character who “disregarded the objections of the settlers.”82
In the same article, Assafir indirectly underwrote Arafat’s accusations by 
mentioning at the end of the news story that “the Israeli military destroyed five Palestinian 
homes in the west Bank alleging that they were not licensed.”83 Every time Assafir talks 
about the Israelis, it refers to them as the “occupation” thus contesting or disputing their 
legitimacy as an Independent State. Assafir also portrayed Israel as an actor that loves 
revenge. A March 7 headline read, “Israel most prominent choice is revenge,”84 which, 
Assafir continued in the body o f the news story, “reflects Israel’s powerlessness towards a 
cessation o f the negotiation process with Syria.”85
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Israel’s later modification of war talk was seen as a ruse. A headline o f September 
23 said, “Netanyahu retrieves the atmosphere of Yum Kippur war in Golan Heights and 
Israel reinforces its military bases and threatens that it is ready for any emergency.”*6 As 
quoted by the paper, Syria continued to accuse Netanyahu o f“pursuing a biased aggressive 
policy and that Israel wants a peace of force rather than a peace of international 
legitimacy”;87 the accusation continued to describe Netanyahu as a “stubborn” man who 
“has returned the peace process to point zero and who has deepened the hatred against the 
Arab nations.”88
Assad, on the other hand, was portrayed as a confident and strict person who 
assures that “no one can submit Syria or scare her with the accusation of terrorism.”89 
Moreover, Assad is a man of peace who insists that the Syrians “are peace callers and work 
for peace for the sake of the Syrian people and the people of the world to live in peace.”90 
The Syrian Vice President was quoted saying that “Syria and Lebanon cannot fall in any 
Israeli trap that may guarantee Israel great benefits at the expense o f Arabs and their 
legitimate rights.”91
In addition to its own characterization, Assafir quoted major sources that appear to 
support its own characterization of the actors. It quoted a Syrian source portraying Israel as 
an aggressive war lover who is “discussing the issue of peace with a war mentality”92 and 
who is stubborn to an extent that it keeps setting “impossible conditions that may kill the 
peace process.
In addition, Israel was portrayed as a “cruel” actor who should “be punished until it 
takes away the hunger siege that it imposes on the Palestinians in Gaza and the West 
Bank” and who had deported 400 Palestinians to the middle of nowhere in 1993.94 
Moreover Israel was described as always “threatening” the other parties to either accept its
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terms or it will escalate the tension.95 Also Israel was portrayed as a “greedy” actor who 
always “refuses to withdraw from South Lebanon alleging that it needs security 
guarantees”96 and who “harvests the economic benefits of the accord.”97 Israel is also 
depicted as a player who always throws the responsibility of its own deeds on others. For 
example, on January 5, 1993 Assafir wrote, “Israel maneuvers to make Lebanon 
responsible for the safety of the deportees.”98 Israel was also shown as an “arrogant” player 
who “challenges the United Nations.”99 Israel was also exposed as an obstructer to justice 
who has sent the “first blow to the peace accord”100 and who keeps “putting impediments 
in way o f peace.”101
On the other hand, Assafir quoted Warren Christopher portraying Assad as a 
skeptical man who had his own “doubts and fears toward Israel which shows the inability 
o f Assad to continue in the peace process.”102 In addition, Christopher’s doubts about the 
success of the peace process were also affected by his views of Syria as a man “supportive 
of terrorism and drug dealing.”103 Christopher, on more than one occasion, was reported to 
have expressed this attitude. On August 2, he insisted that there are “big differences 
between Syria and America since Syria is on the list o f terrorism.”104 However, he believed 
that Syria is a “crucial player in the peace process that one cannot ignore.”105 Thus 
Christopher seemed to say that Syria is a ‘necessary evil’ that one cannot disregard. The 
image of Syria as a terrorism supporter was also found in Dor Gold, Netanyahu’s Arab 
affairs advisor’s claim that Israel cannot negotiate with Syria as long as the latter “employs 
terrorists as their agents.”106 Rabinovitch also “assures that the Syrians are in disarray and 
they are in a definite state of tension.”107 This negative image of Syria does not contribute 
to an atmosphere o f trust necessary for building peace.
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The news stories not only included strong characterizations of actors but also of 
events. For example, Assafir quoted Damascus condemning the growth of the settlements 
as an obstacle to peace. Their expansion threatened to end the peace process. It wrote on 
March 22, 1996 “Damascus: New settlements obstruct to peace.”108 On January 18,1993 
Assafir wrote, “Mubarak warns o f the dangers of deporting Palestinians on Peace.”109 
In addition, Assafir quoted the Egyptian Prime Minister declaring that the Israeli 
blockade/siege of the Palestinians will damage the peace process and call for a 
reconsideration of the whole process at large.110 Ducharet was quoted saying that the 
journey to the peace process was “long and difficult.”111 Washington, on the other hand, 
was reported to be neutral on the deportees issue and neglected its importance.112 
Therefore, Washington seems to treat peace as “an illegal child who does not want to 
adopt.”113 Occasionally, Washington was reported to be working for the Palestinian cause 
although “with unclear promises.”114 The usual suspicions of the broker or third party 
appear in the press when the United States was spoken of as ambiguous, mysterious, and 
uncommitted.
Unique Frames Used in the Coverage o f the Peace Process 
After examining the mood, images and characterization of actors and events, it is 
important to examine what frames these elements form to create a unique shape that 
Assafir reflects in its coverage of the peace process. It is important to note that the frames 
used by Assafir in the news stories depend not only on Assafir’s vision but also on their 
selection and placement of sources. However, the mood of the frame changes to reflect 
Assafir’s attitude toward particular events, new situations, or unexpected opportunities. 
Contradictions, surprises, and changes must be assimilated by the frame. This will be 
discussed in the last part of this chapter.
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In 1993 a major circumstantial “bad faith” frame surrounded peace in the first four 
months of the year. The issue o f the 400 deportees became a condition for resuming peace 
talks. Arab parties refused to talk peace with Israel until the deportees were returned to 
their homes. Assafir’s news stories framed peace accordingly. For example, a January 6 
headline stated “Egypt relates the peace talks with the issue of the deportees,”115 and 
“Mubarak warns from the dangerous impact of deporting Palestinians on Peace.”116
However, in both 1993 and 1996, there are four major perspectives in which the 
peace process was framed. Peace was framed in terms of security, normalization, and 
natural resources when Israel’s motives were discussed. It was framed in terms of 
geographical areas and natural resources when the Arab parties were involved as these 
were assumed to be the motives for negotiations. When Assafir cites an Israeli or an 
American source, their expressed aims are presented as security and normalization with the 
Arabs. Peace becomes conditioned by these two elements and the peace process is limited 
to these two frames.
For example, on January 19,1996, Christopher stated that one of Israeli’s major 
interest in peace was to “avoid any strategic danger against it....and thus normalization 
will guarantee that Israel will be in a safe place.”117 Assafir outlined normalization as a 
contingent action. As Syria demanded a withdrawal from the Golan Heights as a 
precondition for peace, Israel insisted that if Syria agrees to have “normalization with 
Israel,” then Israel will withdraw from Golan and consequently peace will be achieved.118 
For Israel, normalization was also conditioned by the “problem o f water, terrorism and 
security arrangements,”119 and thus peace was discussed within these frames as well 
Israel’s discourse about peace was ‘framed” as a consequence of security. Thus, the head 
o f the Israeli negotiating team was quoted as saying, “Israel will accept any peace that
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guarantees and reinforces its security.”120 President Clinton was also cited as framing the 
peace in security terms. Assafir quoted Clinton, “it is unfair for Israel to give up security in 
return to peace.”121 On another occasion, Clinton insisted that security and normalization 
with the entire Arab world are the way for ending the Arab Israeli conflict and achieving 
peace in the region.122. On several occasions, Assafir cited Clinton promising Israel 
“security guarantees in Golan”123 as a return for peace. Further, Netanyahu was quoted as 
insisting that peace negotiations cannot be resumed unless “the military operations against 
Israel from South Lebanon are ceased.”124 Assafir quoted Barak maintaining that the main 
obstacles to peace are related to security, water, and normalization issues and that the 
“extent of withdrawal depends on the depth of normalization,”125 which consequently 
meant that Israel saw the “amount” of peace as a matter of how for they can have 
normalization with Syria.
The reports oflsraefs demand for warning stations warning stations on the Golan 
Heights further illustrates the pervasive extent of the security frame. Syria (with its 
different geographic frame) states that this demand for stations signals the “failure of the 
negotiations.”126 Israel’s “peace” is viewed through economic and natural resources 
frames. In yet another round of negotiations, Assafir cited the Israeli Prime Minister, 
Shimon Peres, as declaring that the talks would only deal “with the issues of water and 
economy.”127 Although settlements were seen as a major obstacle to peace on the Arab 
side, the Israelis pointedly called them “important for Israel’s security.”128 The impasse 
was highlighted by the Egyptian Foreign Minister’s belief that “the policy of settlements is 
a dangerous act that has its dangerous consequences on the peace process.”129
Assafir consistently reported Syria’s expressions of peace within the geographical 
frame. Syria was said to be willing to have peace with Israel if “there is a foil withdrawal
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from the Golan Heights.”130 Even Rabin reiterated Syria’s concerns by promising a “partial 
withdrawal from Golan in return for a comprehensive peace.”131 The Syrian Vice President 
maintained that “ peace negotiations cannot be resumed unless the Israelis agree to the 
principle of withdrawal from the Arab occupied lands,” “a principle that Netanyahu 
rejects” commented Assafir.132 The geographical framing of peace was repeated by almost 
all Syrian officials cited by Assafir. Assafir characteristically and repeatedly referred to 
Syria’s insistence on “a total withdrawal from the Golan Heights in return for a ‘partial 
peace’.”133 The Syrian Defense Minister stated that the “Syrians aim at peace that puts an 
end to the Israeli occupation and that returns the lands to their owners.”134
In addition, the Palestinians insisted on negotiating the issue of Jerusalem as a 
precondition for any successful peace process. Faisal Husseini, who was in charge of 
Jerusalem file, was cited as declaring that “if Israel wants to live in peace they have to 
achieve an agreement regarding Jerusalem with the Palestinians.”135 The Israelis, on the 
other hand, insisted that “A united Jerusalem is Israel’s Capital”136 and readers were 
reminded that Israel saw “no change in the status of Jerusalem as its Capital”137 The paper 
noted Peres’s statement that “Jerusalem will remain united under Israel’s sovereignty.”138 
Thus Israel considers Jerusalem as its “eternal capital” while the Palestinians see “East 
Jerusalem, which Israel occupied in 1967, as the future Capital of the Palestinian State.”139 
The issue of Jerusalem became a string that each party wanted to pull to its side. Assafir 
blazoned Israel’s supposed intransigence: “Tel Aviv: No medium solutions regarding 
Jerusalem”140 while the Palestinians were said to be ready to deal with the issue in “the 
next phase o f negotiations.”141
As we can see from the above examination, peace is framed by normalization, 
natural resources, and security perspectives. It is reduced to tangible and earthly
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conditions. It is no longer a moral ideal, but rather a prize that is given/earned in return for 
concrete compromises by both parties.
Framing Context
Framing is more than a mechanistic act of disposition and arrangement. It is a 
perspective act that affects human understanding of a particular event. Framing occurs 
within a human context; it reflects and imposes the motives o f the frame. Thus two 
newspapers may frame the same event differently; or they may use a similar frame for 
different events. This section will examine the context in which Assafir framed the peace 
process. Most of the news stories seemed to cover the peace process in an objective 
manner relying on diverse sources of information. However, the selection of particular 
frames reflects Assafir’s agenda and perspective. In a cursory reading of Assafir’s reports, 
we seem to be dealing with objective exposition. A closer reading reveals a particular 
perspective on peace, a perspective that is indirectly conveyed to readers. This seemingly 
objective news may well affect their subjective attitude toward peace. For example, while 
Assafir reported about Rabin’s claim to a partial withdrawal from the Golan Heights, the 
report was preceded by a bigger headline stating “Israeli siege of the Deportees enters its 
third week,”142 thus insinuating that peace was conditioned by the case of the deportees. 
Moreover, just after Assafir reported about the possibility of a resumption of the peace 
negotiations, it concluded with a quote by Peres complaining “it is difficult to keep a chain 
of normal negotiations,”143 thus indirectly hinting that the peace process is not on a healthy 
track. Moreover, in the lead of another news story, A ssafir reported that another round of 
the peace negotiation had started in Maryland [BUT] in “an Israeli negative mood that 
expects failure” and while it talks about the round of negotiation, the whole body o f the 
story focused on the negative comments given by Israeli sources which focus on the
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“difficulty of achieving peace with Syria; and if Israel did achieve peace with Syria, it will 
be difficult to convince the Israeli people of any deal with Syria.”144 And Assafir accused 
Barak of “emptying the peace negotiations o f its content” as he declared that “there are no 
expectations to achieve a quick breakthrough.”145 This pessimistic contextualizatkm is 
reinforced by citing Christopher’s comments “I advise not to expect any major 
outcomes...”146 Furthermore, while Assafir reported that “Syria is concerned about the 
peace process based on the American principles,” it included the sobering comment that 
“Syria does not see any reason for optimism in what the Israeli team offers,”147 and that the 
“previous round of negotiations has caused disappointments because of the over optimism 
that existed after Rabin’s assassination.”148
Assafir expressed a sense of Arab pessimism in its assessment of realistic progress. 
For example, Assafir quoted the Minister o f Agriculture saying, “in my opinion, there is 
not any peace process at all. The Arabs do not want peace and what the [ex -Labor] 
government did was running for peace without realizing that our case in the region is a 
matter of resistance/endurance or death.”149 This negativism was also highlighted by 
reporting the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Amer Moussa, saying, “There is a sense of 
pessimism in the region... we will not remain silent if these negotiations proved to be a 
waste of time.”150
Moreover, Assafir’s coverage o f the peace process was mixed with threats from the 
peace partner. Thus we are told that “Netanyahu announced that his party is not giving up 
Israel’s Nuclear capacity even if there is peace with Syria, Iran and Iraq,”151 and that 
America suggests “the Syrian forces should stay away on an enough distance from the 
borders which will give Israel three days to move its forces in case of any attacks,”152 Thus 
Assafir juxtaposed coverage o f peace talks with reports of war rhetoric.
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On more than one day, Assafir tended to cover the peace process within the context 
of threats and violent events in the region. For example, on February 24, Assafir talked 
about “a strong exchange of fire between Israelis and Palestinians in Gaza.”133 In addition 
Assafir quoted a Lebanese ex Foreign Minister saying, “if terrorism is going to be fought 
likewise, then the peace process is going into isolation and will be replaced by 
bloodshed.”134 “How would Peres Administration respond to the suicidal operations that 
shocked Israel and threatened the American peace process in the region?”133 started one 
news story. Amid the coverage of the peace process, Assafir wrote (in 1993) at great length 
about the Israeli siege of the deportees and the “Israeli siege of the occupied territories” 
and the massacres Israel committed in Gaza causing “one death and 60 wounded.”136 
Likewise, in 1996, Assafir wrote extensively about the Qana Massacre that was committed 
by the Israeli in April 1996 thus questioning the sincerity of peace negotiation while Israel 
was using “force to create a new political status in South Lebanon that may change the 
circumstances and political elements that could help resume peace talks between Israel and 
Syria”137 Moreover, as Israel talked about its intention to make peace in the region,
Assafir reminded its readers that “America has promised Barak to test Falanks missiles on 
Israeli land that may confront any missiles attacks from [Israel’s neighbors].”138
For the most part, the framing of the peace process remained positioned within the 
general context o f aggressive violations in the region. Even when Assafir reported about 
the Gaza-Jericho agreement that “leads to a Palestinian-Israeli accord,” it followed the 
headline by a strong sub-headline stating, “Palestinian strikes internally and 
externally...Israeli and Jordanian worries.”139 Assafir continued highlighting all the 
violations, oppositions, and human casualties after the Oslo Accord was signed thus 
expressing a negative attitude toward the peace agreement. For several weeks before and
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after the peace agreement was signed, Assafir’s headlines maintained a consistent content 
that ranged from “Demonstrations o f‘opposition’ and ‘support’ continues in the occupied 
territories: 10 wounded by the occupier’s [Israel] bullets”160 to “ The first day after signing: 
a Palestinian Israeli disagreement on execution.”161 Reporting appeared to move on a 
double track of peace prospects and war news. Such placement of peace prospects argued a 
state o f futility if not of outright cynicism.
This negative contextualizatkm o f peace continued in 1996. Even while Likud and 
Arafat were trying to talk peace, “Israel intends to keep its troops in Elkhalil pretending to 
protect around 400 settlers” wrote Assafir on June 6 and continued, “the Palestinians 
threatened that the Intifada is going to resume if Israeli doesn’t re-deploy its troops.”162 
Reports of confrontation were interlarded throughout Assafir’s coverage of the peace 
process. For example, on August 29 Assafir quoted Arafat saying to his Administration, 
“the Israeli crimes and continuous violations/infringements means that the Israeli are 
declaring war on the Palestinians... Jerusalem is our biggest war and there will be no 
Palestinian State without Jerusalem.”163 On another occasion, as Assafir covered 
Christopher’s trip to the Middle East to boost the peace process, the story was followed by 
a report stating that “the [Israeli] occupation have committed another massacre in Gaza 
[causing] five deaths and 21 wounded.”164 These stories were in dialogue with yet another 
headline stating, “the negotiations are approaching ... and the number of Palestinians 
martyrs has become ten.”165 In other words, Assafir’s framing of peace process appears 
amid a war of words that is exchanged between the two conflicting parties each accusing 
the other of jeopardizing the peace process and violating agreed pacts.
Peace is contextualized in an atmosphere o f suspicion and recrimination For 
example, on June 6, Arafat responded to Netanyahu’s objection to the existence of a
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Palestinian state, “sooner or later we are going to declare an independent Palestinian state 
with east Jerusalem its Capital and no one can stop us from doing that.”166 In addition to 
that, Assafir reported that the Minister of Justice declared that “he expects a new wave of 
violence in the region if Netanyahu keeps ignoring the already signed peace 
agreements,”167 while Netanyahu assured that “the negotiation with the Palestinians is a 
matter of how far the Palestinians can respect their commitments and responsibilities.”168 
On another occasion, Netanyahu asserted that he sought peace but he believed “it is not fair 
for Israeli to give one hundred percent and the Arabs give zero percent.”169
Assafir’s reports about the American mediation in the peace process suggest an 
American lack of fairness in the region. So while “Clinton assured the Arab leaders that 
Washington is committed to the peace process based on Madrid’s principles..., Israel’s 
friends in the Congress made sure to blame Syria for not having any progress in the 
negotiation process,”170 and that Clinton believes “it is unfair for Israel to give up security 
in return to peace.”171 Moreover, as Syria and Israel were supposed to be negotiating peace 
for land and security, Assafir reported that Netanyahu maintained that “there is no 
withdrawal from Golan Heights.”172 Thus Assafir insinuated that the peace talks were a 
sham and that Israel did not want peace in the region. Assafir seemed to be warning its 
readers not to put much faith in Israel’s peace intention. In the same article, Assafir noted 
with grim resignation, “Sixteen Palestinians died since February because of the Israeli 
embargo.”173 Assafir reminded its readers of the legacy o f bitterness as “Palestinians 
expressed their anger toward the settlement policy,”174 and that a Palestinian minister 
“threatened that violence is going to emerge again if this policy is implemented.” 175 
Assafir ended the story with a quote from the French foreign ministry spokesman on the
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risk of the settlement policy, “we hope that there won’t be any deed that may threaten the 
peace process.”176
In addition to showcasing Israel’s violations, Assafir cited Israeli beliefs about the 
Syrian connections with Hizbollah. While asserting that Syria was willing to talk peace, 
Assafir noted that an Israeli source reported that the Israeli Defense Minister “asked the 
United States to interfere with Hafez Assad and ask him to prevent the passage o f weapons 
and immunity to Hizbullah,”177 and that Assad “still supports the terrorist”178 Assafir 
expressed the fragility o f the situation by quoting an Israeli newspaper, Haaretz, reporting 
that the Israeli government decided to increase the number o f its forces on the Golan 
Heights in retaliation to any Syrian moves in Lebanon”179 and later quoting the Syrian 
Minister of Communication to the effect that “Syria has the right to increase and reinforce 
its military in a defensive position because Israel’s aggressive politics is forcing such an 
atmosphere in the region.”180 This pessimistic frame (peace in a context of war) continued 
throughout the year. Even as Assafir reported on October 7 that the “last opportunity” 
round of negotiations between the Palestinians and Israelis “resulted in both sides agreeing 
to stop the violence and to exchange”181; it immediately followed the story with reports 
about “Israel increasing the settlement budgets” which led the Palestinian negotiator, 
Hassan Asfour, to announce “it is very difficult to negotiate with the Israeli as Israel keeps 
on supporting the settlements and that things are reaching a political disaster and both 
parties are going to lose.”182 Deep into the Fall, news stories continued to reflect this dark 
mood. In a November 26 news report, an Assafir headline read, “Netanyahu suggests a 
summit with Arafat; Israel and the PA exchange warnings.”183
In brief, Assafir’s news stories reflect a negative attitude towards peace. The 
framing context, images, and symbols which Assafir highlights in these stories show a
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deeply pessimistic perspective on peace. It is clear that Assafir. by highlighting difficulties 
and under cutting positive developments, presents a dim picture of the prospects of peace. 
Obstacles are shown to be overwhelming and leaders are reported in such a way that they 
sound insincere, duplicitous or cynical Good news is followed by bad news. Anger and 
suspicion are featured as the dominant style notes o f talks. The effect is one of sullen 
weariness.
Columns and Editorials
The columns and editorials reflect a more ‘subjective and personal’ opinion of 
Assafir than the headlines and news stories. In other words, Assafir’s official subjective 
framing of the peace process appears in the editorials. Because opinions and editorials 
reflect the readers’ and editors’ or the newspaper’s position toward certain events, the press 
makes no pretence of objectivity. It is expected to express opinions and exercise judgment.
The opinions and editorials that appeared in Assafir during 1993 and 1996 convey a 
deeply negative mood toward the peace process. Heavy sarcasm expressed through images 
of failure and betrayal dominated the headlines and the editorials. For example, on January 
1,1996, an editorial title read, “On the road: Lebanon and the Israeli Santa Claus”, in 
which the editor commented, “Santa Claus had ignored the Lebanese people this year and 
didn’t get them their wishful gift which is peace.”184 Thus peace was portrayed as a gift 
that can be offered. The editorial ended with the bitter remark “peace is waiting for other 
unspecified holidays.”185 A personified peace may show up whimsically, but remained 
unscheduled because the timetable is out o f our hands.
Moreover, as peace is characterized in the op-eds in a negative way as are the 
Israelis, who are portrayed as ‘cautious,’ ‘hesitant,’ and ‘hypocritical’ actors whose 
“exaggerated outer enthusiasm to achieve peace is still controlled by hesitant and anxious
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steps”1*6 and who commit atrocities against Palestinians and then claim that each outrage 
“was just an error.”1*7 Moreover, Israel is sarcastically and bitterly portrayed as the 
“decision maker of all the conditions and shape of the peace process” while the Arabs are 
“helpless” who are unable to “reject “what Israel imposes on them.1**
The negative portrayal does not only affect Peres but also touches Arafat who was 
portrayed as a ‘traitor’ who fights all the Palestinians who are against Oslo. The editor 
judged “the Israeli reaction to this “Arafatee Generosity’ as “lack of commitment to 
agreements.”1*9 In fact the writer asked, “Aren’t deadlines unsacred to the Labor party 
especially when it comes to implementing decisions for the Palestinians?”190 The writer 
declared the peace process a sham. He attacked the credibility of both Arafat and Peres 
thus wondering “with this Laborite program and with the Palestinian apparent pathetic 
position, is there anything remained to be negotiated?”191
The peace process is also referred to as a “long road that is full of bumps and mines 
and explosive historical complexes.”192 This battlefield imagery makes peace sound like 
‘war by other means.’ The negative mood toward peace was given a cynical twist in a 
January 29 editorial; the process is compared to a musical instrument that is being “tuned” 
by the “ghost o f Rabin” whose assassination “destroyed the Arab illusion” and that “it is 
ok if the Arabs got dizzy within the Israeli musical chairs.”193 In this editorial, the editor 
not only attacks Israel but also the Arabs who had rushed to have agreements with Israel 
thus saying that there is no real peace process or at least not one of a kind the editor 
endorses. After all, in his opinion, the type o f peace that is going on remains an “illusion.” 
Peace is also referred to as a very sick patient who can only be “treated through [electric] 
shocks.”194
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In another column, the author wrote, “Syria is not honestly happy to drink the cup 
of poison which is signing the agreement with Israel”195, because in the writer’s opinion, 
“Peres is the worst choice because he is a hypocrite political leader who plays the role of 
the prophet of the Middle East Project.”196 Naturally, Syria does not want this poisonous 
agreement and, therefore, having Likud in power is a better option because that keeps the 
image of Israel as a “traditional extremist.”197 In other words, the writer thought that the 
peace process was a poisonous act that Syria does not really want to pursue. This 
extremely negative perspective on peace was also present in a February 9, 1993 editorial, 
which referred to peace as an “unpardonable sin” toward which “Arabs are throwing 
themselves.”198
Coverage of the election featured duplicity as a major frame. Peres was negatively 
portrayed as a man cunningly contradictory in his positions. “Although he expresses his 
intention to have peace and to be called “a hero of peace” he raises three no’s in the face of 
the Arab negotiators: No dismantlement of the Settlements, No division of Jerusalem, and 
No withdrawal from the Golan water.”199 Peres was said to exploit the “Oslo Agreement 
for his own election benefit and his Zionist project to destroy the Palestinian case 
politically.”200 Of course, “total Israeli withdrawal from all the Arab occupied 
territories”201 remained an axiomatic condition in most editorials.
In an editorial, entitled, “the Likudization of Oslo” the writer warned the readers of 
the intention of the new Prime Minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, to “re-design Oslo Accord 
which will lead to the destruction of the whole peace process.”202 The writer characterized 
the new Likud PM as “refusing to negotiate with the weapon pointed to his head” and 
noted the strategic use o f time as “deadlines are also not sacred on the Likud agenda.”203
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In an August 2,1996 column, a writer attacked the Palestinian Authority’s 
credibility in the peace process. He wondered out loud if the PA agreed to a demilitarized 
state allowing Israel to deploy its troops along its borders with Jordan, and if the PA had 
also agreed to prevent the return of the 1948 refugees to Palestine. If this was the case, 
“what could the PA expect to get from Netanyahu’s government who was asking to 
reconsider Oslo’s agreements?”204 Thus if the PA’s credibility was so weak, “how long 
will the Palestinians remain silent toward the game that is gambling with their rights?’203 
The writer continued attacking the PA in other op-eds predicting that “although the PA 
keeps talking about having the east side of Jerusalem as its capital, yet its actions will lead 
in the end to facilitating the process of judiazing the city and consecrating it as a 
reality.”206 This attack on Arafat is part of Assafir’s disappointment in the Arabs, in 
general, who are left with “no other choice but to participate in the peace talks” and thus 
they “creep to the negotiation tables”207 in a passive manner. This condemnation of the 
Arab submission to the Israelis’ demands was very strongly asserted in the June 7,1993 
editorial in which the writers stated, “The Arabs are competing to join the Israeli race to an 
extent that seems there is no need for peace talks or peace accords...”208 In a September 7, 
1993, the editor harshly wrote that “the [Arab] generation of failure is not capable of 
producing more than the Palestinian-Israeli agreement”209
Moreover, on September 18,1996, the editor condemned Netanyahu’s aggressive 
language and his “no’s who kept screaming in the open sky of this confiscated region”.
The writer continued to criticize Netanyahu’s approach to peace, which seems “as if he 
wants to negotiate through missiles, war planes and cannon, and who wants to impose an 
embargo of fire over Syria after he imposed an embargo of hunger over the Palestinians.”
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In an oracular tone, the writer ended,” if this is peace, then how what will war look 
like?’210
In general, the columns and editorials reflect a deeply pessimistic position toward 
the peace process. The editorials, which in effect convey the opinion of the newspaper, 
strongly question the legitimacy o f the peace process. This negative peace is a peace of 
oppression and domination. It sees the type of peace that is taking place in the region as an 
unfair peace that results in more ‘concessions’ from the Arabs and more ‘arrogance’ on the 
Israeli side.
Finally, the pattern o f metaphors used in A ssafir reflects a story of invasion and 
replacement o f people. It is a story about people whose land had been invaded and 
occupied by a “viscous” outsider, and who have been scattered all over the world without a 
home to belong to. Now these people are trying to return home but are not being able to get 
there. Peace becomes a means to get home but many obstacles seem to be in the way of 
peace and consequently the way home seems very long and full of bumps and traps. In 
other words, the pattern of images and metaphors employed by Assafir speaks the story of 
the downtrodden people who seem to have no hope of returning home in the foreseen 
future.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE FRAMING OF PEACE PROCESS IN 
THE JERUSALEM POST
The Jerusalem Post a leading English language Israeli newspaper, has a large 
international circulation. It has been a respected source of news for five decades. In 
addition to distribution centers in five continents, the publication is available on the World 
Wide Web. Using the same categories as the last chapter, this chapter will analyze the 
framing of the peace process The Jerusalem Post The protocols of the former chapter will 
also be followed. First the news stories, then the editorials will be examined.
News Stories
The Mood o f the News Stories
In common with most Middle Eastern newspapers, the 1993 and 1996 front pages 
of The Jerusalem Post dedicated a great part to the coverage of the peace process.
Headlines in nearly every issue of 1993 and 19% focused on the peace process, its 
implications, advantages and drawbacks. As mentioned in the previous chapter, 1993 was a 
year of special significance since it was the time when the peace accord was signed 
between the Palestinians and Labor party. 19% was another fateful year for the peace 
process. Likud came to power in that year and brought with it a deeply pessimistic attitude 
toward the prospect for meaningful peace..
In general, as in Assafir. the 1993 and 19% The Jerusalem Post news stories 
reflected a negative mood, a mood especially heightened in the early months before the 
peace treaty was signed in 1993 and after Netanyahu came to power in May 19%. In 1993 
the mood was less pessimistic than that in 19% since in 1993 negotiations appeared to be 
leading to a real treaty between the Palestinians and Israel Despite its greater overall
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optimism, the mood in the early months o f the year was pessimistic. For example, on 
March 23, 1993 The Jerusalem Post chose as its headline: “Arafat: Burn the earth under 
the feet o f the occupiers,”1 a genuinely non-negotiable sentiment. The mood was especially 
negative because, in the early months, Israel deported around 400 Palestinians from Hamas 
who were left homeless in the cold weather on the Lebanese/Palestinian borders. While 
this issue was not given extensive coverage (as it was in Assafir). it did evoke angry 
rhetoric from Arab leaders, whose 'hostility’ indirectly affected the mood of the headlines 
in The Jerusalem Post making them darker and less hopeful. For example, on March 26, 
1993, the lead o f the story read, “Everybody expects Israel to make greater efforts to solve 
the problem of the Palestinians deported to Lebanon, which has cast a shadow over the 
Middle East negotiating process.”2 The issue of the deportees remained salient throughout 
April creating a feeling of intractability and gloom. On April 18, the headline read, 
“deportees stage ‘death march' to protest peace talks.”3 This expressed the nadir of blasted 
hopes. However, by September a guarded optimism was growing. For example, on June 
17, the headline states, “Israel, Syria to consider US security guarantees,”4 followed on 
June 28 by a headline stating, “Rabin takes blame for peace delay.”5 On July 2, the news 
story started “Rabin, Palestinians slam new US bridging Proposal.”6 On September 3, the 
headline read, “Syria hopes to reach separate accord with Israel next week”7 only to be 
followed by an article starting, “Hussein warns against leaving Jordan out of pact.”8 On 
September S, the writer wrote, “Hussein backs agreement; Syria praises Israel 
‘seriousness’ in talks.”9 However, on September 6, the news story headline stated, “peace 
now’ does not mean ‘boom now’,”10 thus disappointing those who were hoping that peace 
might bring them economic prosperity. On September 14, the headline positively covered 
the signing o f the peace treaty between the PLO and Israel: “’Time for peace has come.’
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Israel, PLO sign accords; Rabin and Arafet shake hands. Peres: Yesterday a dream, today a 
commitment.”11 As Fall progressed to winter, headlines regarding peace talks took on a 
tone of gathering momentum. For example, on October 28, the headline read, “Progress in 
multilateral water talks reported.”12 On December 23, the headline read, “Peres: All 
Palestinians could move to territories or Jordan in Final status.”13
Contrary to the expectations, after the PLO and Israel signed the accord, the mood 
darkened again; pessimism became the dominant mood as Syria became the focus of the 
headlines as an obstructer to peace. For example, on September 27, the headline read, “Syria 
urges tighter Arab boycott.”14 On October 17, the headline read, “Syria threatens to boycott 
peace talks”15 with “nobody expecting] early progress with Syria”16 on October 19. On 
December 6, the headline read, “Christopher trying to ‘energize’ peace talks with Syria.”17 
For the first five months of 19%, the mood oscillated between optimism and 
pessimism, a mood more appropriate to the stock exchange than foreign policy. The nervous 
mixture of hope and fear expressed in the headlines was also reflected in the leads of the news 
stories as well For example, on January 1,19%, the headline read, “Barak plays down 
progress in Syria Talks” with the lead stating that Foreign minister Ehud Barak “last night put 
a damper on the optimistic tone about the negotiations with Syria.”18 While the January first 
headline conveyed a negative mood, an optimistic one followed immediately on January 3 
with the headline stating that “Syria: %  should be the year of peace with Israel.”19. Another 
headline read “Peres: New reality has been created. PM praises Palestinians and settlers.”20 
However, a return to the pessimistic mood is revealed in the January fifth headline: “Better 
atmospherics, lack of substance.”21 Then the positive mood returned on January 19 with Peres 
asserting, “Israeli going for broke in talks with Syria.”22 An air o f uncertainty, perhaps of
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panic beneath the surface of the prose, appears to characterize the reporting o f those times. A 
feeling that the surface hides the dangerous depths seems to be paramount.
Many stories focused on the differences between the two parties’ concerns, 
contrasting the optimism of general agreement with the pessimism of quarrels over 
particular details. For example, on January 16, a reporter wrote, “Barak: Kinneret, Jordan 
River waters must stay in our hands”23 and on January 24, Peres confirmed that there 
would be “no talk about borders with Syria” since “Israel will not agree to take any big 
steps if the Syrians take only small ones.”24 On January 28, Peres continued to state that 
“Jerusalem not up for negotiations.”25 As proposals moved from broad outlines toward 
concrete concessions and tangible compromises, the mood of the headlines abruptly 
darkened. A new flowering of hope was evident in the February headline reading “Syrians 
agree to broad definition of normalization. Israel okays donors to aid Damascus.”26 
Throughout this period, headlines recorded the volatile fluctuation of attitudes toward 
Syria.
These mood swings were not associated with all the actors in the drama; some were 
awarded a consistent persona. While the mood shuttled between optimism and pessimism 
when Israel or the Arabs were the main actors in the headline, it remained relatively 
optimistic when the main characters o f the headline were Americans. A headline on 
January 16 read, “Gore envisions peace and security,” with the lead story reading “US 
Vice President Al Gore arrived from Egypt yesterday evening with a message of hope for 
peace and a promise of security for Israel”27 Thus the identity of the actor appeared to 
determine the range of emotional swing.
After May 1996, when Netanyahu came to power, the mood generally inclined 
more toward pessimism. For example, on July S, the headline read “Orient House: Closing
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us down would deal a major blow to peace.”28 The negative feeling continued with 
“Mubarak [stating]: No war, but terrorism if peace stalls.”29 Depression deepened in 
further headlines throughout the rest of 1996. On September 11, the headline “Levy rejects 
Assad demand to renew talks where left oft”30 sounded the keynote of hopeless anger and 
frustration. Accusations against Palestinians and Arabs appeared frequently in headlines 
and leads. For example, on September 26, the lead story read, “A senior Israeli official 
yesterday accused elements within Palestinian Authority of organizing the confrontation 
between Palestinians and the forces in the West Bank.”31 Typical of a theme of subversion 
and mendacity was the October 17 headline: “Arafat’s stalling on Hebron talks irks 
government.”32 The story lead suggested an ignoble motive. It asserted that such action “is 
upsetting the government and may be aimed at stirring up Palestinian discontent, which 
could trigger violence.”33 On October 29, the headline announced deep divisions between 
Israelis and Palestinians. The headline read, “Erakat: Four points divide Israelis and 
Palestinians.”34 The lead stated, “Negotiations over Hebron are expected to slow down, as 
the sides failed in an all-night session Sunday to resolve four security-related differences 
...”35 In another headline the reporter lamented that “Hebron [is] a missed chance to test 
Palestinian goodwill”36 Throughout October and November, the issue of Hebron made 
front pages headline emphasizing its dark power to destroy the drafting o f any agreement 
between the two parties. On November 10, for example, a blazoned warning appeared, 
“Clinton: Clear Hebron Hurdle.”37 On December 19, another headline read, “Lack of trust, 
not details, block Hebron deal”38 Characteristically, both headlines and stories emphasized 
the depth o f the problem by placing it in a context o f historical and cultural ethos.
On November 24, the exchange o f accusations between Palestinians and Israelis 
continued to make headlines. The headline read, “Hassan criticizes Israeli construction in
I IS
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
territories”39 with the lead asserting that Jordan’s Crown Prince Hassan said that “Israel’s 
expansion of Jewish settlements on occupied Arab land is unacceptable and that Israel has 
an ‘obsessive inflexibility’ about security.”40 On December 2, a headline read, “PM rejects 
Arab verbal attacks. Mordechai tells Bassiouny: Belligerent talk doesn’t help anybody.”41 
In retrospect, it seems that Netanyahu’s rise to power flattened the mood swings of the 
press. A settled and gradually deepening pessimism characterized his tenure.
Patterns o f  Imagery
In most of the news stories analyzed in The Jerusalem Post, the terms “peace” and 
“the peace process” cluster with a small number of thematic terms. The cluster is not 
idealistic, but concrete, in fact narrowly material Often “peace” is treated as merchandise 
that is exchanged with a particular amount of “land” or resources. For example, Peres 
stated, “the extent of peace would directly influence the extent of withdrawal on the Golan 
Heights.”42 In another article, the reporter wrote “negotiations have now reached the point 
where the two skies can see trade-offs necessary for settlement.”43 Again, peace is treated 
as a business deal.
Natural terms are used to describe peace. Peres for example, considered peace 
without economic agreements as “cold peace.”44 The peace process has been in a six- 
month “freeze”45 and the talks have been in “deep freeze.”46 On December 12, Mordechai 
was quoted saying that “Peace between Israel and Jordan has strategic importance and 
everything must be done in order for this peace to be warm.”47 Netanyahu urged for an 
early election before “they [Labor] rush to finalize a hasty half-baked deal with Syria.”48 
Other articles highlighted Israel’s demand for a “warmer peace.”49 Peace is also treated as 
a piece of cheese, which will be the center of discussion to decide on “the aspect of
116
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
‘dividends,’ what each side will give to the other.”30 These archetypal terms (land, heat, 
cold, and food) reflect the visceral feelings that had become invested in the term.
Peace is parsed into abstract varieties as well. There is “political peace” and 
“strategic peace.”31 Moreover, a “comprehensive peace”32 is a peace that involves Syria as 
well. On another occasion, Israel’s PM said, “Syria was keen on the achievement of an 
honorable peace.”33 In addition, Israeli officials continued to talk of Syria’s intention to 
have a “real’ peace and that Syria “constituted a key to a just and comprehensive peace in 
the region.”54 On February 6, The Jerusalem Post quoted King Hussein asserting that the 
Jordanian-Israeli peace is “a real peace, a warm peace. [It] is an example and an inspiration 
to others.”33 Jordan’s Crown Prince Hassan was quoted saying that “only real peace would 
prevent violence in Hebron.”36 On July 7, The Jerusalem Post quoted the Syrian newspaper 
saying “There is no security and no peace outside the framework of a just peace, 
stipulating withdrawal from the occupied Arab lands.”37 Netanyahu spoke of a “strong and 
secure peace.”38 Likewise, on May 3, 1993, The Jerusalem Post quoted Israeli Police 
Minister, Moshe Shahal claiming that he preferred “full peace with Syria” and that if he 
had “to choose between a genuine peace and the Golan, [he] would choose peace.”39 Syria 
is also quoted talking about “firm, solid, real, honorable, just and comprehensive peace 
agreement.”60 Clinton was quoted saying, on December 10, 1993, that the [US] will help in 
building a “comprehensive, just and lasting peace for all the people of the region.”61 The 
constant repetition of terms such as “real”, “whole”, “secure”, and “genuine” reflects the 
deep suspicions o f the press and the anxiety the term aroused. These terms are dialectical 
rather than concrete and are defined relationally. That is, they are defined over and against 
other terms that emerge during the heat of discourse.
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The fearful terms were not the only peace cluster, there were positive peace terms 
as well. Peace positively clustered with “security,” “water,” “normalization” and 
“border”62 for Israel. On April 22, 1993, The Jerusalem Post quoted Rabin confirming, “... 
they [Palestinians] know that for us peace without security means nothing.”63 On January 
16, Peres assured that Israel “will cautiously begin to discuss matters related to the security 
and water arrangements.”64 The Israeli talks of their type of peace that must supply them 
with “the basic needs and security and water needs.”65
Peace is also treated as a parade, which is “on the march.”66 Peace and 
“inequality”67 can not go together for Palestinians. Peace also agons with “redeployment” 
for Palestinians while it is a cluster for Israeli because redeployment means security 
guaranteed.68 Positive growth of the Palestinian State stands as an agon to Israeli security.
The peace process is personified in the language of the parties involved in the 
negotiations. For example, The Jerusalem Post quoted Rabin saying that he “wanted peace 
that would stand on its own two feet.”69 For example, Nicholas Bums, the state 
Department Spokesman treated the negotiations as a human being for which he wanted to 
“take the temperature.”70 On another occasion, Netanyahu was quoted talking about his 
attitude toward the present peace negotiation that is “foolhardy, hasty, and reckless.”71 In 
more than one news story, peace is treated as a living body. On November 6, a reporter 
quoted a Syrian official saying “Netanyahu struck a new nail in the coffin o f the peace 
process.”72 On September 26, Hanan Ashrawi, PA councilwoman was quoted saying that 
Netanyahu should not be allowed to “continue his deception that the peace process is alive 
and well.”73. And on other occasion, President Mubarak was quoted saying that the peace 
process is “really teetering,”74 while Clinton is trying hard to “protect the peace process 
and to help move it forward” treating the peace as a victim that needed help or a person
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who is liable to fell at any moment.73 Moreover, peace is treated as a pedestrian making it 
responsible for any delays in reaching an agreement. So the peace talks are “moving 
slowly”76 and the talks are moving in slow “pace.” On December 6,1993, the peace 
process is also portrayed as a dead soul that needed to be “energized.”77 Personification is 
an ancient rhetorical device, but the kind of personification is telling the person of peace is 
sick, weak, corpse-like, and victimized.
At times peace is framed by war vocabulary. For example, on September 14,1993, 
The Jerusalem Post quoted Arafat saying, “The battle of peace is the most difficult battle of 
our lives.”78 On October 25, 1993, peace was portrayed as a field in which the EC are 
“dragging their feet.”79
To conclude, peace in The Jerusalem Post’s coverage is a pattern of metaphor that 
emphasizes the fragility, risk and danger of peace. To pursue it is to risk the loss of land, 
security, and water.
Extended Action and Characterization n f  Actors 
Part of the framing process that The Jerusalem Post implemented in its coverage of 
the peace is a special characterization of actors involved in the peace process as well as the 
events related to the peace process itself. The images of leaders and adversaries tend to be 
elevated or denigrated according to the events of the day. They are fluid. It is worth noting 
that in the news stories, most of the characterizations were not authored by The Jerusalem 
Post’s writers, but were selected or quoted from other sources. In addition to its pattern of 
metaphor used to describe peace and the peace process, The Jerusalem Post framed 
characters and events in a particular way either by direct characterization or by a strategic 
selection of characterization from other sources.
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For example, on January 3, The Jerusalem Post portrayed Peres as open minded 
and optimistic who “praised the Palestinians” for a “smooth redeployment” asserting “the 
new atmosphere is a pleasant surprise.'’80 Moreover, Peres was shown as a generous 
benefactor who has “seen an increase in the number of Arab laborers working in Israel.”81 
The labor party was presented as willing and doing their best to attain peace. On January 5, 
a Labor party source was quoted saying that “[they] cannot waste any precious time on 
campaigning instead of making peace.”82 Peres was also described as the adventurer who 
was willing “to take a chance” and declaring, “those who don’t dare are not realists.”83 
Throughout the day’s coverage, Peres was lauded as a peace-loving and successful leader 
who had succeeded in taking the path of peace with Syria.84
Rabin was also acclaimed as the kind-hearted leader who was ready to “make 
sacrifices for peace.”83 Peres was also praised as a kind-hearted person who “appealed to 
Arab countries ‘to come in the open and negotiate peace . . . \ ”86 This praise of Peres 
indirectly portrays Arab leaders as the ones who are really obstructing peace. Peres was 
also displayed as a philanthropic leader who envisions in the headline o f the news story 
that “all Palestinians couki move to territories or Jordan in final status.”87 This rosy 
invitation is somewhat weakened by conditions that rule out a “right of return”88 to Israel. 
While Peres and Rabin were portrayed as flexible open-minded leaders, Netanyahu was 
pictured as the “stubborn” and inflexible” leader who was planning to “manage talks 
responsibly, with utmost concern for Israel’s security.”89 In general, Netanyahu’s image 
was mostly negative. Quoting a Labor official source, The Jerusalem Post wrote that 
Netanyahu’s “lack of understanding and political savvy had exerted a high price -  the lives 
of IS soldiers and the wounding o f dozen others.”90 Netanyahu was also portrayed as a 
weak and incapable leader who “has made intensive diplomatic efforts to restore Israel’s
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international image, which was tarnished by the recent violence in the territories.”91 
Obsession with security was featured as Netanyahu’s leadership style.92 The image of 
Netanyahu as an incapable leader was an enduring theme throughout 1996. On December 
13, for example, a typical lead story read, “Netanyahu’s basic policies aren’t really going 
to produce the secure peace voters were promised.”93 Characteristically, his failure was not 
seen as one of nuance, strategy or execution, but as a fundamental weakness.
On the other hand, in 1993 and 1996, the Arabs’ image in The Jerusalem Post was 
uniformly negative. For example, on July 1,1993 Syria was portrayed as a supporter of 
terrorism who “Israel should test whether Syria is behind the escalation of violence among 
radical terrorists groups in Lebanon ...n94 This image continued throughout the year. On 
November 17, The Jerusalem Post wrote, “Syria could curb the fundamentalist 
organizations if it so desired.”93 On December 21, the headline read, “New evidence links 
Syria, Iran to Lockerbie disaster”96 portraying Syria again as a terrorist country.
Syria was also portrayed as a hypocritical player and a deceiver. In feet The 
Jerusalem Post had learned that “Syrian officials are privately telling US counterparts that 
they perfectly understand that Prime Minister Rabin was preoccupied in the aftermath of 
the PLO accord, and had absolutely no expectation of an early breakthrough in talks on the 
Golan.”97 In fact, Syria dominated the news stories in 1993, a period during which it was 
negatively portrayed as an obstructer who was ‘refusing to talk peace.”98 Even when Syria 
was positively portrayed, it was in a context in which Israel was the primary actor. For 
example, on September 5, the author stated, “Syria praised Israeli seriousness in the 
Middle East peace talks and held out the prospect of a firm... peace agreement.”99 Syria’s 
praiseworthy attitude was spoken of as a mere reflection o f Israel’s steadfastness. 
Contrariwise, Syria’s ‘steadfastness’ was most often expressed as uncompromising
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stubbornness. The Jerusalem Post quoted the Syrian daily Al-Baath stating, “anyone who 
thinks Syria could accept anything else is wrong.”100 As Kenneth Burke has often noted, 
the virtues of one set of combatants are the vices of their opponents. Thus Jewish 
‘steadfastness’ becomes Arab ‘stubbornness’ and visa versa.
Moreover, The Jerusalem Post quoted a GSS head portraying Palestinians as 
greedy people who “continue to try to nibble at Israeli Jurisdiction in Jerusalem.”101 On 
January 3,1996, The Jerusalem Post ran a news story about Israeli settlers who were 
thinking of “installing an alarm system in their houses” because they were afraid of 
“Palestinian violence” and “terrorism”102 thus portraying Palestinians as the oppressors and 
terrorists. Quoting Israeli sources, The Jerusalem Post tended to cast the Arabs in the role 
of obstructers o f the peace process. For example, on January 5, an Israeli source was 
quoted as questioning whether Assad “feels the intolerable pressure to conclude peace with 
Israel”103 Minister Yossi Beilin was also cited as stating doubts about “whether Syrian 
President Hafez Assad had really decided to make peace.”104 On January 11, the headline 
wondered about Syria’s “readiness for ‘continuous’ peace talks,”>os thus questioning 
Syria’s sincerity in actually following through on its promises. On January 7, The 
Jerusalem Post quoted Netanyahu lamenting Israeli’s concession and Syria’s firm positions 
on issues thus portraying Israel as a victim and Syria as the sole beneficiary from the peace 
talks.106 Syria was also depicted as a supporter of terrorism thus pushing “Turkey to “urge 
Syria to take effective measures against terrorism and to move forward in the peace 
process.”107 On February 1, an Israeli source was quoted saying that a peace agreement 
“constitutes Syria’s willingness to define normalization as [Israelis] do -  embassies, open 
borders, tourism, and trade,”108 portraying Syria as the cynical party and Israel as the 
idealistic one. On September 11, Netanyahu also delineated Syria as the spoiler, and as a
122
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
people even more stubborn than the Palestinians.109 However, in the same news story, the 
reporter also quoted a Syrian official accusing Netanyahu of making “peace negotiations 
impossible” and striking “a new nail in the coffin of peace,”110 thus noting that the Syrians 
appeared to be responding in the same coin.
The image o f Israel as a victim was present in many news stories in 1993 and 1996. 
For example, on April 22,1993 The Jerusalem Post quoted Rabin stating that Israel has the 
right to protect its people111 implying that Israel was a lamb living among wolves. 
Likewise, on October 29,1996 Netanyahu portrayed Israel as the victim and that “the 
assumption that the blame will always automatically be placed on Israel for foiling to reach 
an agreement no longer works.”112 However, despite its victim status in some contexts, 
Israel was also portrayed as active and powerful, the party who rolled the dice in the peace 
talks. For example, on September 6, 1993 The Jerusalem Post quoted Peres saying that the 
“PLO feces a take-it-or-leave-it situation regarding the ‘Gaza/Jericho agreement’; they 
[PLO] may take their time signing it, but they may not change it.”113 This 'gentle giant’ 
syndrome is common in international rhetoric. One nation’s sincerity and strength make it 
vulnerable to the machinations o f its cynical rivals. Ethnocentrism is a powerful blinder 
that allows nations to pose as victim and conqueror without noticing the apparent 
contradiction.
On the other hand, the Palestinian Authority was described as the villain in the 
peace process. They were the ones who organized “confrontations between Palestinians 
and IDF forces in the West Bank.”114 They were also the ones who were responsible for 
the “traumatic shoot-out in Ramallah.”115 Arafet was also pictured as an opportunist whose 
plan to “topple Netanyahu from his post or at least to squeeze him for significant 
concessions has foiled, and Arafat’s only hope to remain in power might be to mobilize
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Palestinian unrest.”116 Arafat was also represented as a reckless leader who must “stop 
traveling from one place to another as if he had all the time in the world.”117 On March 23, 
1993, he was called an agitator who “urged the Palestinians to escalate resistance against 
Israel and 'bum the earth under the feet of the occupiers’.”118 Moreover, The Jerusalem 
Post quoted an Israeli official source condemning Arafat as an obstructionist. He was the 
person “behind the decision to hold off on giving a formal answer to resuming peace talks 
on Tuesday in Washington.”119 Even when the peace accord was signed on September 3, 
1993, The Jerusalem Post described Arafat’s military garb, casting him as a warrior 
signing a peace agreement; Rabin’s clothing was not described. The Jerusalem Post wrote 
on September 14 of that year, “Arafat, wearing an olive green military-style uniform and 
his trademark black-and-white checkered keffiyeh and speaking in Arabic said....,”120 thus 
suggesting that he and his people had not altered their aggressive posture. On November 
30, Arafat was also pictured as an angry leader who “insisted that the agreed December 13 
date for Israel to start withdrawing from Gaza Strip and Jericho was sacred and must be 
respected [refusing] to elaborate on the consequences.”121 Here The Jerusalem Post 
excerpted the core of his threatening language. Occasionally, Arafat received more benign 
coverage in The Jerusalem Post. For example, on November 4, The Jerusalem Post wrote, 
“Clinton thanked Arafat for his role and affirmed US support for the peace process”122 as if 
willing to bestow praise through a third party.
The Jerusalem Post provided its readers a bleak assessment of Arab opinion about 
Israel. For example, on November 24, Hassan said, “Israel’s obsession with security is 
misguided and responsible for stalling the negotiations toward IDF redeployment in 
Hebron.”123 On November 25, Amr Moussa, the Egyptian FM, was also instanced as 
saying that Israel was “striving to create fait accompli in the occupied territories, to break
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the principle o f land for peace.”124 This typical cite confirms the enduring Arab position 
that Israel is an invading power, an occupier, and a mendacious nation that talks peace 
while pursuing aggression.
Since the majority of The Jerusalem Post sources were Israeli officials, it is not 
surprising that the Arabs were negatively portrayed. In fact, the Syrians and Palestinians 
shared a consistently negative image. Israel was shown as heroic, peace loving, and 
responsible, as well as being victimized and embattled. Finally, there is little coverage of 
Arab examples of restraint or discussions of how to build mutual patterns of obligations for 
both parties.
Unique Frames Used in the Coverage of the Peace Process
I have completed the examination of mood, images and characterization of actors 
and events. These tropes form a constellation or a frame. This frame shapes The Jerusalem 
Post’s coverage of the peace process. A frame provides a consistent perspective for readers 
and a dramatic resource for journalists. Although frames provide psychological closure, 
they can expand or evolve. The frame may be aesthetically modified to meet the challenge 
of unprecedented events, new situations, or unexpected opportunities. Contradictions, 
surprises, and changes must be assimilated by the frame. Rhetoricians say that they are 
elastic sources of inventional matter. One speculates that there are limits. At some point, a 
frame loses its power to assimilate change. As metaphor needs similarities to find its 
associative parts, frames probably have limits o f modifications. At some point they must 
shatter under accommodation and invention. This will be discussed in the last part o f this 
chapter.
There are four major frames in which the peace process was covered and they are 
selectively applied. Peace was framed in terms of security, normalization, and natural
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resources when Israel’s motives were discussed. It was framed in terms o f geographical 
areas and natural resources when the Arab parties were concerned as they are assured to be 
their dominant motives for negotiations. When The Jerusalem Post cites Arab sources, 
their expressed aims are presented as land for peace with Israel For Arabs, peace becomes 
conditioned by this element along with the element of natural resources and the peace 
process is limited to these two frames. For example, on January 3, The Jerusalem Post 
cited the official daily Tishreen reiterating “Syria’s demand that Israel commit itself to a 
complete and early withdrawal from the Golan Heights.”125 Christopher was also quoted 
on April 22, 1993 confirming that “the negotiations are based on land-for peace principle 
and the political rights of the Palestinians should be recognized.”126 The land-for peace 
frame was dominant in the Arab perspective. On July 20,1993, The Jerusalem Post quoted 
Syria’s often repeated trope: “upgrading Middle East peace talks to the ministerial level 
would be meaningless without an Israeli commitment to full withdrawal from occupied 
Arab territories.”127 On the other hand, for Israel discussion of peace is conditioned by 
frames of security and water, and economy. For example, on January 3, Peres placed peace 
within the context o f the many “problems to be solved, for example, the water problem.”128 
On January 5, Christopher went to the Middle East to discuss when “to move to working 
groups involving experts on water, security and economic issues.”129 This language 
expressed the American tendency to adopt the Israeli perspective and to define peace terms 
through the same frames. On January 16, Foreign Minister Ehud Barak was quoted in the 
lead to the news story asserting that “the waters of Lake Kinneret and the Jordan River 
must stay in Israeli hands under any peace agreement.”130 In the same article, the reporter 
asserted, “water is one of the subjects that has been raised during the talks,”131 also quoting 
Peres talking about an agreement with other parties “on some economic principles.”132
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Security remained a very powerful frame in Israel’s peace rhetoric. For example,
On April 22, 1993, The Jerusalem Post wrote, “PM Rabin welcomed the Arab decision, 
stressing that Israel is willing to make compromises, but not at the expense of endangering 
its security or that of its citizens.”133 Likewise, on January 24,1996, The Jerusalem Post 
quoted an Israeli source stating that “security arrangements in any peace treaty with Syria 
would have to achieve three goals: make a surprise attack impossible; reduce the 
possibility of a comprehensive attack by either side; and establish a method for preventing 
any localized incidents from turning into full scale war.”134 While the security frame 
strongly affects peace discourse in Israel, Arabs generally dismiss this view “an 
obstruction to the peace process.”133 Moreover, on May 3, 1993, Police Minister Shahal 
was quoted saying that before Israel withdraw from the Golan heights, it ‘must first hear 
solid assurances from Damascus that it is committed to normalization of relations between 
the two countries. He also said that the sides must reach mutually acceptable security 
arrangements.”136 This tone was also reiterated on June 28,1993, when Rabin assured that 
Israel is “willing to pay a price for peace ... but will make no concessions which could 
compromise our security.”137 On June 17, The Jerusalem Post wrote, “The security issue 
has been at the core of the first two days of discussions between Israel and Syria at the start 
o f this round of peace talks.”138
The articles in The Jerusalem Post highlighted the conditions to peace as obscuring 
the peace process. For example, on January 7, a reporter wrote, “such core areas of 
disagreements as security, water and border issues were not discussed...”139 There is a 
recognition here that associations (clusters) may become so culturally coercive that they 
deprive a state o f its capacity to innovate.
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The status of Jerusalem is often seen as a special case, but it is also a distillation of 
the frame of security and land. Although both parties speak of different conditions with 
regard to peace, however, Jerusalem is a common obstacle without which peace cannot be 
achieved. On January 3, for example, The Jerusalem Post highlighted the GSS’s worries 
and fear that “a comprehensive regional reconciliation might not take Jerusalem or the 
refugees into consideration.”140 Even the Pope declared on January IS that the hope for 
peace “could prove ephemeral if a just and adequate solution is not also found to the 
particular problem o f Jerusalem.”141 On July 2, 1993, The Jerusalem Post quoted Rabin 
criticizing “US bridging proposals that reportedly say the future of Jerusalem could 
eventually become a topic o f negotiation in the Middle east peace talks.”142 This position 
was confirmed on July 7 when “Peres said Egypt should not expect Israel to change its 
position that the city is its eternal capital”143 This is followed by a Palestinian statement 
saying “Jerusalem and all other occupied land should be under Palestinian interim 
government which will lead to implementation o f Security Council Resolution 242.”144 
Thus one can observe two competing perspectives: The Arabs call for land and the Israeli 
call for security. In this atmosphere, fresh grievances are piled upon old grievances, and it 
becomes difficult to imagine resolution without vast structured changes.
Throughout 1993 and 1996, the sources o f the information were drawn mainly from 
the Israelis. As expected, The Jerusalem Post highlighted the frames of security, 
normalization, water, and economy, since these are the conditions that Israel had preset for 
peace. Thus, the Arab voice in the news stories seemed nearly absent and the competing 
land and resource frames were overwhelmed by the dominant Israeli frames. Such 
reporting had the same effects as filtering out conflicting information and providing 
readers with a mo no logical political narrative o f events.
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Framing Context
As mentioned in previous chapters, framing is more than a mechanistic act of 
disposition and arrangement. It is a perspective act that affects human understanding of a 
particular event. Framing occurs within a human context; it reflects and imposes the 
motives of the frame. Thus two newspapers may frame the same event differently; or they 
may use a similar frame for different events. This section will examine the context in 
which The Jerusalem Post framed the peace process. Although most of the news stories 
seemed to cover the peace process in an objective manner, however, The Jerusalem Post 
relies heavily on Israeli sources for its news. This, along with the selection of particular 
frames, reflects The Jerusalem Post’s agenda and perspective. Accordingly, there are times 
when it seems that little distinction is made between society and state. In a cursory reading 
of The Jerusalem Post’s reports we seem to be dealing with objective exposition. However, 
a closer look uncovers a particular perspective on peace, a perspective that is indirectly 
conveyed to readers through particular framing contexts and through the papers reliance on 
particular sources of information. This seemingly objective news may well affect the 
public’s attitude toward peace. For example, just after The Jerusalem Post reported about 
Peres’s optimism of creating a new reality with the Palestinians143 another report in the 
same issue followed that reveals the GSS’s demand to “extradite the Popular Front 
activists allegedly responsible for murdering three Israelis...”146; the report continued 
talking about how many suicide attackers have been located in the past few years...
When the news is put in a positive framing context, the Israelis and Americans are 
the key players. For example, on January 5, the reporter writes “The US and Israel have 
put a positive spin on these talks” while quoting an Israeli source saying that “the Syrians 
have o f course not desisted from their demands for a frill Israeli withdrawal and they
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registered their insistence on it as a sine qua non for any settlement...”147 On January 11, 
the author wrote that ‘Turkey urged Syria to take effective measures against terrorism and 
to move forward in the peace process”148 portraying the talks in a context where one player 
was trying to put obstacles while the others were trying to move things forward. In fact, in 
many articles in which the reporters have a positive framing of the peace process, the 
framing is surrounded or followed by citing an Israeli source accusing the other party of 
being negative about the issue. For example, on January 19, The Jerusalem Post quoted 
Rabinovitch saying that Syria and Israel “have come closer to the issue of the quality of 
peace” immediately followed by the same source commenting that “[Israel and Syria] do 
not have that degree of intimacy between [them].”149 This negative tag attached to a 
positive assessment appears to be a stock reflex, a kind of historic communal reservation 
and a suspicion of good news.
Although the early months o f 1996 reflected a positive framing of the peace 
process in general, however, these stories were interrupted by some negative framing 
contexts that may indirectly reflect The Jerusalem Post’s perspective on peace. For 
example, on January 5, the reporter wrote, “the Likud executive bureau issued an official 
resolution condemning the government’s decision to release hundreds o f terrorists with 
bloodstained hands.”1*0 Such a report diverted the attention o f the audience from the 
advantages and positive image of the peace process to the negative aspects of any deal.
Later in the year, The Jerusalem Post highlighted many issues that seemed to 
threaten the peace process. For example, on July 5, the headline read, “Orient House: 
Closing us down would deal a major blow to peace.”151 In this article, The Jerusalem Post 
quoted representatives from the Orient House threatening that closing the Orient House 
will “have a negative effect on the peace process,”152 and this may be seen by the
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Palestinians as “a step away from peace.”153 Framing the peace process in such contexts 
makes it seem fragile and easily derailed by events or even minor issues. A generous 
allocation of space to minor issues such as the closing of the Orient House appears as 
important as the issue of Jerusalem.
When the Arabs are used as a source of information, the fortunes of the peace 
process appear even more uncertain. For example, although The Jerusalem Post quoted a 
Syrian official talking about Syria’s will to achieve peace, the bulk of the article focused 
on Syrian accusations against Netanyahu and about his obsession with security thus 
highlighting the misunderstandings between the two parties. The article concluded with a 
salvo from the Syrian newspaper, Tishreen. asserting that “there will be no peace and no 
security without withdrawal”154
After Netanyahu’s ascent to power, peace process reporting in a pessimistic context 
seemed to include a generous chorus of Arab threats. For example, on July 7, The 
Jerusalem Post quoted Mubarak saying that “If Israel does not respect its commitments, the 
whole Middle East will face an outburst o f terrorism.”155 This was followed by another 
report in which the reporter stated that Syria’s official media said that Netanyahu was 
making the resumption of peace negotiations impossible by ignoring the outcome of nearly 
five years of bilateral talks.”156 As if in antiphonal reply, Levy was quoted: “if the Syrians 
insisted on an Israeli declaration committing itself to start the talks where they left off or to 
accepting the principle of land for peace, then talks would not be resumed.”157 This chain 
of accusations highlights the differences between the negotiation parties. Such coverage 
indirectly gives the reader the impression that it is almost impossible to ever achieve peace 
because no common core o f interests is spoken o f The author feels a kind of gloomy meta­
text behind all the reports and stories. It is that the people of the region do not share a
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common destiny or a common symbolic capital that can allow them to adjudicate their 
problem. The highest truth behind the storks is human futility and unending anger.
Thus even minor events become synecdochal o f a larger conspiracy. For example, 
on September 19, Netanyahu said that the “rioting in response to the opening of the 
Hasmonean Tunnel "was not a spontaneous activity’ refusing to directly accuse the 
Palestinian authority o f being behind the violence.”138 In this same issue, The Jerusalem 
Post also wrote that "the traumatic shoot-out in Ramallah was a high price to pay for 
knocking a hole in a wall” and quoted Nabil Shaath asserting that "the crisis is escalating, 
fueled by Israeli’s meeting [the PA] and not doing anything, not implementing 
anything.”159 On October 17, Netanyahu charged Arafat and the PA o f trying to stir up 
further Palestinian discontent, which may trigger violence,” because the PA refused to 
acknowledge any progress in the Hebron Talks threatening that if this continued, “there 
will be no Hebron redeployment.”160 Speaking o f the Hebron issue, The Jerusalem Post 
quoted an Israeli source, Meretz MK Yossi Sarid, saying that “a "disaster’ is imminent in 
Hebron and that administrative detentions would not help prevent it.”161
Even when hope for the peace process seemed to be regaining momentum, The 
Jerusalem Post seemed bent on reviving old fears by focusing on the different expectations 
and objectives of the parties. For example, on October 3, the reporter wrote, “the 
government claimed victory after the White House summit yesterday saying it has 
conceded nothing, while Palestinian officials branded the meeting a failure.”162 Here peace 
is cast in the metaphor of a contest between two parties, a contest with winners and losers. 
For example, on October 4, The Jerusalem Post wrote, “by failing to give Arafat any of the 
concrete ‘gestures’ he had requested, Netanyahu ensured that Arafat did not get everything
132
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
he wanted out of last week’s violence.”163 This context positions peace as a contest in 
which threats, deception and bad faith are in play.
The context of war is used in covering peace and the two appear so mixed that they 
seem to be almost in dialog. On October 4, a reporter wrote that the PM tried to assess 
“what the Palestinians might do in the wake of the bloody battles they waged in the 
territories last week.”164 This was followed by a quote from an Israeli officer threatening 
that “if there is another flare-up in the territories, we’ll cream them [Palestinians].”163
In conclusion, the framing context in these news stories reveals a deeply negative 
perspective on peace. One may deduce that perhaps The Jerusalem Post does not really see 
peace as a valid option, and that the term “peace” has become a journalist’s beat like 
weather or sports in which a variety of topics may be discussed.
Columns and Editorials
The op-eds reflect a more ‘subjective and personal’ body of opinion o f The 
Jerusalem Post. In other words, The Jerusalem Post’s subjective framing of the peace 
process appears in the editorials and columns. Because editorials reflect the editor’s or the 
newspaper’s position toward certain events, the press makes no claim to objective 
reporting and is free to make an explicit argument or to assert its frame without apology.
Like Assafir. the op-eds that appear in The Jerusalem Post during 1996 and 1993 
express a deeply negative mood toward the peace process. Heavy cynicism expressed 
through images of failure and betrayal dominated the headlines and the editorials. In feet, 
editorials and opinions in The Jerusalem Post nearly replicate those in Assafir. each 
appearing almost an obverse reflection of the other. One can see a common attitude toward 
peace and the peace process. Not surprisingly, the identity of the victim and villain in each 
newspaper is switched. While in Assafir. Israel is the villain and Arabs are the victims, in
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The Jerusalem Post it is the other way around. Occasionally, the op-eds lament Israel’s 
‘concessions’ in the peace talks. These are framed as threats to security because one cannot 
trust the Arabs. For example, on January 1,1996, Steinberg quoted Shalhevet Frier saying 
that “without nuclear threat the Arab states would be able to attack Israel at a time of their 
choosing, with nothing to worry about;”166 the assumption here is that Arabs are eager to 
do so and that Israel is a constant victim. The author ended his editorial asserting that if 
“peace survives beyond its infancy and prospers” there is a possibility for a security 
arrangement although “this goal is complex”167 Steinberg resembled peace to an infant thus 
giving it the attribute o f feebleness and perhaps innocence whose destiny is decided by 
others. Moreover, in another column, Charles Krauthammer believed that “the Israeli 
public is overwhelmed by the risks and dangers of the PLO agreement just signed,”168 thus 
portraying Israelis as afraid victims and Palestinians as dangerous villains. One of the 
difficulties with this posture is that it tends to associate truth, wise conduct and power in a 
cluster. The resulting fusion is agonistically positioned against a concession, flexibility and 
weakness cluster.
In another pessimistic editorial, the author portrayed Arafat as a deceiver who 
promised to delete the article that calls for the destruction of Israel from the PLO National 
Covenant but never did. The author continued to highlight the articles in the covenant that 
“delegit imize the Jewish state” and that calls for “actions that presuppose its 
destruction.”169 The author sarcastically criticized the Israeli government’s call for 
removing the clause. He wrote, “Remove the anti-Israel clauses? Major surgery is more 
like it,”170 thus insinuating that there must be some drastic cut offs on the Palestinian side 
before a peace process can take place. Again the peace process is threatened by the 
‘disease’ for which a surgery is needed otherwise the ‘malady’ may return and destroy the
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peace. In another editorial, peace is also portrayed as an ill person into which Barak 
“injected a note of sobriety”171 so that there remains solidarity in the Israeli government 
since some “are not sanguine about the withdrawal from the Golan.”172 When the organic 
metaphor of bodily disease grew stale, a mechanical metaphor was substituted. In a 
December 11 editorial, peace was portrayed as a vehicle whose engine may be dismantled 
because of the settlements.173 In another editorial, December 16, peace is compared to 
unconditional love, love that is granted without price. “Peace is supposed to be ideal.”174 
Tsiddon wrote about two types of peace, one that is “based on solid and joint interests”173 
and one that is “signed with an artificial creation, carrying out -for pay- the orders of its 
masters.”176 On October 1,1993, Teddy Preuss wrote that 'peace is a challenge, not a 
danger.”177 But his optimism appeared to be uncharacteristic o f the mass of reporters.
The metaphor of a betrayed relationship was common in editorials focusing on 
attacking Arafat and the Arab parties. For example, on January 11, Eisenberg wrote that 
there were “several myths blown away during the past week” one of which when Arafat 
promised to “curb terrorism against Jews; that he will be the savior of Israel”178 but never 
did. Similarly, Tsiddon depicted Arafat as a liar and a deceiver. The Arabs were portrayed 
as 'anti-peace’ parties whose 'rearmament to the tune of $58billion in the past 3 
months”179 was a sign of the Arabs’ reaction to peace.
Peres did not escape the blame either. He was portrayed as a betrayer who “is ready 
to surrender virtually the entire Golan Heights -  a betrayal o f past Labor promises.”180 The 
driving force behind the trope of betrayal was the larger frame o f security. In a world of 
great insecurity, any concession might be interpreted as a betrayal and a danger. The author 
asked, “What can be more important than security, water and border areas?”181 The silent
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answer is ‘Nothing, not even peace.’ Thus security becomes bonded to religion, 
community, national and personal survival.
An official version of history was retailed in order to portray Israel as a victim and 
Arabs as villains. On January 12, an editorial wrote, “it was not ‘colonialism’ or 
‘imperialism’ that brought the Gaza strip and the West Bank under Israeli rule in 1967 but 
self defense against Arab aggression.”182 Accordingly, Israel is a threatened victim that 
must colonialize other lands for the sake of ‘self defense’ and it is the Arab’s fault. This 
narrative provides a single cosmology for many aspirations -  military, economic, 
territorial and political Even when the Palestinian right to the land is acknowledged, it is 
accompanied with conditions that portray them as villains and untrustful partners. In the 
same editorial the author concludes that Palestinians “have a great historic opportunity” 
that may help them to “realize a large part of their aspiration” only if they “prevent 
offenses against Israeli security and avoid wild rhetoric.”183
In a January 18 editorial the headline read, “Terrorism as usual” reflecting the 
author’s censure of Israeli army withdrawal from particular “Arab population centers” 
because a “hasty withdrawal and a stubborn clinging to a flawed deal do not always bode 
peace.”184 The author also insinuated that Arafat was a manipulator who made Hamas 
fulfill “the function of the shooting arm while the PA does the talking.”185 On November 
29, the author characterized Arafat as a terrorist agitator. The editorial quoted Arafat’s 
avowal o f violence, “we only know one word: jihad, jihad, jihad, ...”186 The author 
concluded that the PLO leader’s idea of peace was a sham,” Arafat wants all the parties to 
understand that for him, [violence] is really part and parcel of the negotiations.”187 The 
editorial thus presented two rival definitions o f peace. In one Israel was seen as a guardian 
of order and a state that makes all the concessions. The second definition construed Arab
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peace as a mixture of threat, sabotage, and negotiation. This is peace by any means 
necessary.
Syria was described as backward, greedy and treacherous in the columns and 
editorials. On February 9, the writer portrayed Syria as a poor country in “which you 
experience the Third World.” Thus the country “is in no position to refuse the US offer” to 
“relinquish the $4billk>n”188 if a peace agreement is signed with Israel Syria’s destination 
makes it a weak player that may be ready to make concessions for 'the sake of money.”189 
True to this logic, peace is consequently portrayed as a financial reward that will be 
granted to Syria if it made peace with Israel In addition to the image of penury, Syria’s 
lack of legitimacy and reliability makes it seem an unfit partner for anyone. On December 
4, the writer asked, “virtually invited to commit aggression and already exonerate from 
guilt by the mothers of his future victims, can Assad possibly be persuaded to abandon 
military operation.”190 Portraying Assad as the villain implies that no peace with a violent 
person is possible and therefore Israel is not to blame for not signing any agreement. 
Besides signing a peace treaty with an oppressor is not justifiable. The image o f Syria as a 
terrorist was also present in Tobby Willig’s opinion, “Syria is still on the list o f terrorist 
nations because it causes and foments terrors.”191
The image of Syria was contrasted with the image of Israel as “the foremost 
exponent o f decency and democracy.”192 Israel was also portrayed as a victim whom 
“Bush/Baker tried to extort by brutality and rudeness,”193 According to Yohanan Ramati, 
Israel is not only victimized by the Arabs but also by the American ‘hypocrisy.’ This 
duplicity is shown by America’s intention “that in the future Israel will not buy arms from 
America directly but through the Pentagon... and have to pay an extra commission ...”194 
The image of Israel being victimized by the West was affirmed by Netanyahu, who stated
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that the West “pressures Israel to make sweeping concessions while unremittingly seeking 
to appease its despot neighbors.”193
In most of the op-eds, peace is discussed within a security frame. Accordingly, 
terrorism is highlighted in order to justify the strict demand for security as a condition for 
any peace agreement. On March 1, the author criticized Peres and Arafat for believing that 
the terrorist acts are ‘killing the peace' and assured that “it isn't the peace they 
[Palestinians] wish to kill, but the Jews, especially the Jews of Eretz Yisrael.”196 On 
November 26, the author concluded, “Israel cannot go on sacrificing its land and its 
security to Western fantasies of peace ...”197 The theme of American indifference is 
touched upon again. While America is dreaming its beautiful dreams, Israel is having 
nightmares.
In a March 10 editorial, the headline read, “A dangerous hypnosis” in which the 
author discovered a paradox, a type of peace that kills. Denouncing the peace process as 
“nothing more than a unilateral Israeli withdrawal” and portraying Israel as a dupe who is 
giving in to the “terrorist Palestinians” who have gotten “Gaza, West Bank autonomy, 
foreign aids, international recognition, their own police force,...”, the author further 
lamented that “in return Israel got what? A pat on the shoulder by the US.”198 The attitude 
of ambivalence to the United States is compounded of hurt expectation, sarcasm at its 
ineptitude, and fury over its pragmatism. The writer argued that Israel was a very big loser 
while Palestinians were constant winners. Again, the peace process was portrayed as a kind 
o f shell game in which cheaters win and honest people lose. The author concluded that 
peace is an “illusion” and a “deception.” Finally, the editorial reminded readers that 
“Arafat is the father of Palestinian terrorism”199 and thus hope for an honorable peace is 
utterly vain.
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It is very obvious in most of the editorials that the peace process is put in a 
historical context in which security frames dictate the selection and interpretation of 
events. For example, on June 24, the editorial read “it would be naive to expect an Arab 
summit to call for less than a full Israeli withdrawal from the territories captured in the Six 
Day War-a w ar... started by the Arabs and fueled by their determination to wipe Israel off 
the map....”200 This historical reminder justifies the legitimacy of Israel’s occupation of the 
land and question the Arabs’ ‘demand’ and ‘obsession’ in land for peace. On November 1, 
the writer quoted retired field marshal and Egyptian chief of staff Abdel Ghani Gamassy, 
saying that the 1973 war ‘would not be the last war between us and the Jews.”201
In addition to this historical context, the editorial, as in many others, also criticized 
the Arab regimes that “remain the last great outpost of depotism in the modem world”202 
thus questioning the accountability of their government even if peace were to be attained. 
Consequently, democracy is assumed to be an apparent precondition to peace. This belief 
is an important resource for Israel It gives them a legitimate reason for not signing an 
Arab treaty in the eyes o f the West.
Although Arab leaders were most heavily criticized, domestic leaders also received 
blame. While Peres was not attacked in op-eds, Binyamin Netanyahu got a fair share of 
criticism in the editorials. In a September 30 editorial the writer commented, “the issue of 
the tunnel exit which touched off the current storm is a revealing indicator of the glib 
shallowness that has marked Netanyahu’s performance thus for”203 exhibiting Netanyahu 
as an inexperienced and unskillful leader who lacks “empathy” and is ignorant of how the 
Arabs “think and feel.” After Netanyahu came to power, doubts about the possibility o f a 
peace agreement increased, the PM sharing blame with terrorists. On October 4, the 
editorial observed, “it is as essential as it is depressing to say straight out that there is no
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way Binyamin Netanyahu’s government and Yasser Arafat’s Palestinian Authority will 
ever reach agreement.”204 On December 4, the writer stated, “And Assad, seeing 
Netanyahu cave in after Arafat’s aggression, recognized this fatal weakness in the prime 
minister”203 thus depicting even Netanyahu as a weak victim. On December 11, the writer 
questioned the credibility of Netanyahu, who “was voted in to give more weight to 
security” but now “must cast off his campaign rhetoric and proceed with the peace process 
outlined by the previous government.”206
In general, the columns and editorials reflect a fearful and suspicious attitude 
toward peace. The editorials and opinions, which in effect communicate the opinion of the 
newspaper and its readers, reveal that The Jerusalem Post strongly doubts the authenticity 
o f the peace process. This negative peace is a peace of victimization and domination. The 
Jerusalem Post and its readers view peace as a process of unilateral concession that 
threatens the security and existence o f Israel and its people. Therefore, it is an 'unwanted' 
peace because the “exchanges” are judged to weaken Israel without guaranteeing its 
borders, people or national identity.
Finally, the pattern of metaphors in The Jerusalem Post tells a story of the return 
home after thousands of years. It is the story of people who were there since time and were 
made strangers and now they have returned home yet their lives are threatened and there 
seems no hope to live in their long lost home in peace and security. It is a story about 
people who seem to be obsessed with security to an extent that their only hope seems to 
keep tighten security on the borders rather than seeing peace as their only way to leave 
safely.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION, INTERPRETATION, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER
STUDY
Synopsis of the Study
The Arab-Israeli conflict has now entered its fifth decade. Despite a decade of peace 
negotiation, the conflict still seems far from being resolved. Most of the research involving 
the Arab-Israeli conflict dealt with the historical and political aspect of the conflict. 
Although it is the leaders of both parties who are most directly involved in peace negotiations, 
the role of the Arab-Israeli media as a shaper of opinion has been conspicuous. Few scholars 
examined the rhetorical strategies of leadership. No one has looked at the role of the Arab- 
Israeli press in framing the peace process. It has been the aim of my study to explore the 
nature and type of the media framing during the most intense years o f peace negotiations. 
The discourse of the Arab and Israeli Press regarding the peace negotiations is an 
important matter because the press plays a major role in shaping the perception o f the Arab 
and Israeli public opinion regarding peace talks.
Discussion
After reviewing the peace discourse of major Arab and Israeli newspapers, this 
study does not draw optimistic conclusions. Although both leading newspapers speak 
about peace, land, and security, the words bear different meanings for their audiences.
Arab writers view land as a kind o f birthright, a return to a lost homeland. Israeli writers 
see land as a concession, a loss of hard won territory and the end of security. Thus 
nationhood and legitimacy for one side translates as encirclement and weakness for the 
other side. Beyond the most rudimentary agreement there is little consensus between the 
papers. Each seems adept at finding the fault-lines of each issue and exploiting these
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divisions. Both papers use the same phrases and discuss the same issues, but they are 
coded differently. In some cases the meanings are nearly opposite. Concessions are seen by 
Israelis as a one-sided give away program. For the Arabs they amount to the payment of a 
longstanding debt and the mere inexorable reconciliation of Israeli’s right to exist. Thus 
the communal narratives of each side point to different values, means, and goals.
What is the end game? For third parties like the United States, the goal has always 
been a nearly borderless Middle East, organized on principles of free trade, high 
technology, and movement of goods, services and labor. The United States then sees the 
world in secular, deracinated and assimilationist terms. This doctrine seems an odd one to 
part of the world that did not experience the European Enlightenment. As the founding of 
the Jewish state recedes into the distance, the Israeli vision of the future has become more 
pluralistic, but the changes have moved into fits and starts. The former PM, Peres had 
moved over a 15 year period from a hawkish position to something not too far from the 
secular detribalized state envisioned by the United States. Recent failures of the process 
and the outbreak of border clashes have put Ariel Sharon, the hero of the 1973 Yom 
Kippur War, back in power. So far this hardliner seems more interested in fortifying the 
borders than in changing them and the Peace Process has broken down.
How did the logic of the Peace Process accord with the goals of the leadership and 
was it supported by either Arab or Israeli newspapers? The basic concept seems to have 
been one of gradualism. If incremental changes were successful, more difficult changes 
would follow and finally a tide o f change would fundamentally alter the political and 
cultural climate of the region. For example, the Oslo process of 1993 was structured as a 
stair-step ascent. The least dramatic and polarizing issues would be dealt with first. It 
began well enough, moving through easy stages and resolving easy issues. Yassir Arafat
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embraced Yitzak Rabin at the White House in 1993 and signed a declaration condemning 
violence as an apolitical strategy. Shortly afterward, his Palestinian Authority was given 
control o f a large part of the famous Gaza strip. This is, as everyone on both sides knew, a 
windy desert and one of the least desirable pieces o f the land in the region. These were to 
be followed by a schedule of withdrawals and consolidations. Finally, the really brutal 
issues could be saved to the close, and that early momentum would aid their resolution.
Probably the most difficult issues were hegemony in Jerusalem (most importantly 
the disposition of places like the Temple Mount) and the problematic status of Palestinian 
refugees. Everyone knows the story: the assassination of Rabin and the failure of Barak, 
the rejection by Arafat of the Jerusalem Plan and the entry of the Temple Mount by Sharon 
and his cadre smashed the hopes of the peacemakers.
The polarizing rhetoric o f the newspapers was in fact a more accurate guide to the 
course o f events than the discourse of the leaders who speak to an international community 
of Middle Eastern states, Western powers and populations in diasporas all over the globe 
as well as to their local constituencies. The suspicion, the paranoia, the quick changes of 
outlook, the expressed lack of faith in negotiation, and the enduring faith in military force 
are the consistent hallmarks of the newspaper coverage. As we have seen problems were 
seldom framed in terms o f the long-term agenda of the nation, but as strategies between 
hostile parties. They were seen as small struggles for advantage in an interminable war 
rather than solutions that would contribute to a final outcome of harmony, order, peace, 
and prosperity. So called pluralistic discussion dissolves into monistic commonplace.
The results o f the study are filled with irony. Villains and heroes are described in 
the same term. Roles are reversed. Both press use terms such as “hypocrite,” aggressor”, 
“incapable”, “betrayer”, and “manipulators” to refer to the opposite party maintaining at
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the same time an image of ‘good will hunter’ with regards to their respective party. In 
other words, the villain in one press is treated as a victim in the other and vice versa.
There is a striking difference in the frequency in which a particular term is used. In 
quoting their sources, each press selectively emphasizes one term far more than the other. 
For example, Assafir would refer most often to ‘settlement’ as an “agon” to peace, such as 
citing the Egyptian Foreign minister as saying, “the politics o f settlements is very 
dangerous to peace.”1. The Jerusalem Post, on the other hand, would focus on ‘terrorism’ 
and ‘peace’ as opposite or agonist pairs as in “Mubarak: No war, but Terrorism if peace 
stalls.”2
Furthermore, in their characterization of actors, both papers followed almost the 
same strategy reflecting a similar agenda setting geared toward supporting two different 
groups. Through selective citation and direct commentary, each paper tends to portray their 
leadership as wise, moral, and capable. For example, while The Jerusalem Post portrayed 
Peres as a generous benefactor and open mined leader, Assafir portrayed him as a fragile 
leader whose credibility in the Arab world is questioned. On the other hand, while Assafir 
portrayed Assad as a confident person and a man of peace, The Jerusalem Post portrayed 
him a supporter of terrorism.
Moreover, the image o f victimhood is present in both presses but attached to two 
different parties. Assafir highlights the image o f the Arabs in general and Palestinians in 
particular, as victims whose land has been taken away from them and who are abused by 
the atrocities of the occupier. The Jerusalem Post on the other hand, emphasizes the image 
of Israel as a victim because o f the terrorist danger that it feces from its Arab neighbors. 
Both papers portray the party they represent as the one who is sacrificing a lot while the 
opponent does nothing but practices opportunism. Moreover, both papers highlighted the
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image of the opponent as an obstructer to “peace.” For example, Assafir depicted Israel as 
a ‘cruel’ actor who is imposing a hunger siege on the Palestinians that may damage the 
peace process and who is “discussing the issue of peace with a war mentality.”3 On the 
contrary, The Jerusalem Post portrays Syria as a stubborn actor who is not willing to talk 
peace. Occasionally, Assafir would quote sources saying negative things about Syria, but 
these criticisms were rare and muted.
This mirror image o f good and evil leadership is one that defeats trust. If one party 
builds up its leadership as honorable and wise and its opponent’s leadership as weak, 
devious and immoral, all support for negotiation is gravely weakened. Any agreements 
will be seen as suspect and fragile. One’s own leaders will be constantly scrutinized and 
second-guessed. Has our leader been fooled? Is the leader a victim of guile? Does be really 
mean what he says about agreements or are his pronouncements merely strategic? On what 
level is his rhetoric to be seen as a smoke screen and on what level as honest persuasion? Is 
he speaking in code? And is the code intended for the opponent, for the nation, or for some 
powerful third party?
And what happens when the leader foils? Is it a betrayal by the enemy or is it a serious 
miscalculation by the leader? How does a press explain failure when it uses a cycle of 
dramatic swings between optimism and pessimism? Since both papers tend to promulgate an 
atmosphere of wild hopes and fears, what is the ultimate effect on the citizenry? Does the 
constant reprisal of this family romance finally do utter doubt and cynicism? Or has large 
public mood swung as a kind of discursive ritual? Leaders foil and foil from office regularly 
to be replaced by new champions and challenges. There is a Biblical expectancy of 
apocalyptic hope and fear. Thus an intense nationalism is kept alive at a time when it has 
grown weaker in the old areas o f its origin in Europe and North America-
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Moreover, as both papers cited their sources of information, they emphasized 
similar images and metaphors that cluster with peace. Both reported about a ‘fair’, 
‘comprehensive’, and ‘just' peace in the region. Both used natural terms to describe peace. 
Both talk about ‘warm’ peace and ‘cold’ peace. Both treated peace as a business deal or a 
merchandise that can only be “sold” if a good price is paid. Both papers treated peace as a 
person with a soul Failure can stick “a nail in its coffin,”4 and send the soul into ‘isolation 
and retreat.”5
Similar terms repeated themselves but were treated differently. Both papers refer to 
normalization, security, water, and land. However, while The Jerusalem Post employed 
normalization, security and water as peace clusters, Assafir used them as opposing agons 
of domination. On the other band, while Assafir associated land with peace, The Jerusalem 
Post used it as an agon of insecurity. In other words, what was used as a cluster in one 
press became an agon in the other. For example, The Jerusalem Post cited an Israeli 
official source as saying, “[Palestinians] know that for us peace without security means 
nothing,”6 while Assafir cites an Arab source as saying, “Syria wants to achieve a peace 
that ends the full occupation, and that returns the land to its owners.”7 Given the tutelary 
role o f the press, the two peoples are being schooled in opposite doxa.
In addition, as each newspaper portrays the other party as the villain, its proponent 
as the victim, it instills hatred towards the other making it impossible to accept or even to 
believe in the necessity and possibility to live peacefully with the villain.
The rhetorical framing o f the peace process in both papers creates a particular 
discourse that is specifically related to the Middle East and to peace negotiations between 
parties involved in similar conflict. The discourse of peace in these presses revealed the 
power of metaphors, images, symbols and frames in creating a cultural discourse that is
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specifically pertinent to the conflicting parties of the Middle East. It is a discourse of peace 
that is surrounded with discourse of violence, victimhood, and accusations. Such discourse 
makes it almost impossible to see any opportunity for cooperation and peaceful 
resolutions. In fact, as peace is defined in many different ways, the goals and means seem 
not only complex, but perhaps contradictory as well. And it is this form of knowledge that 
becomes the meta-text of citizen conversation and the conventionalized speech of the 
leadership in each nation.
An odd ritual dominates stories about peace. Hope and fear, promise and 
pessimism alternate with dreary regularity. The left hand takes what the right hand gives. 
Thus, most o f the reports about peace are accompanied with news about violence 
precipitated by both sides and by accusations against the other party. In other words, 
whenever both presses report optimistic news about the progress o f the peace process, it is 
followed (often in the same news story) by some negative news, which reflects a sort of 
double-minded attitude toward peace.
However, the content of peace news differs between both papers. Assafir. on one 
hand, most frequently refers to Israel’s violation of UN resolutions and to Israeli settlement 
in the occupied territories thus reflecting a lack of trust m Israel’s intention to achieve 
peace and as a result affecting the public’s confidence in Israel’s will for peace. The 
Jerusalem Post on the other hand, emphasizes Arab violence in the occupied territories as 
it reports about peace. Interrupting the positive news about peace with negative news 
indirectly reflects the papers’ deep uneasiness about peace.
Furthermore, contextualization of peace is also present in the reporting of 
accusations that were exchanged between the negotiating parties. In The Jerusalem Post. 
most o f the reports focus on Israel accusing the Arabs of obstructing peace, threatening the
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peace process, refusing compromise and being greedy. Likewise, Assafir focused on 
Arabs’ accusations of Israel and Israeli leaders “emptying the peace negotiations of its 
content,”8 and “choosing revenge as its prominent option in the peace talks.”9 In other 
words, the framing of peace in both presses appears in the middle of a war of words that is 
exchanged between the conflicting parties each accusing the other of obstructing the peace 
process, jeopardizing any chance for achieving peace, or of using peace to exploit and 
hoodwink others.
Rhetorical Implications
Although the two papers frame the issues differently, and privilege different 
clusters of words, they seem oddly similar. Both papers engage in a rhetoric o f stasis. It is 
as if opposing newspapers have decided to cooperate. In effect the two papers operate in 
tandem. For both papers each proposal of the peace process is viewed with suspicion and 
every motive o f the leadership is questioned. The result is a kind of stasis.
Thus both papers seem to cooperate in producing a deadlock. One might draw an 
analogy with social movements in the United States. The Movement to Ban Weapons and 
the National Rifle Association seem to be mirror images of each other. The God terms of 
one may be the devil terms of another. While guns represent security to many members of 
the NRA, they represent danger to members of the Gun Control Movement. Right to life 
and Freedom of Choice organizations in the abortion debates show vocabularies that 
privilege opposite words or redefine the meaning of each other’s most cherished terms. 
While such groups show rhetorical movement and change over decades, they often seem to 
interlock with each other in a rhetoric o f inaction.
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Such rhetoric becomes predictable and ritualized. It tends to eliminate the middle 
ground. In a highly charged situation, the middle position is often ridiculed by both sides 
as weak.
Finally, the rhetoric of the two papers has become so ritualized, so repetitious and 
so cliched that it seems to sabotage creativity. Readers look in vain for novelty, for fresh 
approaches, for fresh frames, and dynamic new metaphors. A kind of negative peace, a low 
level of angry stability may be the result of a steady diet of this sort of reporting.
No doubt new events will change the rhetorical situation and create new 
opportunities for negotiation. At present writing, the only change that is happening is 
rather bleak. Recent struggles over the status of holy places in Jerusalem suggests an 
Islamization or Judicization o f the sacred city has become a political objective. Struggle 
over land and resources is very difficult but struggle over symbolic resources (religion and 
historical identity) is much more fierce. This reframing of the issue of control o f Jerusalem 
makes progress toward peace immensely more difficult. Given the track record of the rival 
newspapers, one has little faith that they will rise to the occasion with careful, objective, 
and imaginative coverage of the incredibly difficult task of nation building and land 
sharing.
Major Contribution o f the Study
This dissertation revealed one unexpected finding. That is the idea that rival 
perspectives can be collaborative as well as competitive. In the first chapter, the work of 
frame theorists such as Entman of North Carolina and Kuypers at Dartmouth was cited. 
Entman is the founder of frame theory and Kuypers one of its major practitioners. Both 
scholars assume that political discourse is a struggle between agents with rival 
perspectives. Kuypers has studied the struggle between the press and the executive branch
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over the framing and control of foreign policy. Entman typically studies rival campaigns in 
which one candidate triumphs over another by imposing his or her perspective upon the 
voting public.
My study demonstrates that rival perspectives cooperate. Each advocated a 
different set o f goals. Yet both cooperated in spreading an atmosphere of fear, passivity 
and pessimism. This unexpected finding suggests greater complexity and irony in the study 
of rhetorical framing. Long ago, Kenneth Burke suggested that competition on one level 
might generate cooperation on another level, but gave only anecdotal examples. This study 
is an extended example of the ironic rhetorical event in which an apparent struggle over 
small issues operated as a cooperative venture in stasis (blockage) on another.
Suggestions for Future Study
While this study examines the construction of political perspectives in major 
newspapers serving rival communities, it might be extended in the following ways for 
future research. One might look at televised news in the two communities to determine 
whether the language and graphics of this other medium reinforces, modifies, or 
contradicts these printed sources. One might also attempt to discover the actual effects of 
the press on its readers and the relationship between the press and the government. Further, 
one might execute a content analysis o f governmental speeches to determine if the same 
patterns of framing and imagery are dominant in the discourse of politicians. One might 
also note that the predictability of the press might make it an easy target for manipulation 
by all sorts of political constituencies in the region. This could be done by a study of 
citations in underground presses of splinter groups. Finally, it would be worth knowing if 
the press covered those political figures that “framed” their discourse in a similar way or 
ignored those who articulated rival frames.
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It seems apparent that the use of framing patterns contributed less to the 
understanding of the dilemma than the patterns of imagery. In a future study, one might 
look at the role of image in the creation and maintenance of political stasis.
Perhaps another way of looking at the articles will be through Burke’s Pentad. 
Throughout the analysis, there seems to be a trend where peace was sometimes referred to 
as an agent, and other times as the agency. A reading of the articles through the Pentad 
may uncover common grounds for negotiations that framing and metaphorical analysis 
failed to unveil.
It is worth noting that the author of this study is Lebanese and thus belongs to one 
side of the conflict. Although the author tried to maintain a good level o f scientific 
objectivity in data analysis and interpretation, however, ideally, it would have been better 
if a second individual who belongs to neither sides of the conflict coded the data and 
assured a reliable and valid analysis.
In the future I hope to look at more creative and hopeful uses o f metaphor. I should 
like to study how imagery opens rather than limits options and creates fresh ways of seeing 
solutions.
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